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ABSTRACT 
In recent years the complexity of understanding the politics of committee assignment, 
has led to lively scholarly debates.  At the heart of this debate lie three theories of legislative 
committee development: the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory.  Each 
of these theories attempts to explain legislative committee assignments through one single 
legislator motivation:  legislator interest, party, or institutional interest.   
This dissertation argues that one single motivation as espoused in the distributive, 
informational, and major party cartel theory is not likely to explain all legislator committee 
assignments.  Instead, Legislators committee assignments are likely to be a reflection of 
multiple motivations, thereby calling for a combination of the distributive, informational, and 
major party cartel theory.  To address this hypothesis, this dissertation examines support for 
all three theories of legislative organization in the Louisiana House of Representatives.  
For the purposes of this dissertation, I rely on legislator membership on Louisiana’s 
sixteen standing committees during the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature.  As 
discussed in detail in this study, Louisiana’s non-compliance with proportional committee 
representation allows scholars to test the informational, distributive, and major party cartel 
theories with limited constraints. 
Second, this dissertation argues that current measurements of legislator committee 
preferences are incomplete.  To address this problem, this dissertation provides a 
comprehensive measurement of legislator committee preferences based on legislator personal 
and constituent characteristics.  This research introduces a new measurement of committee 
membership based on committee member Caucus membership.  
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With this dissertation, I find support for the informational theory over the distributive 
theory and minimal support for the major party cartel theory.  Support for the theories of 
legislative committee development is dependent upon the measurement used to explore the 
extent to which committee look like the membership of the whole chamber.  I further find 
support for each of these theories varies across time and committee.  Thereby, leading 
support for the hypothesis that legislators committee assignments are a reflection of multiple 
motivations: constituents, party, and institutional interest.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Theoretical Importance 
Since the beginning of the Republic, political analysts have expressed the importance 
of committees to the legislative process.  This importance has not only created suspicion 
among many political analysts, but is also revealed in a statement made by Woodrow Wilson 
(1885): “The House sits, not for serious discussion, but to sanction the conclusions of its 
committees as rapidly as possible. It legislates in its committee-rooms; not by the 
determination of its majorities, but by the resolutions of its specially commissioned 
minorities; so that it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on 
public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work” (Wilson 
1885, 78 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 2006, 11).  Suspicions surrounding committees, 
highlighted in Wilson’s remark, date back to the founding of the Republic.  Both Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison feared committee power would lead committees to create 
factions promoting the interest of the few (Frisch and Kelly 2006).  
This fear is still very much alive in today’s powerful committee system.  All bills 
introduced in the legislature must first pass through committees, where they are fully 
scrutinized and then reported with recommendations to non- members concerning the merits 
of the bill.  For the most part, legislation passed by committees is rarely overturned on the 
House floor (Hall 1996).  
The centrality of committees as well as their influence on the passage of legislative 
policy has led to a proliferation of committee research among scholars.  Most of this research 
has centered on committee assignments.  The importance of committee assignments to the 
passage of policies is noted in Frisch and Kelly’s comment, “who is sitting in the committee 
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room when public policy is made is perhaps more important than the votes taken on the floor 
to pass the legislation” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 12).  The suspicions of Thomas Jefferson, 
Woodrow Wilson, and James Madison are brought to fruition with the distributive theory. 
Earliest theories of committee assignments begin with the distributive theory, which 
was first introduced by Niskanen.  Under this theory, legislators with the highest level of 
demand for services are granted membership onto committees providing them with the 
greatest chance of achieving benefits for their district (Krehbiel 1990).  For instance, 
according to the distributive theory, legislators representing agriculture districts are granted 
membership onto the agriculture committee.  The implications of this theory for 
representative policies are daunting.  Arguably, if the distributive theory holds true then 
legislators on committees will represent policies beneficial to their constituents at the 
expense of the whole state.  
The distributional theory first came under attack in the 1990s, beginning with 
Krehbiel’s book, “Information and Legislative Organization,” where he lays out his 
informational theory of congressional organization. Krehbiel, a noted researcher in 
committee assignment, finds legislators are not granted committee assignments based on the 
needs of their district; instead they mirror the characteristics of the legislature as a whole, 
which is a major deficiency of the distributive theory.  Contrary to the implications of the 
distributive theory for representative policies, if the informational theory holds true then 
legislators on committees will produce policies beneficial to the whole state and not a select 
few.  
Conversely, Cox and McCubbins (1993) later contribute to the debate over committee 
assignment, claiming the major tenets of the distributive and informational theory are 
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unacceptable.  Researching the distributive and informational theory, Cox and McCubbins 
argue legislators are placed onto committees to represent the interest of the majority party. 
Committee membership is not determined by the legislative institution or individual 
legislators, but by the legislative majority.  The impact of this theory on legislative policy is 
the creation of policies beneficial to the majority at the expense of the few.  
In recent years the complexity behind understanding the politics of committee 
assignment has led to lively scholarly debates.  At the heart of this debate lie three different 
theories of legislative committee development: the distributive, informational, and major 
party cartel theory.  Each of these theories seeks to explain legislative committee assignments 
through one single legislator motivation: legislator interest, party, or institutional interest.  
This dissertation argues one single motivation as espoused in the distributive, informational, 
or major party cartel theory is not likely to explain all legislator committee assignments. 
Instead, legislators’ committee assignments are likely to be a reflection of multiple 
motivations, thereby calling for a combination of the distributive, informational, and major 
party cartel theory.  
To test this proposal, I create a model of legislator committee assignments.  In this 
model, relying on data obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees, I 
test the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory by determining whether 
legislators seek committee assignments based on the single motivation of their constituents, 
party, or institution.  Individual legislator characteristic measures are chosen based on the 
prior measurements used in legislative committee assignment literature: legislator ideology, 
interest group scores, political party affiliation, district characteristics, and occupation.  
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Furthermore, a new legislator characteristic measurement is introduced based on legislator 
caucus membership.  
In this dissertation, I provide support for my hypothesis.  Finding, that legislator 
committee assignments do not reflect one isolated individual legislator characteristics as 
proposed by the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory instead legislator 
committee assignments are a product of multiple-motivations.  All Louisiana committee 
membership assignments are not representative of individual legislator interest, party interest, 
or the interest of the legislature.  Instead, Louisiana committee assignments are a reflection of 
both individual legislature interest and the interest of the whole legislature.   
1.2 Chapter Overview 
  In Chapter 2, I provide a theoretical foundation for my analysis, state my hypothesis, 
and provide an overall literature review.  While in Chapter 3, I lay out data and model 
specifications.  Furthermore, in Chapter 4, I explain my analysis and findings.  Additionally, 
in Chapter 5, I conduct legislative interviews with 2012 Louisiana House representatives, as 
well as, one former legislator in order to develop a deeper understanding of the Louisiana 
committee assignment process through the eyes of legislators themselves.  Lastly, in Chapter 
6, I conclude with an overview of my findings, limitations of my analysis, and avenues for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theoretical Effect of Committee Composition 
 The widely accepted influential role legislative committee assignments play in the 
passage of legislative policies is undeniable.  As stated earlier by Frisch and Kelly, ““who is 
sitting in the committee room when public policy is made is perhaps more important than the 
votes taken on the floor to pass the legislation” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 12).  
Having said this, our empirical understanding of “who is sitting in these rooms” is 
less clear.  Currently, three theories dominate our understanding of the legislative committee 
assignment process: the distributive, informational, and major party cartel.  Each of these 
models offers a different theoretical and legislator motivation behind the legislative 
assignment process, as well as its potential impact on legislative policy.  Naturally, in order 
to understand the committee assignment process through the eyes of these theories one must 
first understand the theoretical environment in which each theory emerges.  
Importantly, the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory all differ on 
why committees exist, the role committees’ play, who committees are responsible too, the 
theoretical and legislator motivation behind the legislative assignment process, as well as the 
potential consequences of committee membership on legislative policy.  
2.1.1 Distributive Theory 
Chronologically speaking, the distributive theory precedes both the informational and 
major party cartel theories in its theoretical development, with elements dating back to the 
19
th
 century writings of Wilson (1885) and McConachie (1898).  These early scholars cite the 
committee’s independence and its powerful policy making roles in the legislative process 
(Maltzman 1997), each is a major tenet of the distributive theory. Since this philosophy’s 
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inception, the distributive model predominates the view of legislative committee 
organization, until it is challenged by the formalization of the informational theory in the 
1990’s with Krehbiel’s influential work, Information and Legislative Organization. 
Under the distributive theory, congressional committees exist in a majoritarian 
institution composed of legislators seeking their own self- interest.  Put eloquently by 
Groseclose and King (2000), “Congress is like a collection of minority interests trying to 
divide up a pie.”  Each minority is composed of legislators seeking their own self-interest, 
who want as large of a specific piece of pie as possible in order to secure benefits for their 
districts and increase their chances for reelection.  Importantly, the piece of pie each 
legislator desires differs depending on the needs and aspirations of that legislator.  For 
example, a group of legislators representing a district primarily agricultural in nature will 
seek an agricultural slice, while another group may seek an urban slice (Groseclose and King 
2000). 
In order for legislators to achieve their benefits by passing policies favorable to 
themselves, in a majoritarian institution, they must first form a majority.  In order to achieve 
this aim, legislators engage in logrolling: forming a coalition, or voting block, with 
legislators seeking a different slice of the pie.  However, since representatives are looking out 
for their own best interest, once these interests are obtained Groseclose and King (2000) 
reported a potential for legislators to renege on their agreement with each other.  
Arguably, this is where committees come into play.  Committees are created to 
combat the problem of logrolling by facilitating trade and allowing legislators to provide 
distributive benefits to their district while dispersing the costs to the whole legislature 
(Groseclose and King 2000).  I order for committees to meet their intended goals, committees 
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are granted several important rights, such as gatekeeping.  In the committee system before 
bills are presented to the whole legislature for passage, all bills are reported to committees 
with jurisdiction over them.  Under gatekeeping powers, committee members can refuse to 
report a bill out of committee for a vote by the whole legislature (Maltzman 1997), in turn 
killing the bill.  
Under the distributive theory, committees are autonomous creatures, independent of 
control from the parent legislature, subservient to the needs of legislators.  Moreover, the 
distributive theory legislators self-select onto committees that provide them with the greatest 
chance of achieving benefits for their district (Krehbiel 1990).  Consequently, as Weingast 
and Moran (1983) note committees are stacked with members representing similar concerns 
to each other and different interests then the whole legislature.  For instance, a legislator 
representing a district that is majority agriculture in nature will self-select onto the 
agriculture committee.  Members from urban districts will self-select on committees with 
jurisdiction over areas like banking, urban and welfare, to provide the most benefits they can 
to their inner-city constituents (Krehbiel 1990).  Based on this idea of self-selection, one can 
assume that policies resonating from these committees will be antithetical to the interest of 
the legislature as a whole. 
Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the distributive theory suffers from several 
key weaknesses: the idea of self-selection; a strong committee autonomy; and the stacking of 
committees with members representing similar interest based in part on constituent 
characteristics.  Once again, the distributive theory is grounded in the premise that all 
committees are autonomous and assignments are based on legislative self-selection, thereby 
allowing committees to be stacked according to the interest of the party.  Under the 
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distributive theory, committees and their assignments are independent of influence by the 
parent chamber or other outside forces, such as party.  Instead, committee assignments are 
based on a pure self-selection basis, whereby legislators themselves choose the committee 
assignments they desire.  These wishes may reflect constituent concerns, which might aid 
legislators in their reelection bids.  However, in 1993 Cox and McCubbins followed by 
Frisch and Kelly in 2006 all note that the idea of pure committee autonomy and self-selection 
have not held up with the facts.  
 In reality, statistical evidence shows the number of committees that are stacked with 
members representing specific constituencies or ideologies are far more limited that the 
literature pronounces (Cox and McCubbins 1993), thereby allowing the possibility that other 
forces such as the party impact the legislative committee assignment process.  A finding 
further substantiated by Frisch and Kelly’s (2006) results indicating that, “only about 50 
percent of members are assigned to their preferred committee” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 22).  
Finally, research on the distributive theory has been primarily relegated to Congress, 
although limited research exists at the state house level and research at the senate level has 
largely been neglected (Eualu 1984).  Notably, the bulk of research has offered little support 
in favor of the distributive theory at the congressional level (Krehbiel 1991).  Further noting 
the lack of empirical support for the distributive theory, in his 1991 book, Information and 
Legislative Organization, Krehbiel clearly expresses empirical limitations of the distributive 
theory stating:  
As a former subscriber to the orthodox distributive view of legislatures but an 
increasing skeptic regarding its fit with a similarly impressive body of 
empirical research, I regard it as important in this book to confront the 
distributive-theoretic predictions pertaining to legislative organizations head-
on. Intuitiveness may be a nice property of theories, and surely it deters 
challenges from skeptics. However, positive social science is not primarily 
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about the intuitiveness of theoretical arguments; it is about derivation and 
assessment of refutable hypotheses. The appropriate standards in this context 
are standards of evidence rather than intuitiveness, and while distributive 
theories are strong on intuitiveness, they have proven here to be rather weak in 
terms of evidence. Theory says: committees are composed of heterogeneous 
high-demanders. Evidence says: probably not true. Theory says: special rules 
are adopted mainly to facilitate gains from trade.  Evidence says: false. Theory 
says: legislatures commit to restrictive postfloor procedures to enhance 
distributive committee power and cross-committee logrolling. Evidence says: 
false again (Krehbiel 1991, 247-248). 
Within this citation, Krehbiel refers to the mounting growth of empirical evidence against 
support for the distributive theory tenet that committees are composed of heterogeneous 
members representing different views from those of the whole legislature.  Moreover, 
support for special rules and restrictive postfloor procedures to aid the distributive nature of 
committees is lacking.   
Taking these weaknesses into account, both observational and empirical studies  
(Wilson 1885; Goodwin 1970; Fenno 1973; Shepsle and Weingast 1984) have noted support 
for the distributive theory (Maltzman 1997).  Historically speaking, evidence in favor of the 
major tenets of the distributive theory: committee autonomy, committee policy domination, 
legislator committee self-selection, are cited in the early observational works of Wilson 
(1885).  While observing congressional committees, Wilson notes the seemingly autonomous 
nature of committees dictating public policy to the majority (Maltzman 1997).  This 
observation is further noted in Goodwin’s (1970) study, where he notes evidence that the 
approval of committee decisions by the whole chamber is primarily a formality (Maltzman 
1997).  
Speaking indirectly towards the distributive theories idea of the non-representative 
nature of committees, Marvick’s 1950 study in reference to the Agriculture, Interior, and 
Merchant Marine Committee revealed:   
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that committees of Congress vary in their representative character, some being 
fairly representative of the House or Senate, while others being dominated by 
members from particular regions or economic interests….Congressmen 
naturally seek assignment to committees having jurisdiction over matters of 
major concern to their districts and states (Marvick 1950, 281 as cited in 
Eualu1984, 588).  
Picking up on these historical observations, research in the 1970’s through the 1990’s 
also notes the accommodation of legislative committee assignments.  Notably, legislative 
research at the state and congressional level abounds on the importance of committee 
assignments to individual legislators and the willingness of legislative leaders to 
accommodate these requests (Westefield 1974: Shepsle 1978; Bullock 1985; Francis 1986, 
Hamm 1987; Hedlund 1989).  In Bullock (1985, 791) also expresses this view citing “in 
recent years, House Democrats have strived to honor the requests made by its members” 
(Achen and Stolarek 1974; Shepsle 1978).   
Possibly, one could argue, support for the distributive theory moved away from its 
dependence on historical observations to empirical support in the latter half of the twentieth 
century.  The formalization of the theory, began with scholars empirically exploring the 
theoretical tenets of committee autonomy, policy domination, and legislator committee 
assignments in such works as Sheplse 1978; Weingast and Marshall 1988; Alder and 
Lapinski 1997; Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode 2001; and Battista and Richman 2011.  In these 
scholarly works, researchers turn their focus to empirically determining the reasons behind 
individual legislator committee requests, and whether committee members preferences differ 
from the preferences of the whole chambers, by comparing the characteristics of individuals 
(such as constituent, ideology, interest group scores) residing on committees to the 
characteristics of the whole legislature, through a difference of mean or median test.  If, as 
the distributive theory predicts, committees are stacked with individual legislators 
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representing specific interests, then these committees would represent characteristics 
unrepresentative of the characteristics of the whole legislature.  Therein providing support for 
the self-selection hypothesis.  Support for the distributive theory is illustrated in part in four 
major works of congressional studies: Shepsle (1978); Weingast and Marshall (1988); Adler 
and Lapinski (1997); and Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode (2001).  
In his 1978 study, titled “Giant Jigsaw Puzzle,” Shepsle empirically evaluates the 
notion that legislative leaders accommodate legislator committee requests made in part by 
their constituent characteristics, through what he terms the “interest-advocacy-
accommodation syndrome.”  Under this notion, legislators divulge their policy and their 
constituent interest to legislative leaders responsible for committee assignments in order to 
obtain the desired committee assignments.  Further, leaders want to accommodate these 
requests in order to build strong working coalitions (Hedlund 1989).  In his 1989 article 
Hedlund cites Shepsle as stating:  
At every stage in the committee assignment process, then…there is an effort 
to fit the pieces of the giant jigsaw puzzle together in a responsive fashion. 
The matching of assignments to requests, constrained only by scarcity, is both 
a guiding principle and an accurate description of the committee assignment 
process (Shepsle 1978, 238 as cited in Hedlund 1989, 599). 
 Building support for this notion and in turn for the distributive theory, Shepsle finds 
congressional freshmen in the 86
th
 through 93
rd
 Congress make committee requests and are 
granted these requests in part based on their constituency’s geographic characteristics. 
Specifically, they report 83 percent of freshmen House Democrats receiving their committee 
preference, with 59 percent receiving assignments to top committees (Bullock III 1985). 
Following Shepsle’s empirical lead, scholars such as Weingast and Marshall (1988); Adler 
and Lapinski (1997); Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode (2001); and Battista and Richman (2011) 
formalize the distributive theory by conducting empirical tests on the self-selection 
 12 
 
hypothesis and the idea that committees are stacked with members representing specific 
interests.  
 Weingast and Marshall (1988) find additionally support for the distributive theory by 
exploring the extent to which legislators self-select onto committees to achieve benefits for 
their constituents.  Finding committees in the 1978 U.S. House legislature are composed of 
legislators strongly supporting policies found under individual committee jurisdictions 
(Sandahl 2005).  
In 1988, Weingast and Marshall begin their study by laying out a theory of legislative 
institutions similar to firm and contractual institutions.  Extending the basic principles of the 
theory of firm such as the costs associated with trade and how these costs can be reduced, 
Weingast and Marshall propose three assumptions.  First, legislators are accountable their 
constituents.  If they pass legislation that is not in the best interest of their constituents, they 
could face retaliation at the polls in their next election.  Keeping this thought in mind, 
legislators seek to pass legislation that is “politically relevant” to their constituents. 
According to Weingast and Marshall (1988), politically relevant legislation is any legislation 
of extreme interest to a section of constituents in these legislators district (Sandahl 2005). 
Moreover, political parties are no longer able to disperse benefits to legislators who 
tow the party line or promise legislators positions of power in the legislature, rendering 
parties useless in constraining legislator’s behavior.  Furthermore, the authors argue 
legislators are unable to pass legislation themselves.  They rely on other colleagues to help 
them pass policies that are important to their constituents.  One way lawmakers entice each 
other to support their bills is through logrolling, or vote trading. Legislators can always 
withdraw their support (Sandahl 2005).   
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Additionally, the authors argue the legislative committee system is defined by the 
following three conditions: jurisdictional system, seniority system, and bidding mechanism 
for committee seats.  Under the jurisdictional system of committees, bills can only be heard 
or altered by committees that have sole rights over that bill’s specific policy area.  On the 
other hand, seniority system prevents legislators from being removed from their committee 
seats or passed over for chairmanship of a committee if they are next in line.  Lastly, 
legislators seek to increase their chances of reelection by self-selecting onto committees that 
represent their constituents’ interest. Weingast and Marshall term the process by which 
vacant committee seats are assigned to legislators, the bidding mechanism (Sandahl 2005).  
Furthermore, as noted by Sandahl (2005), “Weingast and Marshall test their model of 
legislative organization by stating the following three propositions: “the assignment process 
operates as a self-selection mechanism, committees are not representative of the entire 
legislature but are composed of ‘preference outliers,’ or those who value the position most 
lightly, and that committee members receive the disproportionate share of the benefits from 
programs within their jurisdiction” (Sandahl 2005, 7).   
Using interest group ratings and committee assignments, Weingast and Marshall 
(1988) hypothesize committees will contain members who seek the most benefits for them, 
on the following committees: Armed Services: International Relations: International 
Relations - International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee: Interstate Commerce - 
Consumer Protection and Finance Subcommittee: Education and Labor - Economic 
Opportunity Subcommittee, and Environmental subcommittees.  In accordance with their 
hypothesis, Weingast and Marshall find defense, foreign aid, consumer protection, labor, and 
environment committees all contain committee members who are highly interested in 
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policies enacted under these committees.  The researchers help to show that legislators 
choose committees that will benefits their constituents by seeking membership onto 
committees with jurisdiction over specific policy areas (Sandahl 2005).  
In 1997, Adler and Lapinski go one step farther then Shepsle (1978). Using 
constituency characteristics to determine whether legislators disproportionally seek 
membership onto House Congressional committees during the period of 1943-1994, the 
authors create a measurement of need based on legislator economic, social, and geographic 
district characteristics.  This measurement is rooted in the gains from exchange theory. 
According to this theory, congressional committees contain legislators who represent 
congressional districts with a high demand for the policy benefits enacted under that 
committee (Adler and Lapinski 1997).  In accordance with the distributive theory, Adler and 
Lapinksi find most legislators seek membership onto committees that provide constituent 
benefits to their districts.  
In addition to Adler and Lapinski’s (1997) study, Hurwitz, Moiles and Rhode (2001) 
provide additional support for the distributive theory.  Finding the Agriculture and the 
Agriculture and Rural Development Subcommittee of the Appropriation Committee are 
overrepresented by members representing farming and rural districts.  On the Agriculture 
committee three-fourths of its members represent district with high farm employment. Two-
thirds of the members on the Agriculture Committee represent districts with a high rural 
population.  
Furthermore, Battista and Richman (2011) argue limited support found for the 
distributive theory in state legislature is dependent in part upon the statistical methods used to 
determined legislator preferences.  Unlike in Congress, the authors note unrepresentative 
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state committees are often identified through the use of common measurements of ideology 
such as NOMINATE scores or the Natonal Federation of Independent Business Scores 
(Overby and Kazee 2000; Overby, Kazee, and Prince 2004; Prince and Overby 2005). 
Claiming these scores could possibly underrepresent the likelihood of finding committees 
holding high jurisdiction-specific preferences (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Sprague 2008; 
Fortunato 2009; Hall and Grofman 1990; Synder 1992), the authors rely on measurements of 
legislator preferences, based on a measurement of need and legislator responses to the Project 
Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test (NPAT).  Responses from the NPAT test are 
used to measure the spending and voting preferences of legislatures.  The test found that 
some state committees are over-represented by members representing high need districts and 
high-spending members.  
2.1.2 Informational Theory   
Balking against the conventional wisdom of the distributive theory of congressional 
committees dominating throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s (Krehbiel 1991), in the 1980’s 
scholars such as Maass (1983), Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989, 1990) bring the central 
tenets of the informational theory to the forefront of twentieth-century congressional 
committee studies.  Turning away from the traditional viewpoint of committees as 
autonomous creatures acting in the best interest of their members at the expense of the whole, 
the informational theory offers a much more optimistic view of committees (Groseclose and 
King 2000).  
 Under the informational theory committees are subservient to the wishes of the 
whole chamber, existing chiefly to provide information and specialization to the legislature 
regarding the outcomes of considered policies.  Legislators are enticed to promote this type 
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of committee system because by knowing the potential outcomes of policies lawmakers 
implement, legislators can better ensure that they themselves act in accordance with the 
wishes of their constituents.  A tenet further expanded by Frisch and Kelly (2006), who note 
by understanding policy ramifications, legislators are more apt to pass policies supported by 
voters, therein strengthening their reelection efforts.  Placing members onto committees with 
dissimilar viewpoints to each other, but similar viewpoints to the interests of the whole 
legislature ensures: the subservient nature of committees; the submission of complete 
information about the bills to the legislature as a whole; and promoting policies in line with 
the wishes of the whole chamber (Maltzman 1997).  
Importantly, the informational theory recognizes the incentive of legislators to 
promote their constituent wishes over those of the whole legislature, Maass (1983) according 
to Maltzman (1997) notes: “committees tend inevitably to challenge the whole House for 
control of the legislature’s business…Committee may…become master rather than servant of 
the House” (Maass 1983, 42 as cited in Maltzman 1997, 15).  In order to circumvent this 
problem the legislature has several tools at its disposal, but the two that get most attention are 
committee appointment power and legislative rules.  
Specifically speaking, to promote policies beneficial to the whole legislature, as well, 
as provide credible information concerning these policies, the chamber appoints member on 
to committees who represent the views of the whole legislature.  Krehbiel (1991) notes:  
Other things being equal, heterogeneous committees enhance informational 
efficiency without distributional losses. The key concept is confirmatory 
signaling. If a committee is composed of policy specialists whose preferred 
outcomes bookend the preferred outcome of the legislature’s median voter, 
opportunities for credible transmission of private information are enhance 
(Krehbiel 1991, 96). 
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Specifically speaking, when committees represent similar viewpoints to the whole 
legislature, committees have no reason not to promote policies which are in line with the 
floor or which will provide full and competent information about a bill to the floor 
(Groseclose and King 2000).   
Second, the legislature creates tools, such as legislative rules, to ensure committees 
promote policies in line with the wishes of the whole legislature.  Notably, the legislature 
retains the right to amend legislation reported out of committees in order to shape it to fit the 
floor’s median viewpoint (Groseclose and King 2000).  Moreover, each bill emerging from 
committees must be voted on by the whole chamber.  Therefore, the chamber will review 
over bills and prevent the enactment of bills not in line with its wishes.  Additional tools the 
legislature holds include: discharge process, suspension of the rules, and special rules for 
floor consideration.  Furthermore, the legislative institution can entice committees to promote 
policies beneficial to the whole by restricting committee jurisdiction and by reducing 
committee staff (Maltzman 1997).  
Consequently, several scholars (Maltzman 1997; Frisch and Kelly 2006) note 
important weaknesses in the theoretical tenets of the informational theory.  One major 
weaknesses of the informational theory is that for it to work in an ideal situation the 
legislative chamber needs complete information on the motives and policy preferences of 
legislators.  However, in reality then information is not available (Maltzman 1997).  For 
instance, legislators may misrepresent their ideology in order to receive prestigious 
committee assignments or leadership positions on committees.  One example of changes in 
legislator ideology, is party switching resulting from shifts in constituent ideologies, in the 
hopes of achieving reelection.  Furthermore, under the informational theory, once the true 
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preferences of legislators are revealed they are not often removed from the committee 
assignment process because of the need for committee specialization.  The constant removal 
of legislators reduces the effectiveness of the chamber to receive informed policy positions 
form the committee (Maltzman 1997).  Another limitation of this theory is the broad policy 
jurisdiction of committees and the ability to place legislators onto committees that represent 
the median view of the whole legislative chamber in regards to every policy the committee 
entertains (Maltzman 1997).  
 Additionally, for the informational theory to hold true, under the basis of the 
majoritarian principle, if committees were composed of members unrepresentative of the 
whole legislature then the legislature will reject the committee’s membership.  Frisch and 
Kelly go on to say that the merit of this assumption is debatable.  Initial, committee 
membership is chosen by committee on committees not by the whole legislature.  
Committees on Committees are composed of a small number of both Democrat and 
Republican legislators.  To date, committee membership created by these committees have 
never been seriously challenged by the party caucus.  Second, the floor routinely accepts 
committee assignments presented to them by the party caucus according to Frisch and Kelly 
(2006).  
Taking these potential problems into account, today’s scholarly research lends 
overwhelming support to the informational theory (Battista 2004; Krehbiel 1991; Overby and 
Kazee 2000; Sandahl 2005) over any other theory of committee organization. This support is 
rooted, as Maltzman 1997 notes, in both traditional (Fenno 1966; Robinson 1963; Cooper 
1970; Galloway 1976; Alexander 1916) and formal scholarly works (Maass 1983; Gilligan 
and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990).  
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While many scholars agree over the subservient role of committees to the preferences 
of the whole chamber during the modern congresses, this view of committees, as Maltzman 
1997 cites, was also noted in the early Federalist and Jefferson periods. Galloway (1976) 
asserts:  
During the Federalist and Jefferson periods, it was the general practice of the 
House of Representatives to refer legislative subjects to a committee of the 
whole in order to develop the main principles of legislation, and then to 
commit such matters to select committees to draft specific bills…..the 
committees were regarded as agents of the House which kept control over 
them by giving specific instructions as to their authority and duties (Galloway 
1976, 84-85 as cited in Maltzman 1997, 14). 
A second tenet of the informational theory, observed in the early Jeffersonian 
Congresses, and espoused by Polsby (1968) is the creation of committees to promote 
institutional maintenance, or to serve the needs of the whole legislative institution, by 
creating a formalized division of labor to address the growing legislative agenda, thereby 
providing specialized and essential information to the body.  Observing the early  
Jeffersonian Congresses, Cooper (1970),  notes during the years of the early congress,  the 
institution created the committee system as a means to “process the information necessary to 
address its agenda” ( Cooper 1970, 49-50 as cited in Maltzman 1997, 20).  
 Rooted in empirical support at both congressional (Maas 1983; Krehbiel 1991) and 
state levels (Overby and Kazee 2000), the informational theory has moved to the forefront as 
the predominate theory of legislative committee organization.  This is in part because of the 
influential works of the following scholars: Krehbiel (1991); Overby and Kazee (2000); 
Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004).  
 In 1991, Krehbiel provides support for the informational theory in the 96-99
th
 
Congress in the United States of Representatives and the 99
th
 Senate Congress.  Arguing, if 
the distributive theory holds true then legislators ranking high on political interest group 
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scores will seek membership onto committees representing policies reflected in those scores.  
Using several interest group scores to test his hypothesis as well as conducting a difference 
of mean and median test to compare the policy positions of committee members to the policy 
positions of the whole House, Krehbiel (1991) finds most legislators do not disproportionally 
seek membership onto committees based on their interest (Sandahl 2005).  
Specifically, using the Americans for Democratic Action interest group scores in the 
99
th
 Congressional House, Krehbiel (1991) finds some committees do hold policy positions 
unrepresentative of the policy positions of the whole.  These committees include: Foreign 
Affairs, Education and Labor, Post Office and Civil Service, Armed Services, and District of 
Columbia. Leaving Krehbiel to argue there is a place for both the distributive and 
informational theory in explaining the role of committees in the legislative process (Sandahl 
2005).  
  Following Krehbiel’s (1991) lead, Overby and Kazee (2000) find substantial support 
for the informational theory and minimal support for the major party cartel theory in twelve 
state houses: Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, 
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington.  Seeking to determine 
whether committee members on control committee are less likely than non-control 
committees to contain views unrepresentative of the views of the whole state house, Overby 
and Kazee use survey’s, roll call votes, modified roll call votes, and constituent 
characteristics to measure legislator ideology (Sandahl 2005).  For the purposes of their 
research, these two scholars define control committee as the most powerful committees in 
each state legislature (Overby and Kazee 2000).  Comparing the mean ideology scores of 
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control and non-control committee members to the mean ideology scores of the whole house, 
the authors find overwhelming support in favor of the informational theory (Sandahl 2005).  
In addition, it appears, for the most part, committee members do not represent views 
unrepresentative of the views of the whole house in any of the twelve state houses analyzed. 
This finding holds true regardless of whether legislators are members of control or non-
control committees.  For example, using the 1992 Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry, pro-business group scores, ranking legislators by their support on bills supported by 
the LABI, Overby and Kazee (2000) find Louisiana legislators do not represent views 
unrepresentative of the views of the whole state legislature on Louisiana’s two only control 
committees: the Ways and Means and Appropriations.  This finding holds true on the rest of 
Louisiana’s committees, with the exception of three committees.   
So, building on Overby and Kazee’s 2000 study, Overby, Kazee, and Prince (2004), 
find additional support for the informational theory in forty-five state legislatures.  Using the 
same statistical techniques as Overby and Kazee (2000), the authors find overwhelming 
support, in all states, that legislators do not disproportionally seek membership onto control 
or non-control committees based on interest group scores.  For the most part, committees not 
representative of the views of the whole are rare in state legislatures.  
In 2011, Hamm, Hedlund, and Post use legislator occupation to determine whether 
U.S. state legislatures take advantage of the individual expertise of their members, as 
expressed through the informational theory, under which as noted by Gilligan and Krehbiel’s 
(1987), and Krehbiel (1991), “legislative bodies use the experiences of their members to 
enhance specialization and expertise development through committees” (Hamm, Hedlund, 
and Post 2011, 305).  If the informational theory holds true, Hamm, Hedlund and Post (2011) 
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expect committees to be overrepresented by legislators holding occupations directly related 
to the jurisdiction of each standing committee.  For example, the judiciary committee will be 
overrepresented by members with previous or current occupations in law.    
Hamm, Hedlund, and Post (2011) test the specialization tenet of the informational 
theory for the years 1909-1989 across five committees (Agriculture, Education, Insurance, 
Judiciary, and Labor) in five states (Michigan, Oregon, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and 
Wisconsin).  Finding as a whole, committees are overrepresented by members possessing 
specific occupations related to the jurisdiction of each committee.  Specifically, the authors 
find substantial support for the informational theory in the Judiciary and Agriculture and 
weaker but still strong support in the Education, Labor, and Insurance committees.  
Additionally, overall support for the informational theory varies across state, time, and 
committee.  
2.1.3 Major Party Cartel Theory  
Based on the conventional wisdom of the weakening role of parties in their ability to 
influence legislators both the informational and distributive theories relegate the function of 
“party” as obsolete in  the legislative committee system.  This information is documented in 
the works of Shepsle (1979), Weingast and Marshall (1988), and Gilligan and Krehbiel 
(1987) where the role of party is simply not mentioned or assumed away (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993).  However, in 1993 Cox and McCubbins, develop and test a third 
competing legislative committee organization theory, the major party cartel.  Arguing the 
absence of the worth of the party in informational and distributive theories is not reality, that 
in fact,  they suggest, committees are not autonomous as assumed by the informational 
theory, but are indeed controlled by the legislative majority party (Cox and McCubbins 
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1993),  and the rights of the minority party are significantly excluded (Groseclose and King 
2000).  
 Laying out the major tenets of the major party cartel theory, in their 1993 book, 
Legislative Leviathan, Cox and McCubbins state: 
Our view is that parties in the House-especially the majority party-are species 
of ‘legislative cartel.’ These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in 
the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. 
Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. Fist, 
the legislative process in general-and the committee system in particular-is 
stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because members of the 
majority party have all the structural advantages, the key players in most 
legislative deals are members of the majority party, and the majority party’s 
central agreements are facilitated by cartel rule and policed by the cartel’s 
leadership (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2). 
Comparatively speaking, the vision Cox and McCubbins espouses relating to the majority 
party and its role in legislative committees, stands in direct opposition to the distributive and 
informational theories.  Unlike the distributive theory under which committees are created to 
promote the interests of the individual legislators, or the informational theory where 
committees are formed to serve the institutional needs of the legislative body, according to 
the major party cartel theory, committees are created to pursue the interests of the majority 
party.  
Notably, in order to achieve this purpose, under the major party cartel theory, the 
majority party controls legislator committee assignments, by stacking members onto 
committees that either reflect the median view of their party as a whole, or are more extreme 
than their party (Maltzman 1997).  To avoid bipartisan coalitions which might pursue 
interests contrary to the party’s wishes, legislative leaders stack their members (Maltzman 
1997).   
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With this in mind, Cox and McCubbins (1993) and Aldrich and Rhode (2000) all 
provide support for the premise that legislators are disproportionally placed onto committees 
based on their adherence to the median view of the majority party.  Using legislator based 
ADA interest group scores along with Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores (to measure 
ideology) to test for unrepresentative committees in the 87
th
 through 97
th
 U.S. House, Cox 
and McCubbins (1993) examine the following committees: Agriculture, Appropriations, 
Armed Services, Banking, Commerce, District of Columbia, Education and Labor, Foreign 
Affairs, Government Operations, House Administration, Interior, Judiciary, Merchant 
Marine, Post Office, Public Works, Rules, Science, Veterans, and Ways and Means (Sandahl 
2005).   
For the most part, Cox and McCubbins (1993) find Democrat and Republican 
committee members hold views representative of their party and unrepresentative of 
Congress as a whole. Republicans hold views similar to their party except on the Rules, 
Commerce, and Government Relations committees in three of eleven Congresses.  In seven 
of the eleven Congresses, Republican committee members on the Ways and Means as well as 
on the Public Works committees represent views more conservative than their whole party 
(Cox and McCubbins 1993).  Similarly, Cox and McCubbins (1993) find the same results 
using Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores and difference of medians test for the 80
th
 to 
the 100
th
 Congresses (Sandahl 2005).   
Following Cox and McCubbins lead, Aldrich and Rhode (2000) extend the major 
party cartel theory to the U.S. Appropriations Committee.  Under this study, Aldrich and 
Rhode find Republican committee members on the U.S. Appropriations committee are 
influenced by the Republican majority leader (Sandahl 2005).  Granted these findings under 
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the cartel theory, not all committees are of equal importance to the majority party.   For 
instance, committees with narrow jurisdictions (ex. Agriculture Committee, Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs) do not represent issues that will adversely affect the whole party, 
but only small defined districts. Because of their limited impact, under the major party cartel 
theory the majority party in an effort to win as many seats as possible for its members, will 
often allow legislators to self-select onto these committees (Cox and McCubbins 1993).   
In contrast, committees with broader important jurisdictions (example 
Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Public Works 
and Transpiration), affecting national policy interests, membership will reflect the views of 
the entire party (Cox and McCubbins 1993).  For the simple reason that these committees 
allow the majority party the greatest amount of influence over committees representing 
jurisdiction over Congress’ broad policy agenda (Frisch and Kelly 2006).  As a result, the 
majority party leadership will place party loyalist and members who represent the views of 
the whole party onto these committees (Frisch and Kelly 2006). 
A premise noted by Cox and McCubbins, and substantiated through legislator 
interviews (Masters 1961; Manley 1970; Hinckley 1983), and empirical evidence (Rhode 
1991; Maltzman and Smith 1994).  Collaborating the effects of party loyalty and narrow 
versus broad committees’ jurisdiction on legislator committee assignments can be seen in 
Hinckley’s (1983), comment: “On the committees the leadership considers most critical, 
party loyalty is an important assignment criterion …” (Hinckley  1983, 149 as cited in Cox 
and McCubbins 1993, 165). Manley (1970) further notes, “… the jurisdiction of the Ways 
and Means, then, is enough to generate leadership concern about who is recruited to the 
committee...” (Manley 1970, 24 as cited in Cox and McCubbins 1993, 164).  Masters (1961) 
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additionally finds in the postwar House, those legislator committees appointments to 
exclusive committees were assigned differently than those on non-exclusive committees, 
suggesting a need for the party leader’s stamp of approval (Cox and McCubbins 1993).  
Empirically speaking, both Cox and McCubbins (1993) and Maltzman (1997) reveal 
that committee jurisdiction affects whether committees are indeed representative or not 
representative of the views of the whole party.  Specifically, using Americans for Democratic 
Action interest group scores and Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores while conducting 
either a difference of mean test or median test, Cox and McCubbins show that committees 
with broader jurisdictions are more likely to composed of members representing the views of 
the whole party, then committee representing narrow jurisdictions (Cox and McCubbins 
1993).  
In their, 1994 study Maltzman and Smith reveal that committee jurisdiction over 
salient or non-salient issues does affect whether committees are stacked according to the 
median ideological view of the majority party, or support for the major party cartel theory. 
The authors expect to find committee members on committees representing salient issues are 
more likely to represent the views of the party then members on committees representing 
non-salient issues.  Using roll call votes obtained from “contested amendments from the 94th, 
96
th
, 98
th
, and 100
th
 Congress,” the authors test their hypothesis in the U.S. Agriculture, 
Appropriations and Energy and Commerce committees.  The Agricultural, Appropriations, 
and Energy and Commerce committees are chosen based on their jurisdiction over salient 
and less salient issues.  Specifically, the Agricultural committee maintains jurisdiction over 
less salient issues then the Appropriations and Energy and Commerce committees (Sandahl 
2005).  
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In sum, Maltzman and Smith (1994) find support for their hypothesis in the 
Agriculture and Appropriations committees and non-support in the Energy and Commerce 
Committee.  Adding support to their hypothesis, the authors find that out of “all the 
committees examined the Agriculture committee is most likely to express views divergent 
from the majority on the House floor” (Sandahl 2005, 18).  In turn, support for the major 
party cartel theory is in part dependent upon the committee being analyzed (Sandahl 2005).  
Diverting from the major tenets of the major party cartel theory, Cox and McCubbins 
(1993), then turn their attention to a residual theoretical question emerging from the major 
party cartel theory which is: why legislators defer control to the majority party? The authors 
rooted their answer in the idea of collective dilemmas - that is: 
situations in which the rational, but unorganized action of group members 
may lead to an outcome that all consider worse than outcomes attainable by 
organized action-are inherent in the drive to be reelected in a mass electorate 
and in the process of passing legislation by majority rule (Cox and McCubbins 
1993, 84). 
That is to say, Cox and McCubbins argue legislators defer control of the legislative 
committee system to the majority, because the idea those legislators cannot in and of 
themselves achieve benefits for their districts alone, therein turning towards political parties. 
The majority party promotes cooperation between majority party members by controlling, 
“committee authority, assignments to committees, the production and scheduling of 
committee products, and the control of floor deliberations….” (Weingast and Shepsle 1994, 
163).  Expanding on this idea, Cox and McCubbin further note legislators are enticed to 
adhere to the wishes of the party, because of their desire for reelection, since reelection is in 
part dependent upon the collective reputation of their party (Weingast and Sheplse 1994).  By 
toeing the party line both legislators and the majority party benefit, legislators by obtaining 
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key leadership positions, party campaign contributions and other resources (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993).  
Importantly, even with the advantage legislators gain by following the majority 
party’s wishes, the majority party is still faced with the possibility of committee member 
reneging on their support.  To prevent this from happening, the majority party uses several 
powers at its disposal:  denying legislators committee seats, creating and destroying 
committees, assigning committee resources, controlling the jurisdiction of committees, 
granting committee chairs agenda-setting powers, determining how many members 
committees will be composed of, and what percentage of committee seats will be granted to 
the majority and minority party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). 
 Currently, supporters of the major party cartel theory are facing harsh criticism.  
Most of this criticism revolves around the weakening of congressional parties.  Notably, the 
major party cartel theory bulks conventional post World-War II wisdom (C. Jones 1964; 
Dodd and Oppenheimer 1977; Truman 1959) of the faded role of parties and their inability to 
affect legislative outcome (Maltzman 1997).  As Maltzman 1997 highlights in Wilson’s 
quote,  
…within Congress no visible, and therefore no controllable party 
organization. There is always a majority and minority, indeed, but the 
legislation of a session does not represent the policy of either; it is simply an 
aggregate of the bills recommended by Committees composed of members 
from both sides of the House…(Wilson 1885; 1985, 99 as cited in Maltzman 
1997, 23). 
Arguably, the limited role of parties to affect legislative outcomes is in part accredited to the 
perceived inability of political parties to entice legislators to follow the party’s wishes and 
internal fights within the parties (Maltzman 1997).  
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 In response to the weakening role of parties, proponents of the major party cartel 
theory argue that this criticism is time-bound, that it is in the post-reform era, but the “party 
is not over” (Weingast and Shepsle 1994).  That in fact, as Weingast and Shepsle (1994) 
notes recent research points to parties as playing an increasing role by affecting legislative 
outcomes,  citing the growing power of parties present in the works of scholars such as Collie 
and Cooper 1989, Bach and Smith 1988, and Rhode 1991, including: the increasing power 
and role of the Speaker;  the use of the Rules Committee by political leadership;  an increase 
in the use of multiple referrals and restrictive rules; and the decrease in open rules (Weingast 
the Shepsle 1994).    
2.2 Evaluation of Existing Legislative Organizational Theories  
In response to examining several scholarly works on the distributive, informational, 
and major party cartel theory, I argue the data supports combining the distributive, 
informational and major party cartel theories.  To date, absolute support for either of these 
theories is unsubstantiated. 
As a result, I argue this variance is in part due to the multiple motivations behind 
legislator committee requests.  The reliance of committee organizational theories in 
explaining committee assignments based on one single legislator motivation (legislator 
interest, party, or institutional interest) is problematic (Frisch and Kelly 2006; Maltzman 
1997; Sprague 2008). Instead, legislator’s committee assignments are likely to be a reflection 
of multiple motivations. 
Overtime scholars have found that legislators seek committee assignments based on 
multiple motivations (Bullock III 1976; Deering and Smith 1997; Fenno 1973; Frisch and 
Kelly 2006) and that committees differ in their ability to aid these motivations (Maltzman 
 30 
 
1997; Sprague 2008) thus, creating a finding attacking the very heart of the informational and 
distributive theory.  
  A sentiment echoed and supported loudly in Frisch and Kelly’s (2006) work, 
Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives.  In this body of 
literature, they call into question the use of one legislator motivation to explain legislator 
committee assignments.  Contrary to the presentation of reelection motivations provided in 
the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories, Frisch and Kelly find 
constituency concerns do not predict most congressional member’s committee preferences. 
Instead, “Most congressional members expect professional fulfillment, which means 
assignments need to be responsive to other professional goals” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 19). 
Indeed even according to Frisch and Kelly (2006), Shepsle (1978) considered a strong 
supportive figure of the distributive theory, notes that not all committees assignments are 
based on constituency related reelection motives.  Krehbiel (1991), a landmark figure 
supporting the informational theory, also marks the importance both the distributive and 
informational theory play in explaining committee organization in the legislative process.  
Committee Assignments Based on Multiple Motivations first came to the scene with 
Fenno’s 1973 work, Congressmen in Committees.  In his landmark study, Fenno analyzes 
committee membership on twelve committees in the House of Representatives for the 84
th
 
through 89
th 
(1955-1966) Congresses (Frisch and Kelly 2006).   
Interviewing individual legislators, Fenno finds legislators are motivated to seek 
committee assignments based on three goals: to make good policy, appease constituents to 
obtain reelection, and to gain prestige in the legislative chamber (Fenno 1973).  Stating 
 31 
 
legislators often chose committee assignments based on a combination of these three goals, 
all of which change over time.  A statement reinforced below: 
All congressmen probably hold all three goals. But each congressmen has his 
own mix of priorities and intensities-a mix which may, of course, change over 
time….The opportunity to achieve the three goals varies widely among 
committees (Fenno 1973, 1 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 2006, 72).  
Providing additional support for Fenno’s (1973) multiple-motivation thesis, both 
Charles S. Bullock (1976) and Deering and Smith (1997) find legislators seek committee 
assignments based on multiple motivations (Frisch and Kelly 2006).  In his 1976 article, 
“Motivations for U.S. Congressional Committee Preferences: Freshman of the 92nd 
Congress,” Bullock conducts interviews of 52 of the 53 freshmen in the 92nd Congress, 
finding that legislators seek committee membership based on the multiple goals (Smith and 
Deering 1984 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 2006) of reelection, policy, and prestige. 
Interviewing House freshmen in the 97
th
 Congress, Smith and Deering (1984) find similar 
results (Frisch and Kelly 2006).   
In sum, following Frisch and Kelly’s (2006) multi-motivation lead, I argue one single 
motivation as espoused in the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory is not 
likely to explain all legislator committee assignments.  Instead, Legislators committee 
assignments are likely to be a reflection of multiple motivations, thereby calling for a 
combination of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory (Krehbiel 1991) 
Based on this premise, I argue support for the informational, distributive, and major party 
cartel theories in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House legislative committees will be mixed. 
2.3 A Case Study of Louisiana 
 With this in mind, in order to fully understand Louisiana House legislator standing 
committee assignment preferences, in light of the informational, distributive, and major party 
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cartel theories, one must not only grasp the political environment surrounding Louisiana 
committee assignments, but also  both the formal and the informal rules that govern 
committee organization.  
2.3.1 Formal Rules 
Formally, in the state of Louisiana, all legislator House Standing Committee 
assignments and chair positions are chosen by the Speaker, who is selected by the majority 
party (House Rule 2.5), with partial exception of the Appropriations Committee.  Presently, 
there are sixteen standing committees in the Louisiana House: Administration of Criminal 
Justice, Agriculture, Forestry, Aquaculture and Rural Development, Appropriations, Civil 
Law and Procedure, Commerce, Education, Health and Welfare, House and Governmental 
Affairs, Insurance, Judiciary, Labor and Industrial Relations, Municipal, Natural Resources 
and Environment, Retirement, Transportation, and Ways and Means (Louisiana House of 
Representatives 2012, Citizen Guide/House Rules).   
Notably, according to Louisiana House Rule 6.3, legislators are restricted to serving 
on more than three standing committees at one time.  Specifically, in a given legislative 
session representatives are granted membership onto only one Morning Committee, 
Afternoon Committee, or Weekly Committee (Louisiana House of Representatives 2012, 
Citizen Guide/House Rules).  Moreover, under House Rule 6.7, Morning Committees are 
identified as the Appropriations, Civil Law and Procedure, Commerce, Transportation, 
Highways and Public Works, and Ways and Means. Committees designated as Afternoon 
Committees include: Administration of Criminal Justice, Education, Health and Welfare, 
House and Governmental Affairs, Insurance, and Natural Resources and Environment.  
Lastly, Weekly Committees are as follows: Agriculture, Forestry, Aquaculture, and Rural 
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Development, Judiciary, Labor and Industrial Relations, Municipal, Parochial and Cultural 
Affairs, and Retirement.  Particularly, according to House Rule 6.3, committee chairmen of 
Morning or Afternoon committees are prevented from serving on any other standing 
committee. Similarly, chairmen of Weekly Committees must refrain from membership onto 
more than two standing committees (Louisiana House of Representatives 2012, Citizen 
Guide/House Rules).  
Importantly, the Speakers of the House have very few formal limitations placed on 
them when granting committee assignments. However, these limitations do exist.  For 
example, Speakers must share the decision of committee membership on the Appropriations 
Committee with House legislators.  Whereas the Speaker selects eighteen Appropriation 
members, while the House legislators select the remaining seven from legislators 
representing congressional districts in which they reside (House Rule 6.4).  Secondly, the 
Speaker of the House is restrained by House Rule 6.4 to appoint Appropriation committee 
members according to several criteria: “one member shall be a resident of each of the Public 
Service Commission districts respectively, one member shall be a resident of each of the 
congressional districts respectively, and six members shall be appointed from the state at 
large” (Louisiana House of Representatives 2012, Citizen Guide/House Rules). 
Lastly, unlike in many U.S. state legislatures, the Speakers of the Louisiana House of 
Representatives are not constrained by the formal rule of proportional representation.  Under 
this rule, minority and majority party members are guaranteed committee assignments onto 
all committees based on the percentage of seats they hold in the House (Inside the Legislative 
Process 1996, 4-4 -4-5).  Therefore, the Speaker must grant a specific amount of seats to each 
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party.  In turn, arguably because Louisiana does not abide by this rule, its Speakers are freer 
in their selection of committee assignments.      
2.3.2 Informal Rules: Committee Request and Speaker Committee Selection  
Conventionally, Louisiana House legislators make their committee request known to 
the Speaker through either formal requests placed in writing or by verbal requests (Louisiana 
House legislator anonymous interviews 2012).  Additionally, Louisiana House Speakers 
often grant legislator committee requests based on various methods.  Informally speaking, 
according to a staff member in the Louisiana House of Representatives, Speakers often have 
in mind how they want to compose a committee.  For instance, they may want a particular 
committee makeup to contain members who represent a specific party, race, gender, or 
geographic boundaries (the north/south boundaries in Louisiana).  Moreover, in practice, 
since Speakers have always been selected from the legislative body and have served many 
years as representatives, one can assume an individual legislators’ personal and professional 
relationship with the Speaker can play a role on their selection to specific committees 
(anonymous legislator interview 2012). 
Additional insight into, how and why Louisiana Speakers choose committee 
assignments is provided in the August 1995-1996 study “Inside the Legislative Process”. 
Under this study, researchers sent a questionnaire to Louisiana’s Clerk of the House, to the 
Secretary of the House, or to one of their staff members inquiring, what criteria the 
appointing authorities consider when making their membership selections for committees 
(Inside the Legislative Process 1996).  According to this study, the Speaker of the Louisiana 
House grants committee memberships based on preference, seniority, tenure, political party, 
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and geographic location. Occupation, experience, competency, and gender do not play a 
significant role.  
2.3.3 Informal Power of the Louisiana Governor over Committee Selection 
While the Speaker formally enjoys the formal power of selecting committee chair and 
members, the true power lies in the hands of the governor. Informally, according to a 
Louisiana House legislator interviews, Louisiana is unique in the amount of power the 
governor wields. When the governor is interested he will not only strongly influence the 
selection of the Speaker, but also dictate to them who to choose for committee chairman as 
well as advise the Speaker on committee membership selection (anonymous legislator 
interviews).  A well-known example, of the power the governor yields over committee chair 
and member assignments occurred in March 2004. During, this year House Representative 
Troy Hebert, committee chairman of the House Insurance committee, was removed from his 
chairmanship by Speaker Joe Salter, under the direction of Governor Kathleen Blanco, after 
Hebert voted against a critical vote on a tax issue (renewal of a tax on business utilities) for 
the governor.  After his removal from chairmanship, Representative Hebert famously 
referred to the Governor as “Queen Bee.” 
2.3.4 Why Louisiana? 
 Louisiana’s non-proportional representation requirement provides scholars an 
excellent opportunity in which not only to test the informational, distributive, and major 
party cartel theories but also to predict how these theories will fare in Louisiana.  Notably, as 
discussed earlier, Louisiana is one of twelve states that do not apply proportional 
representation to committee assignments (Inside the Legislative Process 1995-1996).  The 
idea of proportional committee representation is to allow minority party members their right 
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to committee seats based on their percentage of members in the legislature.  Theoretically 
this intent has substantial implications regarding the distributive, informational, and major 
party cartel theories alike.  First, the distributive theory argues that committee membership is 
granted to legislators with the highest need (those representing districts with a large interest 
in the policies enacted under the jurisdiction of specific committees) for membership onto 
that committee.  Therefore, regardless of party these committees will be overrepresented by 
members representing specific districts.  Under proportional representation, this theory will 
not necessarily hold true.  For example, say a majority of minority members represent 
districts with a high need for membership onto a specific committee compared to the 
percentage of majority party members, under proportional representation minority members 
will not be overrepresented on these committees; in turn, constraining the testing of the 
distributive theory (Groseclose and King 2000).  
 Furthermore, applying major party cartel theory in proportional representation, states 
face similar problems with the distributive theory.  As mentioned previously, one tenet of the 
major party cartel theory is that the majority party will overstack majority party members 
onto committees, especially those of vital importance to the majority party regardless of the 
percentage of seats the minority party holds in the legislature.  Under proportional 
representation, the major party is constrained in its ability to stack committees with majority 
party members (Groseclose and King 2000).  Again, biasing support against the majority 
party theory in these states.  
Overall, states adhering to the idea of proportional committee representation, limits 
the testing of the distributive and major party cartel theory.  In fact, arguably proportional 
representation biases ones findings in favor of the informational theory (Groseclose and King 
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2000). As a result, Louisiana’s non-compliance with proportional committee representation 
allows scholars to test the informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories with 
limited constraints.  
In sum, appearing in the concluding section of this chapter, I reemphasize the major 
tenets of the informational, the distributive, and the major party cartel theories as well as lay 
out the testing of my hypotheses generated from excepted support for these theories in light 
of Louisiana’s non-proportional committee representation requirement. 
2.4  Summary 
Informational Theory.  As mentioned earlier according to the informational theory, 
legislators are motivated to maintain and support the legislative institution.  One way they 
maintain the stability of the legislative institution is to create policies beneficial to the whole 
house (Frisch and Kelly 2006).  Under this theory, representative policies are created by none 
other than representative committees.  By creating committees composed of members 
representing varying views from one another, accurate information is more likely dispensed 
to the whole legislature (Krehbiel 1991).  For the informational theory to hold true, though, 
committee membership characteristics must mirror the characteristics of the whole House. 
So, under this theory, I expect to find committees will represent a heterogeneous membership 
(i.e. members representing different characteristics from one another).  
In keeping with current committee assignment literature, in order to determine 
whether committee members represent similar interest to the whole House, this dissertation 
relies on two methods used to test committee and House characteristics: the difference of 
mean and difference of median test.  Both are chosen in order to provide more than one 
avenue for testing the informational theory.  Under these tests, this study compares the 
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difference median (means) of committee members to the difference of median (means) of the 
whole legislature.  Thus, if median (mean) of committee members are found to be similar to 
the median (mean) of the whole legislator, then this study will have found support in favor of 
the informational theory.  
Distributive Theory.  Under the distributive theory, legislators seek membership 
onto committees to represent the needs of their constituents.  According to this theory, 
legislators self-select onto committees with jurisdiction over policies representative of the 
views of their constituents.  This self-selection leads to production of unrepresentative 
policies.  These policies are passed in part through legislative logrolling, the process of 
lawmakers passing legislation beneficial to one politician in the hopes of that representative 
returning the favor (Krehbiel 1991). 
 Based on the tenets of the distributive theory, if legislators seek committee 
assignments based on their constituent concerns then legislative committees will contain 
committee members with similar characteristics to one another.  These characteristics will 
not represent the characteristics of the whole legislature.  For example, legislators 
representing agricultural districts will seek membership onto the agricultural committees.  
Therefore, the distributive theory holds true if the median (mean) of legislator committee 
characteristics are found to be different from the median (mean) view of the whole 
legislature.  
Major Party Cartel Theory.  According to the major party cartel theory, legislators 
do not self-select onto committees as expressed through the distributive theory, rather, are 
placed onto committees by the majority party.  Under this theory, the main purpose of 
committees is to promote policies beneficial to the majority party.  One way the majority 
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party achieves this goal is by stacking membership onto control committees with legislators 
representing the median view of the whole party.  Control committees are those committees 
directly affecting “the success of policy issues important to the majority, such as the 
Appropriations Committee” (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Cox and McCubbins 1993).  
Notably, in order to promote goodwill with its members’, parties will allow legislators to 
self-select onto committees with jurisdiction over issues of minor importance to the party, but 
substantial importance to the representatives districts.  
According to the major party cartel theory, the majority party has several tools at its 
disposal in order to keep committees in line with the party’s goals.  First, the majority party 
can not only elect the Speaker of the House, but it also can set the rules of the legislature.  
Speakers maintain great powers in the United States legislature by controlling the following 
when: bills are voted on by the legislative floor; the rules committee; the number of seats a 
committee possess; and which individual majority party members are placed on which 
committee - all of which constrain legislators from acting against the wishes of the party 
(Sandahl 2005).  If the major party cartel theory holds true, hypothetically, I expect to find 
Democratic legislators on control committees will represent the views of the whole Democrat 
Party and contrary views to the whole party on constituent committees.  
Even more, I expect to find mixed support for the distributive, the informational, or 
major party cartel theory.  Based on findings of previous research that legislators choose 
committee membership based on a combination of motivations (Frisch and Kelly 2006; 
Bullock III 1976; Fenno 1973), and that committees differ in their ability to meet this 
motivations (Maltzman 1997; Sprague 2008).  
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
 I explore support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories, 
in sixteen standing committees in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House, by laying out two models 
of legislator committee assignments.  In the first model, I test support for all three theories by 
determining whether legislators seek committee assignments based on one individual 
legislator preference such as those based on: constituent demographics, party affiliation, 
occupation, caucus membership, or ideology.  These preferences are measured based on the 
current trend of operationalizing legislator committee preferences.  The significance of this 
study is twofold.  First, it goes one step farther by introducing a new measurement of 
legislator committee characteristics based conceivably on legislator party caucus 
membership.  Arguably, this measurement creates a more comprehensive tool for examining 
legislator committee preferences.  For example, Louisiana House Caucus members promote 
policies directly related to the jurisdiction of Louisiana House Standing Committees.  
Debatably, this relationship will entice caucus members to seek membership onto committees 
promoting policies close to their caucus goals.  
Second, this study presents an original model using similar data and measurements as 
in model one.  Working on the premise that legislators choose committee assignments based 
on multiple considerations; therefore, support for the three theories of legislative committee 
organization is broader in contrast to current trends that seek to provide isolated support for 
each theory.  Louisiana is chosen for its non-proportional committee representation 
requirement.  Reasonably, by choosing a state without this characteristic, this study can test 
the distributive theory, informational, and major party cartel theory with limited restraints.  
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This dissertation provides support for the distributive, informational, and major party 
cartel theory by conducting a difference of median and mean test to determine how far 
committee member views are from the views held by the whole Louisiana legislative house 
body.  Committee members’ median (mean) scores are achieved by taking the average of 
how committee members voted on bills in the Louisiana House for the years 1999-2008. 
Similarly, the whole chamber’s median (mean) score is obtained by taking the average of 
how the whole chamber voted on bills in the Louisiana House for the years 1999-2008. 
I report my results using both difference of mean and median test for two reasons: 
first, generalizability and second theoretical appropriateness.  Comparing the results found 
using the difference of medians test to those found using the difference of means tests for 
preference outliers in the Louisiana House of Representatives; I offer two distinct tests of the 
distributive, informational and major party cartel theories. 
  Over the years, as Battista and Richmond (2011, 5) note, the analytical methods used 
to test the major tenets of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories have 
evolved from the simple use of a “difference of mean tests (Weingast and Marshall 1988) to 
rank-sum difference of median tests (Cox and McCubbins 1993) and finally to direct 
simulation of the null data-generating process using Monte Carlo difference in median test 
(Groseclose 1994).”  
Proponents of the difference of median test argue that its ability to determine 
committee representativeness is strongly rooted in theoretical foundations.  Battista (2004) 
states,  
The theoretical logic behind comparing medians is well established. If 
legislators are assumed to have single-peaked preferences (as all models have 
assumed) and legislators are arrayed along only one dimension (also a 
common assumption), the median voter theorem applies and the median 
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preferences is a Condorcet winner (Downs 1957; Black 1958). That is, the 
preferences of the committee collapses to its median legislator’s preference, 
and the preferences of the chamber collapse to its median legislator’s 
preference. Therefore, to compare the collective preference of a committee to 
that of its chamber, we need to compare median preferences. 
Collaborating Battista’s argument in favor of the difference of median test, other well-known 
scholars such as Cox and McCubbins 1993, Groseclose 1994, Hall and Grofman 1990, 
Kiewiet and and McCubbins 1991, Krehbiel 1990 and 1991, Londregan and Snyder 1994, 
Poole and Rosenthal 1997, and Alder and Lapinski 1997 have also advocated the utilization 
of the median approach (Adler and Lapinski 1997).  
Moreover, Battista (2004) notes the primary justification for the continued use of 
difference of mean test is statistical tractability, the ability to generalize from study to study.  
He further states when theories of committee development first came to the scene, many 
scholars lacked the knowledge or the ability to use the theoretically more appropriate 
difference of median test.  This test required scholars to use methods new to political science, 
such as the Wicoxson rank-sum test.  These methods lead many scholars to choose to 
organize their studies of the three theories by conducting a simple difference of mean test 
over the more complex difference of median test.  This choice is amplified by Groseclose’s 
(1994) finding that difference of median and mean test produced similar results to one 
another.  Presently, this justification is weakening with increased statistical knowledge and 
the increase of less expensive computing power (Battista 2004).  Second, Groseclose’s 
(1994) finding has been called into question with Battista’s 2004 study.  In that study, 
Battista provides evidence that the use of difference of mean test is not a reliable substitute 
for the difference of median test “in comparing committees and chambers because their 
estimates of representativeness can differ wildly in either direction (Battista 2004, 167).”  
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Finding difference of means test is more likely to produce unrepresentative committees 
compared to the whole legislature than a difference of median test will produce.  
In this dissertation, the distributive theory and informational theory are tested by 
comparing the mean and median score of committee members to the mean and median score 
of the whole chamber.  The mean and median scores tell us whether committee members 
represent characteristics similar to the characteristics of the whole legislature. If a majority of 
members on a specific committee are found to represent similar characteristics to the whole 
chamber then that committee is said to represent the characteristics of the whole (Sandahl 
2005), therein providing support for the informational theory. Conversely, if a majority of 
members on a specific committee are found to have characteristics unrepresentative of the 
whole chamber (Sandahl 2005), then support is found for the distributive theory.  
The major party cartel theory is tested by separating 1999-2008 Democrat and 
Republican standing committee members into two groups.  In order to test the major party 
cartel theory I look at the Democratic Party members in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of 
Representatives.  “I compare the median (mean) score of Democrat committee members for a 
specific committee to the median (mean) score of the remaining Democrats not in the 
committee.  If the Democrat committee member median (mean) scores are found to be 
similar to the median (mean) score of the whole house Democrat party, then that committee 
is said to be composed of Democrat member’s representative of the views of their party” 
(Sandahl 2005, 28).   
Testing the expectation that support for the distributive, informational, and major 
party cartel theory is mixed; this study creates a multiple-motivation model combining all 
measurements of legislator motivations into one analysis.  Results obtained from difference 
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of median and mean test conducted to analyze the informational, distributive, and major 
party cartel theory are evaluated under one single model.   
In order to provide a strict test of the informational, distributive, and major party 
cartel theory, these three theories are tested using a strict standard of statistical significance 
(.05 level).  By using this level of significance, I can say that support for these theories is 
accepted or rejected with 95% confidence.  
3.1 Measuring Legislator Motivations 
Currently, scholars are debating traditional measurements of legislator committee 
preferences used to test the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories.  This 
debate centers on the use of a single measurement of legislator characteristics, such as district 
characteristics, occupation, party identification, interest group scores and ideology, to fully 
capture legislator committee preferences (Sprague 2008).  This flaw is often blamed for 
creating confusing and misleading results in favor of either the informational, the distributive 
or the major party cartel theory.  In this dissertation, I address this debate by evaluating 
support for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory in light of one single 
measurement of legislator characteristics.  I then add to the current literature by testing these 
theories using a measurement of legislator characteristics based on a combination of 
legislator district characteristics, occupation, party identification, interest group scores and 
ideology.  
Arguably, legislator committee characteristics are difficult to operationalize. 
Representative committee characteristics, in addition to their own attitudes, are often affected 
by several outside pressures such as legislator district characteristics, ideology, interest group 
scores, and party.  The use of legislator roll call votes and interests group scores to measure 
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legislator ideology, a well-documented pressure on legislator preference, to determine 
legislator committee motivation dates back to the earliest studies of legislative committee 
organization (Cox and McCubbins 1993).  The strength and weaknesses of each has long 
been debated.  
  One major strength of using interest group scores to measure legislator ideology is the 
ability of these scores to capture what Rhode (1991) terms legislator ‘operative’ preferences 
(Sprague 2008).  These inclinations “refer to the preferences that actually govern the voting 
choice, when all other forces pressuring the member in one direction or other are taken into 
account” (Rhode 1991, 41).  Legislator constituency, interest groups, party leaders, and 
individual legislator own attitudes, are included among these forces (Rhode 1991). 
Debatably, by capturing these different influences a more valid measurement of legislator 
motivations is created. 
In practice, methodologically speaking, interest group scores are not created to 
provide a measurement of legislator ideology, but to determine which legislators are 
supportive of their cause (Fowler 1982).  To obtain their goal, these groups create their 
scores by determining how many times legislators vote in line with the group’s policy 
positions (Sprague 2008), often choosing controversial nonpartisan issues to determine their 
ratings (Cox and McCubbins 1993).  By choosing these types of issues, interest groups are 
able to identify both Democrats and Republicans supportive of their cause.  Sequentially 
creating scores with both liberal and conservative supporters and interfering with the 
separation of conservatives and liberals (Cox and McCubbins 1993).   
In addition, critics argue interest group scores are often complied from a limited 
number of votes.  Basing legislator interest group ratings on a few votes makes interest group 
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scores for individuals unstable over time, causing these scores to fluctuate and change from 
Congress to Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993). 
Conversely, another measurement of legislator ideology, Poole and Rosenthal W-
nominate scores, faces harsh methodological criticism.  Similar to interest groups scores, 
these attacks often focus on the ability of these scores to capture the true ideology of 
legislators.  Critics state the sole reliance of Poole and Rosenthal’s scores on legislator floor 
roll call votes compromises the value of these scores as a measure of ideology (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993).  Arguing Poole and Rosenthal scores are not capable of taking into 
account all the aspects of legislator roll call preferences opponents reject the score.  For 
instance, as Battista and Richman (2011) note, legislator roll call votes usually occur after 
logrolls or other coalitions have been created (Hall and Grofman 1990), and intra-committee 
vote trades (Glenn R. Parker and Suzanne Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004). 
Furthermore, legislators can and do alter their votes from committee to the house floor.  How 
legislators votes on a bill in committee, is not necessarily representative of how they will 
vote on the floor (Glenn R. Parker and Suzanne Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004). 
Sidestepping the problems associated with legislator roll call votes, scholars use 
legislator district characteristics (Adler and Lapinski 1997) and occupation to measure 
legislator committee preferences.  In 1997 Adler and Lapinski pave the way for using district 
characteristics to identify legislator committee preferences by developing and coining a 
measurement of legislator ‘need.’  This measurement uses district characteristics to 
determine how compelling membership onto a specific committee is to an individual 
legislator. Legislators’ identified as representing a high need for membership onto a specific 
committee are those representing districts whose policies fall under the jurisdiction of that 
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committee.  For example, a legislator representing a district mainly agriculturally in nature 
has the highest expected need for membership on the agriculture committee.  Support for the 
distributive and informational is based on whether committees are overrepresented by “high 
need” legislators compared to the whole legislature.  
One strength of using district characteristics as a measure of legislator committee 
preferences is its ability to directly measure “a critical component of a legislator’s operative 
preferences, constituent interest” (Spraque 2008, 311).  A major obstacle of this 
measurement is its ability to fully explain legislator motivations.  Critics argue that to draw a 
true picture of legislator preferences, scholars must take into account the personal goals of 
legislators that cannot be fully explained through this measure (Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004).   
 Unfortunately as presented here, current measurements of legislator motivations face 
several weaknesses.  The main weakness is the inability of these measurements to fully 
capture all legislator committee motivations.  Legislator caucus and delegation membership 
provides us with a different angle to understanding legislator committee membership, by 
providing more information concerning legislator motivations. 
One major strength of legislator caucus and delegation membership is its direct 
applicability to a wide range of committees.  Similar to interest group scores, legislator 
membership in these organizations provides data of individual legislator interests.  The 
quantity of state caucus and delegations as well as the different areas of interest they cover, 
allows scholars to obtain a vast amount of legislator interest data.  This data is directly 
applicable to determining legislator committee assignment choices.  More importantly, unlike 
interest group scores which are created to identify legislators supportive of their individual 
cause, caucuses are created with the goal of promoting policies directly beneficial to 
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legislator constituents.  Arguably, this focus creates a close measurement of individual 
legislator interests.   
Nevertheless, legislator caucus membership is not the silver bullet.  Perhaps, this 
measurement faces some of the similar weaknesses of previously mentioned measurements 
of legislator committee preferences.  First of all, caucuses do not provide a measurement of 
legislator interest for all committees.  In Louisiana, caucus membership does not explain 
legislator membership on the Appropriations, Civil Law, Judiciary, Retirement, or Ways and 
Means committees.  Additionally, legislator caucus membership does not capture all of 
legislator committee preferences.  It does not account for legislator personal goals, party, or 
ideology.  
Furthermore, one drawback of the use of caucus membership to explain legislator 
preferences is the direct correlation between district characteristics and caucus membership, 
even after controlling for party, committee, electoral security, and seniority (Miler 2011).  
Specifically, in 2011 Miler finds legislator district characteristics affect whether legislators 
choose membership onto specific caucuses.  Arguably, the inherent connection between 
constituent characteristics and caucus membership characteristics affects the extent to which 
caucus membership can offer any new additional information over and beyond district 
characteristics.  Addressing this critique one major strength of the caucus membership 
measurement is its ability to offer a more refined measurement of legislator preferences as 
seen in the case of the Acadiana Caucus, Jefferson, Orleans, and Capital Region Delegations.  
Due to the fact, that while constituent characteristics may affect whether a legislator chooses 
to join a specific caucus it does not reveal the whole picture.  For example, unlike individual 
constituent characteristics, caucus membership in the Acadiana Caucus, Jefferson, Orleans, 
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and Capital Region Delegations narrows constituent characteristics to specific geographical 
areas.  
  To illustrate, under Table 3.3 the district characteristic percent employed in wholesale 
or retail trade is a factor expected to positively affect whether legislators seek membership 
onto the Commerce Committee.  If this holds true, one can infer two things.  First, legislators 
representing districts with a high percentage of their constituents employed in wholesale or 
retail trade disproportionally seek membership onto the Commerce Committee.  Second, it is 
plausible that policies reflected out of the Commerce Committee will represent regions with 
a high percentage of their district employed in wholesale or retail trade at the expense of the 
whole state.   
  Conversely, as Appendix Table A.1 reveals legislators residing on the Jefferson, 
Orleans, and Capital Region Delegations significantly represent districts employed in 
wholesale or retail trade as well as specific geographic regions in the state.  Therefore, 
instead of policies reflected out of the Commerce Committee representing all areas of the 
state with a higher percentage of constituents employed in wholesale or retail trade as the 
former example would assume,  these policies may represent the wholesale or retail interests 
of a specific geographical area at the expense of the whole state.   
Notwithstanding this, caucus membership on the Rural and Black Caucus, could 
potentially suffer from the correlation problem associated with constituent characteristics and 
caucus membership.  As a whole, it is difficult to differentiate any additional information 
provided by membership onto the Rural Caucus and Black Caucus not already captured 
through district characteristics.  This being the case, these two caucus variables may 
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duplicate the same measurements already examined through constituent characteristics in 
Table 3.3.    
On this occasion, this analysis uses legislator district characteristics, interest group 
scores, legislator ideology, party, occupation, and legislator caucus and delegation 
membership to investigate support for the informational, distributive, and major party cartel 
theories in sixteen standing committees in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of 
Representatives.   
3.2 District Characteristics 
Undeniably, Alder and Lapinski’s 1997 study revolutionize research on legislative 
committee composition.  Contending, representatives join committees based on their district 
characteristics, Adler and Lapinski further explore the extent to which district characteristics 
affect legislative committee membership.  Using U.S. Census district data, as well as, data 
from various sources, the authors begin their study by creating a measurement of 
representative need.  This need is directly related to the percentage of a legislator’s district 
characteristics falling under the jurisdiction of each committee.  Importantly, the higher the 
percentage of these characteristics the higher the legislator need.  Hypothesizing committees 
are composed of legislators representing a high need (or districts with a high percentage of 
economic, social, and geographic characteristics falling under the jurisdiction of each 
committee), Alder and Lapinski analyze their data by conducting a Monte-Carlo difference 
of median test.  
Seeking to extend Alder and Lapinski’s (1997) research on district characteristics and 
legislative committee composition to the state level, Table 3.1 uses Alder and Lapinski’s  
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Table 3.1: Constituency Characteristics as Determined by District Need and Committee 
Type 
 
study to relate legislator district need with committee membership.  Following the authors’ 
lead, this dissertation relies on U.S. Census data in order to create a measurement of 
legislator need.  Notably, not all measurements used by Adler and Lapinski are easily 
available at the state level.  Furthermore, not all committees in the Louisiana House standing 
committees are examined in Alder and Lapinski’s congressional study including: Health and 
Committee  Constituency Characteristics Districts Types with the Highest Expected  
Need 
* African Americans 
* Population Density 
*% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing,  
and hunting 
*Percent living in rural farming areas 
* % urban 
* Population Density 
Commerce 
*% of district employed in wholesale and  
retail trade 
*Districts with a high % of its pop.  
employed in wholesale & retail trade,  
finance, insurance, and real estate 
*% of district attending public elementary and  
high school 
* Median family income     
District contains higher education institution  
(major universities with their branches and  
technical college) 
% of district with disabilities % of district with disabilities 
% employed in healthcare  % employed in healthcare  
% of district age 55 or over % of district age 55 or over 
% below poverty line  % below poverty line  
Gov’t Affairs  % of district employed in public administration    
% of district employed in public  
administration    
* % of African Americans 
* Percent Urban 
High Population Density             
% below poverty line 
Labor  % employed in manufacturing * Districts with a high % of pop. employed  
in manufacturing 
Orleans delegation  
 % of district employed in local government                                                 
Retirement % of district age 55 or older High % of district age 55 or older 
Transportation 
* % of district employed in transportation and  
warehousing  
*District with a high % of its pop. employed  
in transportation and warehousing 
Note: * Obtained from Adler and Lapinski’s (1997) study.  No * indicates this author’s expectation of districts with the highest 
expected need for membership onto a specific committee based on the jurisdiction of the committee.  Appropriations, Ways and 
Means and Natural Resources are excluded because district characteristics are lacking.  
 
 
Health and Welfare 
*”Districts with high levels of interest in  
civil rights and legal issues” (Alder and  
Lapinski 1997). 
Judiciary 
Municipal 
 
Education *District with a large % of its pop. that  
attends public elementary and high school 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
*Districts with a high % of African  
Americans, high % of individuals living in  
urban areas, and high % below poverty line 
Agriculture *Agricultural districts 
*”Districts with high levels of interests in civil  
rights and legal issues" (Adler and Lapinski  
1997) 
Civil Law 
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Welfare, Governmental Affairs, Municipal, Retirement, and Labor.  In both of these cases, I 
use Census district data most directly related to the jurisdiction of each committee.  Lastly, 
standing committees such as Appropriations, Ways and Means, and Natural Resources are 
excluded because district characteristics are lacking.   
Measurements of legislator district characteristics for the years 1999-2008 are 
obtained from various sources.  Since the 1990 Census does not provide a break down by 
House district, data for the years 1999-2001 is obtained from the 1996 and 1998 Almanac of 
State Legislative Elections.  Data for the years 2002-2008, however, is provided by the U.S. 
2000 Census with the exception of poverty, household income, and the percent of African 
Americans.  Poverty data, on the other hand, is provided by the 2006 Almanac of State 
Legislative Elections for the years 2001-2008.  When available, the most current data are  
used for each district characteristics.  Following this premise, for the years 2006-2008, the 
variables average household income and the percent of African Americans in each house 
district is provided by the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections.  It is important to 
note, though, since Louisiana House standing committees maintain jurisdiction over multiple 
policy areas, several census measurements are used to capture as many dimensions of the 
committee as possible.  
3.3 Poole and Rosenthal W-Nominate Scores 
Legislator roll call ideology is based on Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores 
(Poole and Rosenthal 1997), which are created from legislator vote choice on contested 
(unanimous) congressional floor roll call votes.  Relying on these votes, representatives are 
arranged along a liberal, moderate, and conservative spectrum which range from “-1.00 
(strong liberal) to +1.00 (strong conservative)” (Ardoin and Garand 2003).  Hence, allowing 
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researchers to determine how liberal or conservative an individual legislator is compared to 
whole legislative body (Sandahl 2005).    
For the purpose of this analysis, Poole and Rosenthal scores are extended to the state 
level.  Additionally, in this dissertation contested roll call votes are defined as all votes 
recorded in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature digest that contain at least five 
legislators voting contrary to their counterparts (Sandahl 2005).  All 105 legislators in the 
Louisiana 1999-2008 House are used in this analysis, except for those who leave or are 
replaced in the legislative year being studied. In which case, these legislators are excluded 
because of the lack of roll call data available to accurately determine their voting ideology.  
In all, from 1999 to 2008 this study looks at two thousand, one hundred and thirty-one 
contested roll call votes.  Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are computed with the help of 
Dr. Bratton using Poole and Rosenthal W-Nominate Roll Call Analysis Software.  Table 3.2 
provides a yearly breakdown of the contested votes used to create legislator ideology. 
Table 3.2: Contested Roll Call Votes by Year  
 
 
3.4 Party 
 
 Legislator Party identification data is obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana House 
of Representatives.  Legislators are coded zero if they are Democrat and one if coded 
Republican.  
3.5 Legislator Interest Group Scores 
 Legislator interest group scores are created from Louisiana Association of Business 
and Industry (LABI) interest score.  These scores rank legislators according to their vote on 
bills that promote pro-business stances.  Legislators are ranked on a 0 (legislator does not 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
# of contested roll call votes 343 45 338 32 323 280 165 267 138 200 2,131
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vote according to the interest of the LABI) to 100 scale (legislator votes according to the 
interest of the LABI).  Legislators are positioned on this scale according to roll call point 
values.  These values are dependent upon two factors: first, whether legislators vote in 
accordance with the wishes of the LABI, and second the deemed importance by the LABI of 
these individual votes on bills to the business community (LABI 2012/Voting Records).   
3.6 Legislator Caucus Membership 
Along with LABI interest group scores, an additional measurement of legislator 
interest is obtained through legislator caucus membership.  Caucuses include: Acadiana 
Delegation, Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, Independent Caucus, Jefferson Delegation, 
Orleans Delegation, Republican/Democrat Delegation, Rural Caucus, and Women’s Caucus.  
Each of these delegations promotes legislation important to their caucus’ goals.  
 The Acadiana Delegation goal is to promote policies that affect the following 
parishes: Acadia, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cameron, Evangeline, 
Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, LaFourche, Point Coupee, St. Charles, St. James, 
St. John the Baptist, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, Vermilion, and West 
Baton Rouge (Acadian Legislative Delegation 2012).   
 The purpose of the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus is to enact policies that 
positively promote the interests of their constituents: “implementing, and promoting, policies 
that allow citizens fair and open access to educational and economic advancement 
opportunities, providing leadership in challenging policies which hinder the progress of 
African Americans, organizing and maintaining a networking system in Louisiana that links 
together elected officials, faith-based civic organizations, business and colleges and  
universities for identifying cutting-edge issues that affect Louisiana’s African American 
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citizenry and developing and implementing community-based programs, meetings and 
forums for the distribution of information and serving as a united public voice for the African 
American population in Louisiana” (Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus 2012).  
Furthermore, the aim of the Capital Region Delegation is to bring legislators 
representing districts in the capital region together to produce positive results for the region. 
“While each member maintains representation of their district’s priorities, the Delegation 
works as a coalition to elevate those priorities that are regional in nature to the next level” 
(Capital Region Delegation 2012).  Because the Capital Region Delegation was created in 
2008, this is the only year analyzed in this study. Parishes in the Capital Region include: 
Ascension, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Livingston, Pointe Coupee, St. 
Helena, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana (Louisiana House of Representatives).  Both 
the Jefferson and New Orleans Delegations seek to promote policies that better individuals 
living in these parishes (Capital Region Delegation 2012). 
The objective of the Rural Caucus is to promote policies that better the condition of 
individuals living in rural parishes.  The Rural caucus is the largest caucus in the Louisiana 
state legislature (Rural Caucus 2012).  Additionally, the intention of the Independent Caucus 
and Republican and Democrat Delegation members is to promote policies beneficial to their 
individual party.  Similarly, the Jefferson Delegation and Orleans Delegations seek to 
promote policies beneficial to individual living in the districts represented by the Jefferson 
and Orleans Delegations (Jefferson and Orleans Delegations 2012).  
Further, the goal of the Louisiana’s Women’s Caucus is to address issues concerning 
women.  The mission of this caucus is two-fold.  First, is to “prepare the next generation of 
women’s leaders” (Women’s Caucus 2012).  Second,  is to “serve as the premiere voice and 
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leading monitor of issues, legislation and policies, which impact women, including fighting 
for breast cancer awareness, pay equity, expanded child care services, domestic violence 
prevention, better healthcare and more economic development opportunities” (Women’s 
Caucus 2012).  
Consequently, in this analysis I use legislator caucus membership to determine how 
closely Louisiana committee preferences represent the views of the whole chamber.  In order 
to conduct this test, this dissertation extends Alder and Lapinski’s (1997) district and 
committee related measurements and hypothesis to caucus membership.  In 1997, Alder and 
Lapinski explore the link to which district characteristics affect committee membership by 
relating legislator need to committee type and membership composition.  Under this study, 
the authors hypothesize committees are composed of members who represent districts with a 
high percentage of economic, social, and geographic characteristics falling under the 
jurisdiction of each committee.  Noting the higher the percentage of district characteristics 
falling under the jurisdiction of a specific committee, the higher the legislator need for 
membership onto that committee.  
Extending Adler and Lapinski’s 1997, classification of legislator need to state level 
caucus membership, this study seeks to determine how closely committee preferences 
represent the views of the whole chamber by exploring the extent to which district 
characteristics of legislator caucus members affects Louisiana 1999-2008 standing committee 
membership.  Legislator district characteristics are used to identify the number of caucuses 
and delegations members representing district types with the highest expected need for 
membership onto a specific committee.  In Table 3.3, I not only use Alder and Lapinksi’s 
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(1997) classification of legislator need, committee type, and membership composition, but in 
addition I also include legislator caucuses and delegations.   
Data for Louisiana House 1999-2008 caucus members’ district characteristics are 
obtained from U.S. Census and Almanac of State Legislative Elections.  Specifically, the 
2000 U.S. Census data is used to provide legislator district information for all years used in 
this analysis with two exceptions.  First, for the years 1999-2001 the 1990 U.S. Census data 
does not provide individual legislator district data.  Therefore, data for these years is obtained 
from the 1996 and 1998 Almanac of State Legislative Elections.  Second, data for the years 
2002-2008 are provided by the U.S. 2000 Census with the exception of poverty, household 
income, and percent of African Americans.  Poverty data is provided by the 2006 Almanac of 
State Legislative Elections for the years 2001-2008.  For the years 2006-2008, the variables 
average household income and the percent of African Americans in each house district is 
provided by the 2006 Almanac of State Legislative Elections.  Data for legislator caucus 
membership is obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives or the 
Caucus’ themselves. 
 In addition, not all measurements of legislator need used by Adler and Lapinski are 
easily available at the state level.  Moreover, not all committees in the Louisiana House 
standing committees are examined in Alder and Lapinski’s congressional study including: 
Health and Welfare, Governmental Affairs, Municipal, Retirement, and Labor.  In both of 
these cases the most appropriate census data is used.  Further, standing committees such as 
Appropriations, Civil Law, Judiciary, Retirement, and Ways and Means are excluded from 
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Table 3.3: Legislator Caucus Membership on Committees as Determined through 
Constituent Characteristics 
 
Committees 
District Types with the Highest 
Expected Need as defined by 
Adler and Lapinksi 
Identified Caucuses and 
delegations whose members 
represent districts types 
with the highest expected 
need 
   Administration of 
Criminal Justice 
* Districts with a high % of 
African Americans, high % of 
individuals living in urban areas, 
and high % below poverty line 
Black Caucus 
   
Agriculture *Agricultural Districts Acadiana Delegation 
  Rural Caucus 
   
Commerce * Districts with a high % of pop. 
employed in wholesale and retail 
trade, finance, insurance, and real 
estate 
Orleans Delegation 
Jefferson Delegation 
Capital Region Delegation 
   
Education  *District with a large % of its pop. 
attends public elementary and high 
school, avg. of district household 
income 
Black Caucus 
Rural Caucus 
   
Environment  Districts with a high % of natural  Rural Caucus 
 resources Acadiana Delegation 
   
Health and Welfare % of districts with disabilities, % 
employed in healthcare, *% of 
district age 55 or over, % below 
poverty line 
Black Caucus 
Rural Caucus 
   
Government Affairs   % of district employed in public 
administration 
Black Caucus 
   
Insurance *% of district employed in 
insurance 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
Labor 
 
Districts with a high % of the pop. 
employed in manufacturing 
 
 
Acadian Caucus 
Rural Caucus 
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(table continued) 
  
Municipal Districts with a high % of pop. 
employed in local government 
Black Caucus 
   
Natural Resources  Districts with a high % of natural 
resources 
Acadian Caucus 
Rural Caucus 
   
Transportation * District with a high % of its pop. 
employed in transportation and 
warehousing 
Jefferson Delegation 
 
Note: *Obtained from Adler and Lapinski’s (1997), no * data is based on this author’s 
expectation of districts with the highest expected need for membership onto a specific 
committee based on the jurisdiction of the committee. Appropriations, Civil Law, Judiciary, 
Retirement, and Environment Committees are excluded because of the lack of district and 
Caucus characteristics directly related to the jurisdiction of the committee. 
 
 
this table because of the lack of legislator district characteristics directly related to the 
jurisdiction of these committees.  Lastly, due to limited membership both the Independent 
and Women’s Caucuses are omitted from this analysis.   
3.7 Legislator Occupation 
Legislator occupation characteristics are obtained from the 1999-2008 Louisiana 
House of Representatives and from Kathleen Bratton.  Occupation is coded one if a 
legislator belongs to a specific occupation and zero if not.  Legislator jobs are chosen based 
on whether they directly relate to each committee’s jurisdiction.  For a list of these 
occupations and the committees they relate to, please refer to Table 3.4.  As a result of the 
lack of legislator occupations relating to the jurisdiction of specific Louisiana House 
committees, the following committees have been removed from this analysis: 
Appropriations, Environment, Government Affairs, Labor, Municipal, Natural Resources, 
Retirement, Transportation, and Ways and Means.  
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Table 3.4: Occupation Characteristics and Committee Types 
 
 
Committee 
 
Legislator Occupation 
Administration of Criminal Justice Lawyer, Law Enforcement 
  
Agriculture Cattleman, Farmer 
  
Civil Law Lawyer, Law Enforcement 
  
Commerce Wholesale Trade, Retail, Financial 
Planner, Communication Company 
Executive, CEO, Business Owner, 
Businessman, Business Consultant, Tax 
Consultant, CPA, Accountant, Investment 
Banker, Real Estate 
 
Education  Educator, Coach, College Administrator, 
Professor, Educational 
Administrator, Athletic Director 
 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
Occupations related to health (such as  a 
nurse, psychologist, physical therapist, or 
welfare (any profession that was focused 
on addressing poverty or socioeconomic 
status--most commonly social work, 
official positions in non-profit agencies, 
positions in government agencies designed 
to address poverty or the needs of the 
disadvantages) (Dr. Bratton).  
  
Insurance Insurance Owner/Agent 
  
Judiciary Lawyer, Law Enforcement 
  
Note: Appropriations, Environment, Government Affairs, Labor, Municipal, and 
Natural Resources, Retirement, Transportation and Ways and Means Committees are 
excluded because of a lack of legislator occupations directly related to the jurisdiction 
of these committees.  
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3.8 Conclusion 
In sum, this chapter provides a detailed account of how this study examines support 
for the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theories in the 1999-2008 Louisiana 
House of Representatives.  I begin by laying out two models of legislator committee 
assignments.  In the first model, I test the distributive, informational, and major party cartel 
theories by determining whether legislators seek committee assignments based on individual 
committee preferences.  In fact, to achieve an accurate result, I use a difference of mean and 
a difference of median test to measure how closely individual committee member preferences 
represent the views of the whole chamber.  Following the current trend in committee 
research, legislator committee preferences are measured using: legislator ideology, interest 
group scores, political party affiliation, district characteristics, and occupation.  In addition to 
this, I introduce a new legislator characteristic measurement based on legislator caucus 
membership.  Lastly, using similar data and measurements as model one, I explore the extent 
to which legislators choose committee assignments based on multiple considerations.  
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CHAPTER 4: STATISTICAL RESULTS 
Traditionally, the study of legislator committee assignments revolves around three 
main theories: informational, distributive, and major party cartel.  Particularly, at the root of 
these theories lies an explanation of legislator committees assignments based on one single 
legislator motivation: legislator interest, party, or institutional interest.  In contrast, this study 
adds to the current literature by arguing legislator committee preferences are not likely to be 
explained through a sole motivation; rather, a combination of motivations.  With this is mind, 
I create and develop a multi-motivational approach to testing the informational, distributive, 
and major party cartel theory.   
Furthermore, this dissertation seeks to provide a more accurate test of the theories of 
legislator organization by analyzing and developing a broader approach to testing the three 
theories.  Presently, many researchers (for example Cox and McCubbins 1993; Weingast and 
Marshall 1988; Krehbiel 1991; Glen R. Parker, Suzanne Parker, Copa, and Lawhorn 2004, 
Overby and Kazee 2000) examining the major tenets of the three theories of legislative 
organization seek to provide support based on narrow measurements of legislator committee 
preferences.  The current reliance of scholars on limited measurements of legislator 
committee preferences to test legislator committee development theories has several 
drawbacks.  The main disadvantage of these limited measurements is their inability to fully 
capture all legislator committee motivations.  For instance, if scholars rely solely on district 
characteristics to measure legislator committee preferences, they capture the role constituent 
interest plays in legislator committee membership, but not the role of legislator personal 
goals (Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004).   
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With this in mind, this dissertation seeks to fill this methodological gap by employing  
several measurements of legislator committee preferences including: legislator ideology, 
party, district characteristics, occupation, interest group scores, as well as introducing a new 
measurement based on legislator party caucus membership.   
Under these circumstances, this dissertation seeks support for the distributive, 
informational, and major party cartel theories by determining whether committee members 
represent views contrary to the views of the whole, similar to the whole, moreover whether 
majority party committee members represent views similar to the majority party on control 
committees.  
As a result, this analysis finds mixed support for the distributive and informational 
theories and furthermore, and minimal to no support for the major party cartel theory.  
Support for the theories of legislative committee development is dependent upon the 
measurement used to explore the extent to which committee look like the membership of the 
whole chamber.  I further find support for each of these theories varies across time and 
committee. Thereby leading support for the expectation that legislators’ committee 
assignments are a reflection of multiple motivations: constituents, party, and institutional 
interest.  
In keeping with the traditional terminology used in previous studies to test the 
informational, distributive, and major party cartel theories, standing committees in the 1999-
2008 Louisiana House of Representatives found to contain members unrepresentative of the 
views of the whole legislature are identified as preference outlier committees.  For the 
purposes of this paper, preference outlier committees are those committees composed of 
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members who represent mean (median) views divergent from the mean (median) views of 
the whole legislature or their party.   
To conclude, this chapter begins by examining support for the informational, 
distributive, and major party cartel theory, by organizing its results according to two models 
of legislator committee assignments.  First of all, in the first model, the three theories of 
committee development are tested using individual legislator committee preferences: 
legislator ideology, interest group scores, political affiliation, district characteristics, 
occupation, and legislator party caucus membership.  Relying on these measurements, a 
difference of mean and a difference of median test are used to determine how closely 
individual committee member preferences represent the views of the whole chamber.  After 
this, using similar measurements and data as model one, mixed support for the distributive, 
informational, and major party cartel theory is determined by creating a comprehensive 
analysis of model one.  
4.1 Testing the Informational and Distributive Theory 
 In Tables 4.1 – 4.8, this dissertation seeks support for the informational and 
distributive theories.  The informational theory is tested, by determining whether Louisiana 
House committee members represent views similar to the views of the whole legislature.  
Conversely, the distributive theory, predicts committee members will not represent views 
similar to the views of the whole legislature.  To determine support for these two theories, 
this study relies on both Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, 
district characteristics, and party caucus membership.   
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4.1.1 Ideology 
Relying on Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores and difference of median test to 
probe for preference outliers in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees, Table 
4.1 reveals evidence of Louisiana House committees as preference outliers in twenty of one 
hundred and seventy cases.  Out of these cases, the only consistent committees composed of 
legislators representing different ideologies from the whole legislature are the Ways and 
Means and the Transportation Committees.  Accordingly, over a ten year span, these two 
committees show responsibility for sixty percent of the outlier cases found in the Louisiana 
House standing committees.  Specifically speaking, the Ways and Means Committee 
constitutes forty percent of the outliers and the Transportation Committee only twenty 
percent (a preference outlier committee only for the years 2004-2007).  More importantly, 
similar results are also found in Tables 4.2 and Appendix Table A.12-A.21 using the 
difference of mean test.  
Adding to these results, Appendix Tables A.2-A.4 and A.7-A.10 clearly show for the 
years 1999-2001 and 2004-2007, only between .05 percent and thirty percent of committee 
members on the Ways and Means Committee represent ideologies similar to fifty-five to 
sixty percent of non-committee members.  In fact as displayed in Appendix Figures A.4.1 
through A.4.4, the ideological leaning of Ways and Means Committee members’ floor voting 
patterns compared to the House as a whole tend to be concentrated towards the moderate 
liberal end of the liberal/conservative continuum.  Non-committee members voting patterns 
tend to range from moderate to strong conservative.  In Appendix Figure A.4.1-A.4.3 both 
the 1999, 2000, and 2004 Ways and Means Committee members voting patterns tend to 
concentrate toward the liberal end of the liberal/conservative continuum.  Non-committee 
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Table 4.1: Difference of Medians for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Poole and Rosenthal 
W-nominate Scores  
 
 
 
 
 
Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
Number of years 
committee is a 
preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N N     Y** N N N N N N N 1 
Agriculture N N N  Y* N N N N N N 0 
Appropriations N N N  Y* N  Y*  Y* N N N 0 
Civil Law N N N   Y**      Y*** N N N N N 2 
Commerce N N  Y* N N N N N N N 0 
Education N N  Y* N N N     Y** N N N 1 
Environment N N N N  Y* N N N N N 0 
Health and Welfare N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Government Affairs N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Insurance N N N N N    Y**      Y*** N  Y* N 2 
Judiciary N N    Y** N N N N N N N 1 
Labor N  Y*  Y* N N N N N N N 0 
Municipal N N N  Y*  Y* N N N N  Y* 0 
Natural Resources N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Retirement N    Y** N N N N N N N N 1 
Transportation N N  Y* N N    Y**      Y***      Y***      Y*** N 4 
Ways and Means      Y***       Y***      Y***      Y*** N      Y***    Y**      Y***      Y*** N 8 
Number of committees in a 
given year that have 
significant differences 
1 2 3 2 1 3 4 2 2 0 20 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are produced by a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton.  They are based on Louisiana House contested roll call votes and  range 
from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative). 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier  
Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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Table 4.2: Difference of Means for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Poole and Rosenthal W-
nominate Scores  
 
 
 
Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
Number of years 
committee is a 
preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N N N N N N   Y* N N N 0 
Agriculture N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Appropriations N N N N N  Y*    Y** N  Y* N 1 
Civil Law N N N    Y** N N N N N N 1 
Commerce N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Education N N N N N N  Y* N N    Y** 1 
Environment N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Health and Welfare     Y** N N N N N N N N N 1 
Government Affairs N N N N N    Y** N N N N 1 
Insurance N N N N N N N N   Y* N 0 
Judiciary N N  Y* N N N N N N  Y* 0 
Labor N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Municipal N N N N N     Y** N N N  Y* 1 
Natural Resources N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Retirement N        N N N N N         Y**    Y**     Y** N 3 
Transportation N N N N N     Y**       Y***      Y***      Y*** N 4 
Ways and Means      Y***       Y***       Y***    Y** N      Y***     Y**      Y***      Y*** N 8 
Number of committees in a 
given year that have 
significant differences 
2 1 1 2 0 4 4 3 3 1 21 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are produced by a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton.  They are based on Louisiana House contested roll call votes and  range 
from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative) 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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members tend to shift more toward the conservative end of the continuum.  Conversely, 
Appendix Figure A.4.4 in 2008 displays evidence that Ways and Means Committee members 
are more conservative in their voting patterns than in 1999, 2000, and 2004.  Non-committee 
members are more evenly disbursed in their voting patterns, but still concentrate toward the 
conservative end of the spectrum. 
In the end, the statistical analysis presented in Table 4.1 and 4.2 and further expanded 
on in Appendix Table A.2-A.21 provide overwhelming evidence that Louisiana House 
legislators represent ideologies similar to the whole House.  As a result, overall support for 
the informational theory is confirmed with the exception of two House committees - Ways 
and Means and Transportation.   
4.1.2 LABI Interest Group Scores 
Alternatively, using LABI business interest group scores instead of Poole and 
Rosenthal ideology scores and a difference of median test to examine preference outliers in 
the 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees, Table 4.3 reveals, for the most part, 
committee members and non-committee members represent similar business interest.  
Having said this, there is a slightly higher occurrence of preference outlier committees using 
LABI scores then Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores.  Namely, preference outliers 
occur in twenty six out of one hundred and seventy cases.  That is to say, six more times then 
found using Poole and Rosenthal scores.  
 Similar to the results found using Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores, the Ways 
and Means and Transportation Committees contain the greatest amount of preference 
outliers.  For the years 1999-2008, the Ways and Means Committee is a preference outlier 
committee for nine out of ten years.  Likewise, but, without the same magnitude, the  
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Transportation Committee represents interests different from the whole legislature for four 
out of ten years.  Conversely, contrasting the results found using Poole and Rosenthal W-
nominate scores, in Table 4.3 the Appropriations Committee is an outlier for three (2004, 
2006, and 2007) of the ten years analyzed.  
Expanding on this finding, Appendix Table A.22-31 provides specific percentages of 
committee and non-committee members representing interests in favor of the LABI.  For 
instance, in Appendix Table A.22 for the year 1999 twenty one percent of Ways and Means 
Committee voted more often than not for policies in the interests of the LABI compared to 
fifty-two percent of the whole legislature.  Additionally, in 2004 Appendix Table A.27 
reveals eleven percent of Ways and Means Committee members voted more often the not in 
favor of the interests of the LABI compared to fifty-three percent of non-committee 
members.  
By the same token, Appendix Figures A.4.5 through A.4.8 also shows a deeper 
understanding of the findings in Table 4.3.  Collaborating the results describe in Appendix 
Table A.22-A.31, by comparing the pro-business (conservative) or liberal ideological 
leanings of committee members to the 1999, 2000, 2004 and 2008 to the Louisiana House as 
a whole, Appendix Figures A.4.5 through A.4.8 provide evidence that Ways and Means 
Committee members voting patterns are more liberal than non-committee members whose 
voting patterns are more pro-business.   
Altogether, Table 4.3 and Appendix Tables A.22-A.31 provide evidence that the 
1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committee members and non-committee members 
represent similar business interest.  This being the case, support for the informational theory 
is established with the primary exception of the Ways and Means Committee as well as a few 
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isolated exemptions, including but not limited to the Appropriations and Transportation 
Committee.  
Incidentally, it is important to note, as shown in Table 4.4 and Appendix Tables A.32-
A.41 there is a slightly lower occurrence of outliers found using the difference of mean test.  
Indeed, displayed in Table 4.4 committees are preference outliers in nineteen of hundred and 
seventy cases.  Notwithstanding this, both statistical tests still provide similar results for the 
Ways and Means Committee and Transportation Committees.  
4.1.3 Summary 
On the whole, evaluating the results in Tables 4.1 through 4.4, preference outliers are 
rare in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House Legislature.  The Ways and Means Committee is the 
only committee to consistently be a preference outlier.  Portraying results found using both 
difference of median and mean tests Tables 4.1 through 4.4 reveal overall support against the 
distributive theory and in favor of informational theory.  Louisiana House legislators do not 
disproportionally gain membership onto the 1999-2008 Louisiana House committees, based 
on their ideology or interest group scores.  This finding is supported in the following 
committees: Administration of Criminal Justice, Agriculture, Appropriations, Civil Law, 
Commerce, Education, Environment, Health and Welfare, Government Affairs, Insurance, 
Judiciary, Labor, Municipal, Natural Resources, and Retirement.  The Ways and Means is the 
only committee to substantially show that its membership is disproportionally composed of 
members representing specific ideology and interest group scores.   
4.1.4 Legislator District Characteristics 
Indeed, support for the informational theory and against distributive theory is further 
substantiated through legislator district characteristics.  Using the same statistical methods as
71 
 
Table 4.3: Difference of Medians for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using LABI scores 
 
 
 
LABI scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
Number of years  
committee is a 
preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N N N N N N Y*    Y** N N 1 
Agriculture N      Y*** N N N N N N  Y* N 1 
Appropriations N N N N N     Y** N     Y**      Y*** N 3 
Civil Law N  Y* N N  Y* N N N N N 0 
Commerce N N N N N N Y* N N  Y* 0 
Education  Y* N N N N N  Y** N N N 1 
Environment N N N N N N Y* N N N 0 
Health and Welfare  Y* N N N N N N N N N 0 
Government Affairs N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Insurance N     Y** N N N N    Y** N N N 2 
Judiciary    Y** N N N N N N N N N 1 
Labor N N N N     Y** N N N N N 1 
Municipal N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Natural Resources    Y** N N N N N N N N N 1 
Retirement    Y**       Y*** N N N N  Y* N N N 2 
Transportation N N N N N      Y***      Y***      Y***      Y*** N 4 
Ways and Means    Y**      Y***     Y**      Y***    Y**     Y***      Y***      Y***    Y** N 9 
Number of committees in a 
given year that have 
significant differences 
4 4 1 1 2 3 4 4 3 0 26 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the 
interest of  LABI) 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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Table 4.4: Difference of Means for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using LABI scores 
 
 
 
LABI scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
Number of years  
committee is a 
preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Agriculture N     Y** N N N N N N  Y* N 1 
Appropriations N N N N N  Y* N  Y*    Y** N 1 
Civil Law N     Y** N N  Y* N N N N N 1 
Commerce N N N N N N  Y* N  Y*  Y* 0 
Education N N N N N     Y**  Y* N N N 1 
Environment N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Health and Welfare N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Government Affairs N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Insurance N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Judiciary N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Labor N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Municipal N N N N N    Y** N  Y* N N 1 
Natural Resources   Y* N N N N N  Y* N N N 0 
Retirement   Y*     Y** N N N N  Y* N N N 1 
Transportation N N N N N      Y***      Y***      Y***      Y*** N 4 
Ways and Means     Y**      Y***       Y***     Y** N      Y***      Y***      Y***    Y** N 8 
Number of committees in a 
given year that have 
significant differences 
1 4 1 1 0 4 2 2 3 0 18 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the 
interest of  LABI) 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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employed for Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores, as well as, LABI interest group 
scores, Table 4.5 - 4.6 reveals, for the most part, Louisiana House standing committees 
in1999-2008 are not overrepresented by members representing district characteristics that 
differ from the whole.   
Namely, out of 270 cases in Table 4.5, Louisiana House standing committees contain 
preference outliers in only 23 cases.  Out of these 23 cases, the Agriculture Committee is 
responsible for 17 of them, the Health and Welfare Committee for four, and the Judiciary 
Committee for two. 
Specifically, in regards to the Agriculture Committee, Appendix Table A.42-A.47 and 
A.51 reveals for the years 1999-2004 and 2008 between eighty-two and ninety-four percent 
of  Agriculture Committee members represent districts with an above median percentage of 
their district employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting compared to between 
twenty-four and thirty-eight percent of non-committee members.  Further, providing 
supplementary evidence to the results found in Table 4.5, Appendix Figure A.4.9 and A.4.10 
display evidence that Agriculture Committee members tend to represent districts with 
moderate to high levels of individuals employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing 
industry.  In contrast, non-committee members tend to represent districts with significantly 
smaller amounts of their district employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing than 
committee members.  Moreover, in Appendix Figure A.4.11 and Appendix Figure A.4.12, 
2004 and 2008 committee members tend to represent districts with moderate to less moderate 
percentages of their district employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing.  Non-
committee members primarily represent districts with constituents rarely employed in 
agriculture, forestry, hunting, or fishing.  
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Table 4.5: Summary of Results for Determinants of Preference Outliers Using the Difference of Medians for the 1999 Through 
2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Constituency Characteristics  
 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing Committee 
 
 
1999 
 
 
2000 
 
 
2001 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
 
2004 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
 
Number of years committee is 
a preference outlier  
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% of pop. living in urban areas 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting  
 
% living in rural farming areas 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
10 
 
 
N/A 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
 
Pop. density 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
0 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale  or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real 
estate 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
  N 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
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(table continued) 
           
Health and Welfare  
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% poverty 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Y* 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Y** 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y* 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
3 
 
1 
 
0 
Government Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration  
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
Judiciary 
 
% African Americans 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y* 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y** 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y* 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
Y* 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
Y* 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
                        0 
Municipal 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
                        0 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
% on social security 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y* 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
0 
 
0 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
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(table continued)  
           
Number of committees in a given year that have 
significant differences  
 
 
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 16 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable 
 Legislator district data is obtained from various sources including Almanac of State Legislative Elections and the U.S. Census  
 Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference 
outlier, under the Agriculture committee % living in rural areas is defined as N/A to prevent double counting the committee as a preference outlier due to the fact that the committee is 
already counted as a preference outlier for those years 
Out of 270 cases there are 23 instances of  preference outliers 
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Lastly, the results in Table 4.5 and Appendix Table A.42-A.51 are further 
substantiated through a difference of mean test displayed in Table 4.6 and Appendix Tables 
A.52-A.61.  In contrast, to the difference of median test, the difference of mean test does 
identify a slightly higher occurrence of preference outlier committees.  However, both tests 
provide similar results to each other.  So, with the exception of the Agriculture Committee 
overall, the results in Table 4.5-4.6, and Appendix Table A.42-A.61 display the greatest 
support for informational theory and minimal support for distributive theory.  Indeed, the 
existence of preference outliers in 1999-2008 Louisiana House standing committees is rare.  
Above all, committee members tend to represent similar district characteristics to the whole 
legislature. 
 In sum, the absence of support for the distributive theory using Poole and Rosenthal 
ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, and constituent characteristics in the Judiciary, 
Administration of Criminal Justice, Commerce, and Civil Law Committees is not surprising 
since these committees traditionally lack jurisdiction over district related policies and 
therefore are unlikely to attract legislators seeking their districts interests (Maltzman 1997).  
However, in alignment with the expectations of the distributive theory, which states that 
support for the theory is most likely to be found in committees providing specialized benefits 
to its members, support for the distributive theory is found in the district related Agriculture 
Committee. 
Furthermore, support for the distributive theory in the Agriculture Committee 
provides substantial support for Maltzman’s (1997) contention that support for the 
distributive theory is most likely found in constituent based committees, such as the 
Agriculture Committee and not in policy or prestige committees.  According to Maltzman 
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(1997), constituent committees often deal with low salient issues or those issues of low 
interest to a wide range of individuals (Maltzman 1997).  Importantly, since low salient 
issues do not often attract a lot of attention, legislatures primarily do not place a lot of 
pressure on committee members to pass policies beneficial to the whole.  Therefore, support 
for the distributive theory is more likely to be found in constituent committees than in policy 
or prestige committees that deal with more salient issues (Maltzman 1997).  Additionally, 
support for the distributive theory in the Ways and Means, a control committee handling 
important issues (such as monetary issues), is particularly interesting since it stands in 
contrast to traditional congressional findings as noted by Overby and Kazee (2000) that 
control committees are not likely to be outliers ( Krehbiel 1990).   
4.1.5 Occupation  
Furthermore, this study uses legislator occupation to determine support for the 
specialization tenet of the informational theory.  Under this tenet legislatures create 
committees to provide specialization and information to the legislature as a whole (Maltzman 
1997).  One way legislatures increase their specialization is by tapping into the expertise of 
individual legislators, as seen through their occupations (Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011).  
As a whole, this analysis reveals Louisiana House standing committees are not 
overrepresented by members representing occupations directly related to jurisdiction of  
specific committees, therein providing overall support against a major tenet of the 
informational theory.   
In fact, after examining the Louisiana House Administration of Criminal Justice, 
Agriculture, Civil Law, Commerce, Education, Health and Welfare, Insurance, and Judiciary 
Committees, Table 4.7 reveals a difference of mean test preference outlier committees exists
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Table 4.6: Summary of Results for Determinants of Preference Outliers Using the Difference of Means for the 1999 Through 
2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Using Constituency Characteristics 
 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing Committee 
 
 
1999 
 
 
2000 
 
 
2001 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
 
2004 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
 
Number of years committee is 
a preference outlier  
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% of pop. living in urban areas 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y* 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting  
 
% living in rural farming areas 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
Y*** 
 
 
10 
 
 
N/A 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
 
Pop. density 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
Y* 
 
 
N 
 
Y* 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
0 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale  or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and real 
estate 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
Y* 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
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(table continued) 
           
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
  N 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
Health and Welfare  
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% poverty 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Y* 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Y** 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
Y** 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
Y* 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
0 
 
4 
 
2 
 
0 
Government Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration  
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
Judiciary 
 
% African Americans 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y** 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y** 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
Y* 
 
N 
 
N 
 
Y** 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
Y** 
 
N 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
3 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
                        0 
Municipal 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
                        0 
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(table continued) 
    
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
% on social security 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
N 
 
N/A 
 
 
0 
 
0 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
  
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
Y* 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
Number of committees in a given year that have 
significant differences  
1 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 20 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable 
 Legislator district data is obtained from various sources including Almanac of State Legislative Elections and the U.S. Census  
 Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference 
outlier, under the Agriculture committee % living in rural areas is defined as N/A to prevent double counting the committee as a preference outlier due to the fact that the committee is 
already counted as a preference outlier for those years 
Out of 270 cases there are 27 cases of preference outliers 
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in only 18 out of 80 cases or 23 % of the time.  Having said this, with the exception of the 
Education Committee, for at least one out of the ten years analyzed, every committee is 
overrepresented by members with occupational backgrounds related to policies falling under 
the jurisdiction of these committees.  
Specifically speaking, Table 4.7 shows for the years 2004, 2006, and 2008 the 
Louisiana House Agriculture Committee is overrepresented by legislators with previous or 
current job experience as cattlemen and farmers.  Additionally, in 2000-2001, and 2008 the 
Administration of Criminal Justice and in 2002-2003, and 2008 the Judiciary Committees are 
overrepresented by legislators with law or law enforcement backgrounds.  
Furthermore, for the years 2004 and 2006 the Commerce and in 1999 and 2008 
Health and Welfare Committees are overrepresented by members who were once or are 
currently employed in commerce or health and welfare occupations.  Lastly, in 2002-2004, 
and 2006 the Insurance Committee is overrepresented by legislators with job backgrounds in 
insurance industry (i.e. insurance salesmen). 
In sum, for the most part, Louisiana House standing committees represent similar 
backgrounds to the legislators in the whole house, thereby providing support against the 
specialization tenet of the informational theory.  However, having said that, it is important to 
note more preference outlier committees are found using the occupation measurement than 
Poole and Rosenthal Ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, or district characteristics 
scores.  Taken as a whole, for the years 1999-2008, Louisiana House standing committees 
identified as the Administration of Criminal Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Health and 
Welfare, Insurance, and Judiciary Committees are preference outlier committees twenty-
three percent of the time.  In rare cases, Louisiana House standing committees are  
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Table 4.7: Summary of Results for Determinants of Preference Outliers Using the 
Difference of Means for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives 
Using Legislator Occupation 
 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
 
1999 
 
 
2000 
 
 
2001 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
 
2004 
 
 
2005 
 
 
2006 
 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
# of years 
committee is a 
preference 
outlier 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice  
 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement 
occupation  
 
 
N 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
 
3 
 
Agriculture 
 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
 
N 
 
 
 
 Y* 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
 
  
Y** 
 
 
N 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
 
N 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
 
3 
 
Civil Law 
 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement 
occupation  
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
 
  Y** 
 
 
1 
Commerce 
 
Commerce occupation  
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
  
Y** 
 
 
N 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
2 
Education 
 
Education occupation  
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
0 
Health and Welfare  
 
Health and Welfare 
occupation  
 
 
  
Y** 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
  Y** 
 
 
2 
Insurance 
 
Insurance occupation  
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
  Y** 
 
 
  Y** 
 
 
  
Y** 
 
 
N 
 
 
  Y** 
 
 
N 
 
 
N 
 
 
4 
Judiciary 
 
Lawyer/ Law Enforcement 
occupation  
 
Number of committees in a 
given year that have 
significant differences 
    
 
 
N 
 
1 
 
 
N 
 
1 
 
 
N 
 
1 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
2 
 
 
  
Y*** 
 
2 
 
 
N 
 
3 
 
 
N 
 
0 
 
 
N 
 
3 
 
 
N 
 
0 
 
 
   
Y*** 
 
5 
 
 
3 
 
18 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable 
 Legislator occupation data is obtained from various sources including Dr.Bratton and the Louisiana House of Representatives, occupation 
is coded (1) if a legislator belongs to a specific occupation and (0) if not 
 Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the 
number of years a committee is a preference outlier  
 
overrepresented by legislators currently or once employed in fields related to policies falling 
under the jurisdiction of these committees compared to the job occupations of the whole 
house.  Additionally, subsequently due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable 
used in this analysis, a difference of median test was not conducted.  
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Lastly, empirical support against the specialization tenet of the informational theory 
found in Table 4.7 is further substantiated through a preliminary test of Louisiana committee 
stability over time.  Noted scholars as recently as 2011 remark, “committee membership 
stability is important to fostering committee expertise and knowledge” (Jewell 1962, 94 as 
cited in Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011, 304).   Exploring this idea, scholars such as Hamm 
and Hedlund (1994) have found “the best predictor of committee continuity is the percentage 
of members who serve in the previous legislative session (Hamm and Hedlund 1994, as cited 
in Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011, 305).”  Therefore, I examine committee membership 
stability in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives, by comparing the percentage 
of legislators residing on the same legislative committee in current and past legislative 
sessions. However, for legislator committee stability to exist, legislators’ must be reelected 
(Hamm, Hedlund, and Post 2011).  Exploring legislator turnover in the 1996, 2000, 2004, 
and 2008 Louisiana House legislative sessions, I conclude with the exception of 2008 
legislator turnover is rare.  For the most part legislators are reelected from one session to the 
next.  
 Further, conducting a quick preliminary analysis of a small sample of legislator 
committee membership stability from session to session, I find membership is somewhat 
stable from 1996 to 2000 and 2000 to 2004 but there is unquestionably movement.  In the 
case of several legislators I examined, representatives usually changed membership on at 
least one committee.  Further the turnover rate in 2008 was substantial, leading to several 
committee membership changes from 2004 to 2008.  In all, based on this finding, it is 
probable to assume that committee membership instability in the Louisiana House could 
foster a lack of committee specialization.  
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4.1.6 Caucus and Delegation Membership 
Examining all 17 Louisiana House standing committees across the years 1999 
through 2008, Table 4.8 using a difference of mean test reveals significant evidence that 
when compared to non-committee members, Louisiana House committees are 
overrepresented by members representing caucuses with a direct stake in the policies enacted 
under their jurisdiction.  Indeed, this finding is substantiated in fifty percent or more of the 
years analyzed for the following committees: Agriculture, Governmental Affairs, Insurance, 
Municipal, and Natural Resources. Likewise, the same results were revealed for thirty to 
forty percent of the years studied in the: Commerce, Education, Environment, Health and 
Welfare, and Labor Committees.  In all, with the exception of the Administration of Criminal 
Justice, Appropriations, and Retirement Committees, every committee in the Louisiana 
House of Representatives are overrepresented by members representing specific caucuses for 
at least one of the ten years analyzed.   
Moreover, breaking down the results found in Table 4.8 by individual years, this 
study shows for the years 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2008, 29% of committees are preferences 
outliers.  In the years 2001, 2002, and 2006, 35% of Louisiana standing committees are 
preference outliers.  In 2004, 2005, and 2007, 41% of Louisiana House standing committees 
are preference outliers.  
Specifically, looking only at standing committees representing preference outlier 
committees fifty percent or more of the time in Table 4.8, this analysis shows the Agriculture 
Committee is overrepresented by legislators representing the Rural Caucus.  Further, the 
Government Affairs Committee and Municipal Committees are overrepresented seven out of 
ten years by the Acadiana, Rural, or the Jefferson Delegation.  Moreover, the Insurance 
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Committee is a preference outlier committee for eight out of ten years, by the Acadiana, 
Jefferson Delegations and the Black Caucus.  While the Natural Resource Committee, on the 
other hand, is overrepresented six out of ten years by the Acadiana Caucus. Finally, the 
Labor Committee is a preference outlier committee for six years, either by the Rural, 
Acadiana, or the Black Caucus and the Jefferson or Orleans Delegations.  
In sum, in Table 4.8, there is moderate support for both distributive theory and 
informational theory.  Most importantly, support for the distributive theory depends on the 
year and committee being analyzed.  For instance, in 2005, support for distributive theory is 
found in fifty-nine percent of Louisiana House committees while in 2004, support was in 
forty-one percent of committees.  Notably, preference outlier committees appear in both 
prestigious and highly sought after Louisiana House committees such as the Agriculture and 
Natural Resource Committees, as well as in non-prestigious Louisiana House committees 
including the Municipal, Commerce, and Insurance.    Furthermore, the findings in Table 4.8 
stand in direct contrast to the overall results in favor of informational and against distributive 
found using Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, district 
characteristics, and occupation.  
Admittedly, support for the distributive theory using legislative caucus membership 
variables do not conform to caucus constituent membership based expectations.  As state 
previously, one potential problem with the use of caucus membership to explain legislator 
preferences is the direct correlation between district characteristics and caucus membership.  
This correlation can be seen in the similar results found between caucus membership and 
constituent characteristics in Table 4.5 and 4.8.  In the same way, as Table 4.8 displays for 
the most part caucus members are not more likely to be overrepresented on committees with 
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jurisdiction over policies directly related to their members’ constituent characteristics, with 
the exception of the Agriculture, Natural Resource, Municipal and Health and Welfare 
Committees.  
 However, in keeping with this study’s expectations, the measurement Black Caucus 
does provide additional information over that gained through constituent characteristics.  To 
illustrate, in Table 4.8 the Black Caucus is overrepresented on the Municipal Committee for 
seven out of ten years studied.  Notably, as revealed in Appendix Table A.1, the Black 
Caucus is overrepresented by members representing districts with a large percentage of 
African Americans as well as a large % of their district employed in local government.   
While percent of a district employed in local government does not affect whether legislators 
join the Municipal Committee in Table 4.5, membership on the Black Caucus does affect 
membership onto the Municipal Committee in Table 4.8.   Diving deeper into the constituent 
characteristics of the Black Caucus, I find the percent black in a district affects membership 
onto the Municipal Committee in Table 4.8.   A district characteristic tapped into by the 
Black Caucus, but not assumed to affect membership onto the Municipal Committee by 
constituent characteristics.   
Notably, in Table 4.8, contrary to constituent and caucus expectations, the Civil Law, 
Environment, Governmental Affairs, Insurance, and Education Committees, are sporadically 
overrepresented by Caucuses representing district characteristics seemingly unrelated to the 
jurisdiction of each of these committees.   
While this finding is contrary to expectations, it does provide support for the distributive 
theory.  More importantly, while not expected several committees are overrepresented by 
geographic oriented caucuses.  For example, the Insurance Committee is overrepresented by 
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the Jefferson and Orleans Delegation.  This result, could cause policies promoted out of the 
Insurance Committee to support the interests of the Jefferson and Orleans Delegations at the 
expense of the whole state.  Finally, as a result of the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable used in this analysis, a difference of median test was not conducted.  
4.2 Testing the Major Party Cartel Theory 
This dissertation seeks support for the major party cartel theory by testing Hypothesis 
Three.  Under this hypothesis the majority party, that is the Democrats, in the 1999-2008 
Louisiana House of Representatives, stack standing committees in the Louisiana House with 
Democrat members representing the full range of views found in that party.  Specifically 
speaking, the major party cartel theory predicts this finding will especially hold true for 
important legislative committee, that is, those committees representing broad issues that 
affect the whole party, and less likely in more jurisdiction specific committees where policies 
only affect a few (Maltzman 1997).  To determine support for the major party cartel theory, 
this study relies on both Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores and LABI interest group 
scores.  
4.2.1 Ideology  
Exploring through Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores and by conducting a 
difference of median test, in Table 4.9, the results provides overall support against the major 
party cartel theory.  For the most part, preference outlier committees are rare in the 1999-
2008 Louisiana House.  Overall, standing Democrats committee members represent views 
similar to those of the whole House Democrat Party.  Unlike, as predicted under the major 
party cartel theory, representative committees are not more likely found on broad Louisiana 
committees than jurisdiction specific Louisiana committees.  In fact, preference outlier,
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Table 4.8: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preferences Outliers Based on Caucus Membership Using the 
Difference of Means Test for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives  
 
Louisiana House 
Standing Committee 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
# of years 
committee is a 
preference 
outlier  
Administration of 
Criminal Justice 
                      
                        
Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Black Caucus  Y*  Y* Y* Y* Y* N N N N N 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N  N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
            
Agriculture                       
                        
+Acadiana Caucus N Y* Y* Y* N Y* N N N  Y* 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N N N Y* Y* Y*    Y** 1 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Rural Caucus    Y**    Y**      Y***       Y***      Y***      Y***    Y**       Y***       Y***      Y*** 10 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
Appropriations                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
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(table continued)            
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
Civil Law                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N    Y**    Y**  Y* N N N N N 2 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
Commerce                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N  Y*    Y**    Y**  Y* N N N N N 2 
+Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N Y* N N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N  Y* 0 
+Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N      Y*** 1 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N Y* N 0 
+Capital Region 
Delegation 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
Education                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus     Y** N N N N     Y**    Y** N N N 3 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N    Y**  Y* 1 
+Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region  Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Y* 0 
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(table continued)                        
Environment                       
                        
+Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N/A 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N  Y*     Y**      Y***      Y*** N/A 3 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N/A 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N/A 0 
+Rural Caucus N N         N N N N N N N N/A 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  N/A N/A 
                        
Health and Welfare                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N  Y*  Y*  Y* N N N N  Y* N 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Black Caucus N N N N N    Y**    Y**    Y**  Y* N 3 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N N/A 
                        
Government Affairs                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus    Y**   Y**   Y**   Y**   Y** N N N N N 5 
Jefferson Delegation N   Y**   Y**   Y**   Y** N N N N N 4 
+Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N  Y* N N  Y* N 0 
Rural Caucus    Y**   Y** N N N    Y**  Y*  Y*   Y** N 4 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
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(table continued)            
Insurance                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus   N    Y** N  Y*  Y* N N N N N 1 
Jefferson Delegation     Y** N N  Y*  Y*    Y**    Y**    Y**    Y** N 5 
Black Caucus N N         N         N N    Y** N N N N 1 
Orleans Delegation N N N    Y**     Y** N    Y**    Y**  Y* N 4 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Capital Region 
Delegation 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
Judiciary                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N    Y** N N N N N 1 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA N/A N 0 
                        
Labor                       
                        
+Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N   Y** 1 
Jefferson Delegation N N  Y*  Y*  Y*  Y*  Y*  Y*  Y*    Y** 1 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 1 
Orleans Delegation N N N    Y**    Y** N N N N N 2 
+Rural Caucus N N    Y**   Y**   Y** N N N N       Y*** 4 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
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(table continued)            
Municipal                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Black Caucus    Y**       Y***    Y**  Y*  Y*      Y***      Y***      Y***      Y***   Y* 7 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N      Y*** N N N N 1 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N//A N/A N/A N/A   Y* 0 
                        
Natural Resources                       
                        
+Acadiana Caucus      Y*** N N N N       Y***    Y**       Y***       Y***      Y*** 6 
Jefferson Delegation  Y* N N N N N N N N N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N    Y** 1 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Rural Caucus  Y*  Y*  Y* N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
Retirement                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
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(table continued)            
Transportation                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
+Jefferson Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N   Y* N N N N N    Y** 1 
Rural Caucus N N N N N N N N N  Y* 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
Ways and Means                       
                        
Acadiana Caucus N     Y** N N   Y* N N N N N 1 
Jefferson Delegation N N N N N  Y*  Y*  Y*  Y* N 0 
Black Caucus N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Orleans Delegation N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Rural Caucus N N N N  N N N N N N 0 
Capital Region Delegation N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N 0 
                        
# of committees in a 
given year that have 
significant differences 
5 5 6 6 5 7 7 6 7 5 59 
 Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee, N/A data unavailable  
 Legislator caucus data is obtained from various sources including the caucuses themselves and the Louisiana House of Representatives, caucus is coded (1) if a legislator belongs to a specific caucus 
and (0) if not   
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01  
Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
+ represents caucuses or delegation expected to be overrepresented on each committee in Table 3.5 
Data is unavailable for the Capital Region Delegation from 1999-2007 due to its creation in 2008 
Data for the Environment Committee in unavailable (N/A) in 2008 due to it merging with the Natural Resource Committee in the same year 
# of years a committee is a preference outlier total takes into account for some years a committee is a preference outlier for more than one characteristic 
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unrepresentative committees are found in both broad and jurisdiction specific committees.  In 
other words, preference outlier committees occur in only fourteen out of one hundred seventy 
cases. Out of these fourteen cases, the Agriculture, Governmental Affairs, and Ways and 
Means Committees represent sixty-four percent of the cases, but even so, neither of these 
committees displays a consistent pattern of support as preference outlier committee.   
Moreover, supplementing Table 4.9 findings of a few preference outlier committees 
in the 1999-2008, looking specifically at the Ways and Means Committee, Appendix Table 
A.76-A.85 shows in 1999 twenty four percent of Democrat committee members represent 
ideological views similar to fifty-seven percent of Democrat non-committee members.  In 
2004 and 2005, twenty-eight percent of Democrat committee members represent views 
similar to fifty-seven percent of Democrat non-committee members.  Additionally, in 
Appendix Table A.78, in 2001 eighty percent of Democrat members on the Agriculture 
Committee represent ideological views similar to forty-two percent of Democrat non-
committee members.  In 2004, forty-two percent of Democrat non-committee members 
represent similar views to seventy-nine percent of Democrat Agriculture Committee 
members, compared to 2008, eighty two percent of Democrat committee members and forty-
one percent of non-committee members demonstrated a similar view.  Additional information 
on other significant committees is shown in Table 4.9, Appendix Tables A.76-A.85.   
 Appendix Figures A.4.13-A.4.24 add to these results in Table 4.9 and Appendix 
Table A.76-A.85, by displaying the distribution of Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores 
for both Democrat committee and Democrat non-committee members on specific Louisiana 
House standing committees.  In 2004 Appendix Figure A.4.18, reveals Democrat Ways and 
Means committee members are more liberal than their party.  Further examination of 
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Appendix Figure A.4.21 revealed that in 2004 Democrat Appropriation committee members 
are more conservative than their party members.  For the same year, as demonstrated in 
Appendix Figure A.4.16 and A.4.17 Democrats on the Governmental Affairs and Municipal 
Committees are more liberal than their party as a whole.  Lastly, Appendix Figure A.4.12 
exposes in 2008 the Democrats on the Agriculture Committee are more conservative than 
their party.   
Even more importantly, similar results are found in Table 4.10 and Appendix Tables  
A.86-A.95 using a difference of mean test.  However, comparatively speaking, a slightly 
higher occurrence of preference outlier committees is found using the difference of mean test 
over the difference of median test.  Still, for the most part, these differences are accounted for 
by the Municipal, Parochial and Cultural Affairs Committee.  Under the difference of median 
test the Municipal Committee is a preference outlier committee in the year 2004, whereas the 
difference of mean test shows it to be a preference outlier committee in 2003-2004, and 
2006-2007.  
In sum, in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 with the primary exception of sporadic support for the 
major party cartel theory in the Agriculture, Governmental Affairs, Municipal, and Ways and 
Means Committee, Democrat committee members represent similar views to the whole party.  
4.2.2 LABI Interest Group Scores  
Furthermore, in alignment with the preceding findings, LABI scores provide minimal 
support for major party cartel theory.  Namely, conducting a difference of median test in 
Table 4.11, this analysis finds there are only nine cases out of one hundred and seventy 
where Democrat standing committee members do not represent similar business interests to 
the whole Democrat Party.  The Agriculture Committee accounts for three of these cases.  
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Table 4.9: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Medians 
for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate Scores  
 
 
 
Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
# of years committee 
is a preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
    N       Y**       N    N N N N N N N 1 
Agriculture     N       N       Y***    N N     Y**       N  Y* N     Y** 3 
Appropriations     Y**       N       Y*    N N N N N        N N 1 
Civil Law     N       N       N    Y**    N N N N N   N 1 
Commerce     N       Y*         N    N N   Y*         N          N N        Y* 0 
Education     N       N       N    N N N N N N N 0 
Environment     N       N       N    N   Y* N N N   Y* N 0 
Health and Welfare     N       N       N    N        N N         N N N N 0 
Government Affairs     N       Y**        Y**    N N     Y** N   Y* N N 3 
Insurance     N       N       N    N N        N    N          N N N 0 
Judiciary     N       N       N    N N N         N N N        N 0 
Labor     N       N       N    N N N N N  N    N 0 
Municipal     N       Y* Y*    N   Y*     Y** N N N N 1 
Natural Resources     Y**          N       N    Y*   N        Y* N N N N 1 
Retirement     N         N       N    N N N      N N N N                 0 
Transportation     N       N       N    N N N N N N N 0 
Ways and Means   Y**       Y*       N        N        N     Y**        Y**              N     N   N 3      
# of committees in a given year 
that have significant 
differences 
    3       2            2     1 0 4 1 0 0           1 14 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are produced by a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton. They are based on Louisiana House contested roll call votes and  range 
from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative) 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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Table 4.10: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Means 
for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate Scores  
 
 
 
Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
# of years committee 
is a preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N Y* N N N N N N N N 0 
Agriculture N N Y** N N Y** Y** Y** N Y* 4 
Appropriations N Y** N N N N N N N N 1 
Civil Law N N N Y*** N N N N N N 1 
Commerce N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Education N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Environment N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Health and Welfare N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Government Affairs N N Y** N N Y** Y* Y** N N 3 
Insurance N N N N N Y* N N N N 0 
Judiciary N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Labor N N N N N N N N N Y* 0 
Municipal N N N N Y** Y*** Y* Y** Y** N 4 
Natural Resources Y** Y** N Y** N N N N N N 3 
Retirement N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Transportation N N N N N N Y* N N N 0 
Ways and Means Y* Y** N N N Y* Y** N N N 2 
# of committees in a given year 
that have significant 
differences 
1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 1 0 18 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are based on a program created by Poole and Rosenthal with the help of Dr. Bratton. They are based on  Louisiana House contested roll call votes and  range 
from -1 (strong liberal) to 1 (strong conservative) 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01 
 Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
Data for 2000-2003 obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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The Governmental Affairs and Municipal Committees each furnish support in two cases.  
Providing additional information to Table 4.11, and looking specifically at the Agriculture 
Committee in the Appendix Table A.97, A.101-A.102, seven percent of Democrat committee 
members on the 2000 Agriculture Committee support pro-business policies moderately to 
highly supported by the LABI compared to forty-nine percent of Democrat non-committee 
members.  In 2004, seventy-seven percent of Democrat committee members support pro-
business policies moderately to highly supported by the LABI compared to forty-two percent 
of Democrat non-committee members.  Lastly, in 2005 seventy-five percent of Democrat 
committee members represent pro-business views moderately to highly supported by the 
LABI compared to forty-two percent of non-committee members.  
Moreover, supplementing the results found in Table 4.11 and Appendix Table A.101 
and A.105, Appendix Figure 4.26 reveals 2004 Democrat committee members hold more 
conservative pro-business views than Democrat non-committee members.  Additionally, 
Figure 4.27 shows that 2008 Agriculture Democrat Committee members and non-committee 
members both hold moderate conservative pro-business views.  
Furthermore, collaborating the results found in Table 4.11, difference of mean test in 
Table 4.12 provides overall support against the major party cartel theory.  Having said this, 
Table 4.12 does find a higher occurrence of preference outlier committees using the 
difference of mean test over the Table 4.11’s difference of median test.  Specifically, Table 
4.12 shows six more cases of preference outlier committees than Table 4.11.  Particularly 
important, the Natural Resource Committee and Labor Committees are preference outlier 
committees for the first time under the difference of mean test.  Additionally, this test finds a 
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higher occurrence of times than the Transportation Committee, Agriculture, Governmental 
Affairs Committees are preference outliers.  
 In sum, for the most part, Table 4.11 and 4.12 reveals support against the major party 
cartel theory.  As a whole, Democratic membership on the 1999-2008 Louisiana House 
standing committees, represent similar business interests to the whole Democrat party. 
Conversely, while preference outlier committees are rare they do occur in the Agriculture, 
Governmental Affairs, Municipal, and Transportation Committee.  In all, there appears to be 
limited support for Cox and McCubbins (1993) contention the majority party will place 
members’ representative of the views of the whole party onto control committees, and allow 
members to self-select onto less important committees.  In fact, arguably the overall support 
for representative committees in both control and non-control committees bolsters support 
for the informational theory.  
4.3 Overall Findings  
As a final point, in the remaining section of this chapter the results in Tables 4.1-4.12 
are compared to evaluate the expectation of mixed support for the informational, distributive, 
and major party cartel theory.  Table 4.13 finds when including all measurements used in this 
analysis, mixed support for this expectation.  As a whole, 1999- 2008 Louisiana standing 
committees provide support for both the informational and distributive theories, and minimal 
to no support for the major party cartel theory.   
However, these results do not paint the whole picture.  Breaking down results 
reported in Tables 4.14-4.17 shows support for each of these theories is dependent upon the 
measurements used to examine support for the distributive, informational, and major party 
cartel theory.  Using Poole and Rosenthal Ideology scores, LABI interest group scores, and
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Table 4.11: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Medians 
for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives LABI Scores 
 
 
 
LABI Scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
# of years committee 
is a preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice     N       N       N    N N          N N N N N 0 
Agriculture     N       Y***       N    N N     Y**           Y**   Y* N N 3 
Appropriations     N       N       Y*          Y*    N N N N        Y* N 0 
Civil Law     N       N       N    N    N N N N N   N 0 
Commerce     N       N       N    N N N        N         N N        N 0 
Education     N       N       N    N N N N N N N 0 
Environment     N       N       N    N N N N N N N 0 
Health and Welfare     N       N       N    N        N N        N N N N 0 
Government Affairs      N       N       Y***          Y***    N N N   Y* N N 2 
Insurance     N       N       N    N N          N    N         N N N 0 
Judiciary     N       N       N    N N N        N N N        N 0 
Labor     N       N       N    Y*   N N N   Y*  N    N 0 
Municipal     N       N Y*    Y*    N N N     Y**      Y** N 2 
Natural Resources     N       N       N    N N          N N N N N 0 
Retirement     N         Y*       N    N N N       N N N N 0 
Transportation     N       Y*       Y**         N N N N   Y*    Y* N 1 
Ways and Means     N          N           N        N        N          N         Y**              N      N   N 1 
# of committees in a given year 
that have significant differences 
    0       1       2    1    0 1 2 1 1           0 9 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the 
interest of  LABI) 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01,   
Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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Table 4.12: Summary of Results Found When Testing for Preference Outliers Based on Party Using the Difference of Means 
for the 1999 Through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives LABI Scores 
 
 
 
LABI Scores 
 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
 
2008 
 
# of years committee 
is a preference outlier 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Agriculture N N N N N Y** Y*** Y* N N 2 
Appropriations N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Civil Law N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Commerce N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Education N N N N N Y* N N N N 0 
Environment N N N N N Y* N N N N 0 
Health and Welfare N N N N N Y* N N N N 0 
Government Affairs  N N Y** Y** N Y* N Y** N N 3 
Insurance N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Judiciary N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Labor N N N Y** N N N N Y* N 1 
Municipal N N N N N Y** Y* Y*** N N 2 
Natural Resources Y** N N N N N Y** N N N 2 
Retirement N Y** N N N N N N N N 1 
Transportation N N N N N Y** Y* Y** Y** N 3 
Ways and Means N N N N N N Y** N N N 1 
# of committees in a given year 
that have significant differences 
1 1 1 2 0 3 3 3 1 0 15 
Note: N indicates not a preference outlier committee, Y indicates preference outlier committee 
Louisiana Association of Business and Industry Interest group scores (LABI) range from 0 (legislators do not vote in accordance with the interest of LABI) to 100 (vote in accordance with the 
interest of  LABI) 
Significance Level ranges from *p=.10, **p=<.05, and ***p=<.01,   
Providing a stringent threshold for the existence of preference outlier committees only significance levels .05 and .01 are calculated in the number of years a committee is a preference outlier 
Data for 2000-2003 is obtained from Sandahl 2005 
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constituency characteristics Tables 4.14-4.15, reveal that as a whole the informational theory 
describes committees in the Louisiana House.  In turn, most committee members represent 
the views of the whole legislature.  Conversely, surprisingly when the Louisiana caucus 
membership and the occupation measurements are used to determine the existence of 
unrepresentative committees in the Louisiana House, Tables 4.16-4.17 show different results.  
When these measurements are examined, these tables reveal mixed support for the 
informational and distributive theories.  The most substantial support for the distributive 
theory is found using committee caucus membership.  
4.4 Critique of the Results 
All told, general support for the informational theory above the distributive theory, 
with the exception of occupation and party caucus and delegation, in Tables 4.1-4.15, are 
consistent with the findings of most scholarly researching studying committee organization.  
Moreover, limited support for the major party cartel theory is present in all the years 
analyzed with few random exceptions.  However, it is important to note that the existence of 
preference outlier committees appears to differ across time and measurements.  Notably, in 
many cases this variance appears even within the same legislative session.  For example, 
support for the distributive theory in the Administration of Criminal Justice Committee 
appears randomly across three legislator preference measurements: ideology, LABI interest 
group scores, and occupation.  Specifically, in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 the Administration of 
Criminal Justice Committee is composed of legislators representing different ideological 
viewpoints and business interests from representatives in the whole legislature for one out of 
ten years.   
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Table 4.13: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on the Combination of 
Legislator Ideology, Party, LABI Interest Group Scores, Party Caucus Membership, Legislator Occupation by Counting the 
Number of Preference Outliers 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committees 
Distributive 
 
Informational 
 
Major Party Cartel 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
Mixed Mixed N 
 
Agriculture Y  N Mixed 
Appropriations Mixed Mixed N 
Civil Law Mixed Mixed N 
Commerce Mixed Mixed N 
Education Mixed Mixed N 
Environment Mixed Mixed N 
Health and Welfare Y  N N 
Government Affairs Y  N Mixed 
Judiciary Mixed Mixed N 
Insurance Y  N N 
Labor N Y  N 
Municipal Y  N Mixed 
Natural Resource Y  N N 
Retirement N Y N 
Transportation Mixed Mixed N 
Ways and Means Y  N Mixed 
 
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% 
or less is no support for the theory (N) 
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Similarly, in Table 4.7 the Administration of Criminal Justice Committee is 
overrepresented by legislators with occupations in law or law enforcement in three of the ten 
years analyzed: 2000, 2001, and 2008.  Importantly, as Table 4.1, 4.3, and 4.7 reveals 
variance in support for the distributive theory in the Administration of Criminal Justice 
appears to not only be random, but is also inconsistent within legislative sessions.   However, 
in a few cases support for the distributive theory is systematic.  For instance, the Agriculture 
Committee provides consistent support for the distributive theory across several legislator 
preference measures: legislator district and caucus membership.  To illustrate, in Table 4.5 
from 1999-2008 the Agriculture Committee is consistently overrepresented by members 
representing districts with a large percentage of their population employed in agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, and hunting.  Similarly, in Table 4.8 for all ten years the Agriculture 
Committee is statistically overrepresented by members belonging to the Rural Caucus.  
Indeed, support for the distributive theory in the Agriculture Committee appears so much and 
so consistently this is not likely to be a random result.               
Moreover, one reason the existence of preference outliers differ across time and 
measurements, may be legislative turnovers, bringing in new legislators with different 
interests based on political aspirations, prestige, policy orientation and the like; thereby, 
causing legislator ideology and committee membership ideology to change from year to year.  
Upon evaluating these possibilities there appears to be some support for the turnover 
explanation.  Gathering legislator turnover data from the Louisiana House for 1999-2002, 
and the Book of the States for the years, 2003 through 2008, it appears turnover rates in 
general are limited.  For 1999-2008 the turnover rate was ten or less, with the exception of 
2004 and 2008, however. In 2004, for instance, 20 membership changes occurred
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Table 4.14: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Ideology and Interest 
Group Scores by Counting the Number of Preference Outliers 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committees 
Distributive 
 
Informational 
 
Major Party Cartel 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N Y N 
Agriculture N Y Mixed 
Appropriations                          N Y N 
Civil Law N Y N 
Commerce N Y N 
Education N Y N 
Environment N Y N 
Health and Welfare                          N Y N 
Government Affairs                          N Y Mixed 
Insurance N Y N 
Judiciary N Y N 
Labor N Y N 
Municipal N Y Mixed 
Natural Resources N Y N 
Retirement                          N Y N 
Transportation MIXED MIXED N 
Ways and Means Y  N Mixed 
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or 
less is no support for the theory (N) 
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Table 4.15: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Constituency 
Characteristics by Counting the Number of Preference Outliers 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committees 
Distributive 
 
Informational 
 
Major Party Cartel 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N Y N/A 
Agriculture Y (100%) N N/A 
Civil Law N Y N/A 
Commerce N Y N/A 
Education N Y N/A 
Health and Welfare Mixed Mixed N/A 
Government Affairs                          N Y N/A 
Judiciary                          N Y N/A 
Labor N Y N/A 
Municipal N Y N/A 
Retirement                          N                          Y N/A 
Transportation N Y N/A 
 
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or 
less is no support for the theory (N) 
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Table 4.16: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Committee Caucus 
Membership Counting the Number of Preference Outliers 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committees 
Distributive 
 
Informational 
 
Major Party Cartel 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N Y N/A 
 
Agriculture Y (100%) N N/A 
Appropriations N Y N/A 
Civil Law N Y N/A 
Commerce Mixed Mixed N/A 
Education Mixed Mixed N/A 
Environment Mixed Mixed N/A 
Health and Welfare Mixed Mixed N/A 
Government Affairs Y N N/A 
Judiciary N Y N/A 
Labor Mixed Mixed N/A 
Municipal Y N N/A 
Natural Resource Y N N/A 
Retirement N Y N/A 
Transportation N Y N/A 
Ways and Means N Y N/A 
 
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or 
less is no support for the theory (N), N/A means the theory cannot be tested using caucus membership 
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Table 4.17: Summary of Results for the 1999 through 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives Based on Occupation by 
Counting the Number of Preference Outliers 
 
Louisiana House Standing 
Committees 
Distributive 
 
Informational 
 
Major Party Cartel 
 
Administration of Criminal 
Justice 
N/A Mixed N/A 
Agriculture N/A Mixed N/A 
Civil Law                        N/A N N/A 
Commerce N/A N N/A 
Education N/A N N/A 
Health and Welfare                        N/A N N/A 
Insurance N/A Mixed N/A 
Judiciary N/A                      Mixed N/A 
 
*Distributive, Informational, and Major Party Cartel Theory: based on results from 1999-2008, mixed support is identified as 50-30% support,, 60% or more is support for the theory (Y), and 20% or 
less is no support for the theory (N), N/A means the theory cannot be tested using caucus membership. 
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representing 19% of the 105 elected legislators, and in 2008, there is a substantial turnover in 
state legislators.  Louisiana witnessed a tremendous membership transformation - out of 105 
legislators, there are 63 (60 %) membership changes.  
Further, another possible explanation for committee preference outliers to vary from 
one year to another may be the ideology of the chamber change from one year to another, but 
the committees ideologies are remaining constant.  If so, then arguably this instance is 
explained by the fact that the committees are changing but in reality they are not.  Exploring 
this possibility, this dissertation compares the ideology of the committee to the ideology of 
the whole Louisiana House.  Preliminary findings do not offer support for this discrepancy 
which leads to the conclusion that committee membership ideology is changing 
correspondingly with the ideology of the legislature.  
Additionally, one potential explanation for variation in support for the distributive 
theory across constituent measurements used in this analysis may be due to the inherent 
variation associated within these measurements.  Specifically, it is plausible to assume 
preference outlier committees are more likely to be found when using constituent 
characteristics not uniformly found throughout the state.  To illustrate, if there were a few 
agricultural districts in Louisiana, then one would expect legislators representing these 
districts to disproportionally seek membership onto the agricultural committee compared to a 
majority of legislators representing non-agricultural districts. Conversely, if a constituent 
measurement characteristic were found consistently within the entire state, then committees 
with jurisdiction over issues related to these characteristics will be sought after by legislators 
representing the whole state and not specific districts.   
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Evaluating this possibility, I conduct a preliminary analysis of results found in 
support for the distributive and informational theory in Table 4.5.  Finding, no support for the 
contention that variance in legislator district characteristics affects the likelihood of finding 
preference outlier committees.  Specifically, in 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 the constituent 
measurements % of African Americans in a district, and % employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting vary significantly across the state.  However, in the case of % of African 
Americans it does not appear to increase the likelihood of finding preference outliers.  
Likewise, there is little variance in the factor % employed in healthcare across the state, but 
this factor is a preference outlier in the Health and Welfare Committee for the years 2004-
2006.     
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CHAPTER 5: LEGISLATOR INTERVIEWS: THE LOUISIANA 
COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION: THROUGH THE EYES OF LOUISIANA 
HOUSE LEGISLATORS 
 
 What can be gained from qualitative data that cannot be gained from quantitative 
data?  Multiple scholars such as Campbell and Fiske (1959); Jick (1979); and Pearce (2002) 
express the importance of using both of these methods to evaluate the research question at 
hand. In the same light, I evaluate committee assignments in the 1999-2008 Louisiana House 
Legislature, by employing both qualitative data expressed through legislator interviews and 
quantitative data as seen in empirical analysis, obtained from legislator roll call votes, 
constituent characteristics, interest group scores, ideology, occupation, and caucus 
membership. In particular, Pearce is apt when she advanced the following concept:  
Research sometimes elect to study a single research question using multiple 
methods. Using more than one approach reveals multiple pieces of evidence 
that serve as “building blocks” in the research endeavor (Lieberson 1992). 
Also, methods that vary in form and focus act as checks on one another, 
adding supplementary features and compensatory strengths to the mix (Axinn, 
Fricke, and Thornton 1991; Burgess 1982; Denzin 1970; Massey 1987; Sieber 
1973). This complementarity may be achieved by allowing a set of different 
research methods to interactively evolve, using one to inform the other, 
strengthening the overall research process, yielding richer data, and increasing 
the depth of insight for interpreting the findings (Pearce 2002, 104).  
Expanding on this comment, Pearce argues the use of different techniques to study a 
particular phenomenon has several key advantages, such as their ability to divulge different 
evidence from one another and thereby painting a more complete picture of the research 
question, adding validity to the finding, (Pearce 2002), and opening up areas for future 
research (Jick 1979).  Equally important, is the unexpected finding, that results are not 
similar across various research methods.  In this event, these unanticipated results can open 
up areas for review that scholars have not yet considered in their analysis (Jick 1979).  
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Additionally, the use of qualitative data alongside quantitative data analysis has the 
key advantage of contributing differently to the knowledge and understanding of a particular 
phenomenon.  Unlike statistical methods, qualitative methods, such as interviews, allow 
scholars to explore complex and delicate features of an occurrence not captured through 
empirical means (Ritchie 2003).  For example, empirical data focuses on understanding and 
measuring a particular manifestation through numbers, while on the other hand, qualitative 
research methods allows researchers to address the questions of who, how, and why (Ritchie 
2003).  Specifically, by employing both statistical analysis and face-to-face legislator 
interviews in this paper, I can extend the understanding of committee organization in the 
1999-2008 Louisiana House from empirically revealing that either committees support the 
informational, distributive, or major party cartel theory; to developing a stronger 
understanding of the underlying reasons and motivations encompassing the deeper questions 
of why and how committees in Louisiana are representative of the views of the median 
majority party or the whole legislature - a question not answered through empirical data.   
Furthermore, it is important to understand the context in which a particular 
phenomenon occurs (Ritchie 2003).  While both quantitative and qualitative analysis allow 
for this type of knowledge, qualitative analysis, on the other hand, is a superior application. 
For example, in this study, quantitative analysis reveals the number of committee members 
representing specific demographic (constituent), occupations, and ideologies (party and 
interest group) compared to the whole chamber, unfortunately, it does not convey the process 
in which legislators request or receive committee assignments.  For instance, in the Louisiana 
House the Speaker formally assigns committee seats, but informally the Governor has a 
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major say as to who is placed on which committee, thereby diminishing the overall power of 
the Speaker. 
Therefore, my empirical findings show substantial support for the informational and 
major party cartel theories.  So, the aim of this chapter is to determine whether support for 
these findings are further substantiated in views of Louisiana house legislators, individuals 
with an important perspective on committee development, as well as to shed light on some 
potential underlying reason for these findings not revealed through statistical analysis. 
Specifically, looking at who is responsible for allocating committee seats in the Louisiana 
house, the motivations surrounding the allocation of these seats, legislator motivations which 
may initiate committee request, and legislators’ perception of the Louisiana house committee 
process as a whole.  Hence, by conducting face to face legislator interviews in combination 
with our empirical analysis, this study benefits from the perceptions obtained from 
participants with first-hand experience of the legislative committee assignment process.  This 
in turn, will develop a deeper understanding of Louisiana legislator committee assignments, 
by specifically scrutinizing the motivations, incentives, and intent expressed by legislators 
themselves vis-á-vis committee assignment request and assignments.  
5.1 Previous Qualitative Literature Review on Committee Assignments 
Before, 1950 limited research exists on congressional legislative committee 
assignments (Eualu 1984); remarkably, most of the early reports cited in committee 
assignment research focuses on congressional committee studies appearing in the sixties and 
seventies.  Several of these early findings depend at least in part on legislator interviews. 
These dialogues are employed to help clarify the motivations which may encompass 
legislator committee request and their assignments (Master’s 1961; Gertoz 1976; Shepsle 
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1978), the degree legislators freshmen legislators receive their requested committee requests 
(Gertoz 1976; Shepsle 1978), legislator committee request motivations (Fenno, 1973; 
Bullock III 1976), and lastly the motivations behind Committee on Committee’s assignments 
of legislator’s to congressional committees (Masters 1961). 
In 1976 Gretoz uses interview data, to determine the success rate of legislators 
receiving their preferred committee seats.  Meeting with freshmen congressional House 
members in the 89
th
, 90
th
, and 91
st
 Congresses, Gretoz (1976) asks such questions as: “One of 
the first important decisions you have to make after you were elected had to do with the 
committee or committees you wanted to serve on?  What thoughts did you give to this 
matter?” (Gretoz 1976, 696).  In an effort to expand on legislators answers to this question, 
Gretoz often asked follow up questions such as: “Why?” or “Which Committee did you most 
prefer?” (Gretoz 1976, 696).  His results reveal that freshmen legislators are most often 
assigned to committee seats they most prefer and those legislators who did not, were often 
transferred to their preferred committee later on in their second or third term.  
Contrary to Gretoz (1976) who focus his whole examination of legislator committee 
success rates on interview data, Shepsle in his 1978 study, “The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle,” 
examines this question using data collected from question and answer sessions to supplement 
his empirical analysis gained from data on legislator committee list requests.  Unlike the 
latter data, interview data allows Sheplse to state: “to breathe some life into this request data, 
as well as track down a number of specific descriptive details of the committee assignment 
process not available in the public record…” (Shepsle 1978, 8).  Particularly, through 
interviews of Freshmen Democrat members and their administrative assistants on the Ninety-
fourth Congress Ways and Means Committee, or the Democratic Committee on Committee, 
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Shepsle not only gains in-depth personal information from legislators and their assistants on 
how they campaigned for specific committee requests (i.e. endorsements from interest 
groups, their state delegation, etc.), why they sought membership onto committees, but also 
develops an understanding of freshmen legislators’ initial perception of the general 
committee process.  
In all, using empirical and interview data, Sheplse reveals most legislators request 
committee assignment based on their constituent interests.  Additionally, the Democrat 
Committee on Committees seeks to accommodate legislator requests.  For example, in the 
Eighty-seventh through Ninety-third Congresses, almost 60% of Freshmen Democrat 
Legislators received their top committee request. Additionally, eight out of ten of these 
legislators received some sought-after committee request (Shepsle 1978).  Specifically, some 
factors affecting legislators receiving their first preference committee request include: 
whether legislators are facing a competitive environment for a committee seat, if the 
representative’s predecessor previously resided on a particular committee.  Importantly, the 
region a legislator represents, and their electorally-security does not appear to play a role in 
legislator committee assignment success.  
Turning away, from understanding whether legislators receive their requested 
committee seats, interview data has also been used to focus attention towards understanding 
“Why?” legislators receive their requested committee seats.  Arguably, one of the major 
qualitative works on the allocation of legislator committee seats, dates back to Master’s 1961 
study, “Committee Assignments In The House of Representatives.”  In his 1961 landmark 
study, Masters’ explores the allocation of committee seats in the 80th through 86th Congresses 
of the House of Representatives, addressing the question of what motivates committee on 
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committees to grant legislators specific committee requests through the use of qualitative 
data such as conducting  personal interviews with members and staff of various committees 
as well as members of committees on committees and deans of state delegations, in addition 
to combing through personal letters, official documents, and personal observations (Masters 
1961).  These interviewees are chosen in part on the basis of the important role legislators’ 
play in the committee assignment process.  Rooted in part on legislator interviews, Masters 
finds congressional committee assignments are a product of many factors other than party 
loyalty such as: seniority, geography, professional background, interest groups, religion, and 
ethnic or racial factors. Importantly, the relevance of these factors depends on the type of 
committee being analyzed.  
 Similar in significance, interview data is a key to understanding the motivations 
behind legislator committee request (Bullock 1976; Fenno 1973; Smith and Deering 1983). 
In Fenno’s (1973) groundbreaking work, Congressmen in Committees, he conducts 
interviews of congressional legislators seeking assignments onto House Committees in the 
84
th
 through 89
th
 Congresses (1955-1966), asking, “Why did you want to get on the ______ 
committee in the first place?” (Fenno 1973, 2).  In turn, finding legislators seek committee 
assignments for a combination of several reasons: constituents, making good policy, and 
gaining prestige in the legislative chamber. 
Collaborating Fenno’s 1973 finding, Bullock (1976) focuses solely on legislator 
interviews of 53 freshmen congressional legislators serving in 1971, to determine the 
motivations behind freshmen legislators’ committee choices.  In total, 18 interviews are 
conducted with legislators and 68 with staff members.  Bullock states “staff members were 
often better respondents than congressmen since the former gave fuller attention to the 
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questions, provided more answers, and allowed more time for the interview” (Bullock III 
1976, 202-203).  Examining, legislator responses, Bullock III finds legislators do seek 
committee assignments based on multiple motivations: goal of reelection, prestige, and 
making good policy.  Out of these factors, most legislators commented when choosing 
committee assignments, the motive of making good policy preceded both reelection and 
prestige.  Notably, of all the legislators interviewed, only less electorally secure ones 
declared reelection as the primary reason for their committee assignment more often than 
policy making concerns (Bullock III 1976). 
Even more importantly, in his opening statements, Bullock III (1976) quickly 
addresses an important concern with Fenno’s analysis: the issue of question wording. 
Bullock III argues the framing of Fenno’s question to congressional legislatures, “Why did 
you want to get on the ______ committee in the first place” (Fenno 1973, 2), not only 
assumes that legislators want the seats they receive; it also leads to the conclusion that every 
committee assignment in the House is desirable.  Bullock argues, by asking a slightly 
different question than Fenno, “What committees did you want to serve on? Why?” (Bullock 
III 1976, 202), one is able to capture more information about legislator committee 
preferences such as what committees legislators perceive as undesirable and what 
committees legislators wanted to receive, but did not (Bullock III 1976).  
Since its publication, Frisch and Kelly (2006) note succeeding research  has not only 
deemed Bullock III”s question wording as superior to Fenno’s, but also employed it in latter 
research on congressional committees (Smith and Deering 1984;1997).  Questionably, the 
results of these studies have become “the basis of the most widely accepted typology of 
congressional committees” (Deering and Smith 1997).  Specifically, by imploring the 
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question, “What committees did you want to serve on? Why?” Bullock distinguishes between 
legislators’ perceptions of desirable and less desirable committees, finding the following six 
committees are perceived by legislators as helping to secure their reelection bid: Agriculture, 
Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marines, Public Works, and Veterans’ Affairs.  But, 
committees deemed influential in policy matters are Banking and Currency, Education and 
Labor, Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Judiciary.  While prestige and influential committees 
include the Appropriations and Ways and Means, and lastly undesirable committees include 
the District of Columbia, Government Operations, House Administration, Internal Security, 
Post Office, Rules, and Science and Astronautics (Bullock III 1976).  Collaborating Bullock 
III’s (1976) results are Deering and Smith (1997) using the same question wording as 
Bullock III, find similar results to Bullock III’s (1976) committee typology (Frisch and Kelly 
2006).   
In Smith and Deering (1983), “Changing Motives For Committee Preferences of New 
Members in the U.S. House, the authors seek to develop a further understanding of legislator 
committee motivations by focusing exclusively on legislator interviews conducted of 
freshmen in the 97
th
 Congress.  Replicating Bullock III’s (1976) legislator interviewing 
method of legislators in the 92
nd
 Congresses, the authors evaluate and compare the legislator 
committee preference motivations of legislators in the 97
th
 Congresses to Bullock’s results 
found in the 92
nd
 Congress.  Finding as a whole Fenno’s typology of legislator committee 
motivations, reelection, policy, and prestige explain legislator committee motivations.  Even 
more importantly, legislator committee motivations change overtime, in part to the changing 
roles in Congressional House procedures or policy agendas (Smith and Deering 1983). 
Lastly, unlike Bullock III, the authors find that most legislators seek committee assignments 
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based on district-oriented motivations rather than policy motivations (Smith and Deering 
1983).  
Moreover, legislator interviews are also used to study policymaker committee 
motivations and how these motivations affect committee behavior in single committee 
studies.  To illustrate, Perkins (1980) focuses her sole analysis on interviews.  Specifically, 
members on the 92
nd
 and 93
rd
 House Judiciary Committees are asked: 
“When you entered Congress in (date), what were your three committee 
requests?” “Why did you want to be on the Judiciary Committee?” “What 
benefit do you get from being on the Judiciary Committee?” “Does it help you 
with reelection?” “Give you policymaking influence?” “Give you influence 
within the House?” “Members were asked if they agreed with such 
generalizations as, “The New York Times writes that you….; is this correct?” 
“Is it a fair generalization?” (Perkins 1980, 374). 
Legislators responses to these questions are corroborated or refuted through additional 
interviews with congressional members, committee staff members, staff director and 
counsels of the House Judiciary Committee, interest groups, members of the executive 
branch (for ex. Department of Justice), political reporters, and other congressmen, as well as 
written documents (such as newspaper articles) accounting the behavior of interviewed 
legislators.  It is important to note, interviewees are promised anonymity, as well as the fact 
that Perkins uses follow-up questions to verify participants’ answers (Perkins 1980).  
To put it briefly, taking issue with Fenno’s (1973) finding that committees contained 
members with high goal agreement scores to each other, for instance members on X 
committee highly agreed that they joined a particular committee for the goal of reelection.  
Perkins analysis reveals that members on the Judiciary Committee do hold different goal 
priorities (reelection, policy, prestige or other career) from each other.  Further, these mixed 
goals affect the structure and behavior of the committee.  To illustrate, among many findings 
Perkins interviews reveal as a whole, legislators seeking assignment onto the Judiciary 
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Committee for policy concerns appear to “spend the most time on Judiciary Committee 
affairs” (Perkins 1980).  Specifically, legislator representing policy goals on the committee 
are referred to in interviews as “present and active”, while a few legislators citing reelection 
as a priority for gaining membership are described as “minimally present.” 
While most qualitative research focuses understanding legislator motivations and 
perceptions of committees at the congressional level, research at the state level has also been 
explored (Hedlund 1989; 1990; Hamm and Hedlund 1989).  In the form of example, 
interview data has also been instrumental in providing contextual information about state 
House and senate committees (Hamm and Hedlund 1994), although this work is limited.  In 
their (1994) study, Hamm and Hedlund explore legislator perceptions on the importance of 
committees to the legislative decision making process, how much power committees are 
perceived to hold, and who influences committees (Hamm and Hedlund 1994).  They 
employed both state legislator interview data as well conducting a content analysis, i.e. 
“…the systematic examination of texts or transcripts to translate textual information into 
“data”…” (Frisch and Kelly 2006, 345), to in part reveal legislator perceptions of the state 
committee assignment process (Hamm and Hedlund 1994).  Notably, in order to gage 
legislator perceptions of state committees, Hamm and Hedlund send out mail questionnaires 
to each House and Senate chamber in eighteen states evaluating the time between 1971-1986.  
In total over 4,630 legislators participated in the study. Then two follow-up questionnaires 
are disseminated in order to verify legislator responses.   
Importantly, these interviews reveal several important findings about the state 
committee system.  To name a few: legislators perceive committees to be a focal point in 
legislative decision making; committee members are seen by legislators as specialist in their 
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area of jurisdiction, however, not as much as their cohorts in Congress;  representatives see 
committee members as spending a good amount of time on committee work; and committee 
members are receiving less committee assignments.  
5.2 Data and Method 
In this chapter, I develop a deeper understanding of the Louisiana committee 
assignment process by interviewing individuals with first-hand knowledge of the committee 
process, current 2012 Louisiana House Legislatures.  These interviews are conducted to tap 
into several main topics.  First, the formal and informal norms of the committee assignment 
process, the self-perception legislators have of committee assignments versus their 
perception of how representatives as a whole are assigned to committees, and their 
perception of how other legislators are assigned to committees.  Specifically, to determine 
whether the overall empirical findings of this study in favor of the informational and major 
party cartel theory are further substantiated in the views of Louisiana house legislators, and if 
so, to shed light on the potential underlying reasons for these findings not revealed through 
statistical analysis. 
 I begin the qualitative analysis by conducting face to face interviews with six current 
legislators in 2012 Louisiana House of Representative  and one former 2004-2008 Louisiana 
House member now serving in the 2012 Louisiana House Senate.  By focusing interviews 
solely on legislators themselves and not on staff members, I hope to circumvent some of the 
potential problems noted by scholars (Frisch and Kelly 2006) as associated with relying on 
legislator personal staff to reveal legislator committee preferences.  To illustrate, Frisch and 
Kelly (2006) argue against substituting legislator staff members in place of legislators 
themselves to gauge legislator committee preferences, stating: “It seems unlikely that all staff 
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members, or even most of the staff, who were interviewed would have access to their 
member’s complete committee preferences and the rationale for those preferences” (Frisch 
and Kelly 2006, 346).  Likewise, as Frisch and Kelly note Eulau (1985) comments “It is 
difficult to accept that one person can serve as a surrogate or agent for another when it comes 
to a psychological variable like ‘motivation’” (Eulau 1985, 234 as cited in Frisch and Kelly 
2006, 346). 
Further, for the purposes of this study, with the exception of one legislator, I 
primarily focus on interviews with legislators serving in the 2012 Louisiana House, due to 
accessibility issues of questioning a representative sample of former legislators in the time 
frame of this study, namely 1999-2008.  Moreover, the potential inherent bias exists of 
asking former legislators, to accurately recall and provide complete information on their 
committee assignment preferences and request during their service in the 1999-2008 
Louisiana House Legislature.  Additionally, interviews are conducted in early May 2012, 
near the beginning of the legislative session after committee assignments are complete, in the 
hope that the assignment process is still fresh in legislator’s minds.  Likewise, careful 
considerations are made to ensure responses are representative of state in categories such as 
region, party ideologies, race committee chairs, rank and file members, legislators residing 
on prominent and less prominent committees as identified through legislator interviews, and 
incumbent and freshmen legislators.  
Specifically, the bulk of the interviews conducted in this study focus on seasoned 
legislators (those who have served at least one term in office), because these legislators have 
gone through the committee process more than one time, therefore, they are in a more 
informed position to provide data concerning the process.  Additionally, many legislators 
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begin jockeying for committee assignments for the next four years during their current term 
in office, a practice not available to freshmen legislators.  Therefore, unlike freshmen 
legislators, season legislators can provide information concerning the lobbying actions of 
legislators seeking committee assignments in prior legislative sessions leading up to the 
current allocation of committee seats.  
Furthermore, for this investigation, interviews were conducted with legislators who 
received both prestigious and less prestigious committee assignments.  According to Cox and 
McCubbins (1993), in the legislative process, representatives are often assigned to 
prestigious committees as a reward for toeing the party line.  Those same researchers, Cox 
and McCubbins(1993), went on to state since prestigious committees deal with salient issues 
that affect many districts, the majority party will want to stack these committees with 
legislators loyal to them (Maltzman 1995).  Considering this, it can be assumed that 
legislators who reside on choice committee assignments may have a more favorable view of 
the committee assignment process then those residing on less prestigious committees, therein 
providing different interpretations of the committee assignment process.  For the purposes of 
this study and based on Louisiana House legislator interviews, prestigious committees are 
those committees that are identified by respondents as committees highly sought after by 
most legislators.  Specifically, three committees are consistently cited by interviewed 
legislators as highly sought committees: Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Commerce. 
One legislator notes, “Money committees are particularly important because they help 
legislators secure funding for their districts.”  Less sought committees include: Insurance, 
Agriculture, Retirement, Civil Law, Municipal and Parochial, and Labor.   
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Additionally, this study focuses on questioning members of the both the majority 
party, Republican, and minority party, Democrats, in the 2012 Louisiana House of 
Representatives.  For the simple reason that in the Louisiana House committee assignments is 
the responsibility of the Speaker, a majority party member; therefore, it can be assumed that 
representatives associated with the party currently out of power will have a different view of 
the committee assignment process than those representing the party in power.  Further, one 
limitation of the interviews conducted in this study is its full reliance on African American 
and white males, and the exclusion of white females, Hispanics and independents, and 
legislators representing the far north east and deeps south east regions of Louisiana. 
Regrettably, time constraints did not allow me to pursue these interviews with more vigor. 
Furthermore, because only one Hispanic currently resides in the Louisiana House, for the 
sake of anonymity, this individual was omitted from the survey.  For additional demographic 
and region information on of interviewed 2012 Louisiana House legislators please refer to 
Table 5.0 and Figure 5.0. 
Importantly, all interviews are conducted face to face with legislators at the Louisiana 
House Capitol.  Time spent on each of these interviews ranges from twenty minutes to an 
hour.  During the actual interview, legislators are read a scripted questionnaire, comprising of 
eleven questions.  These questions focus on: the formal and informal process of legislator 
committee assignment; legislator perceptions of the committee process in general i.e. what 
they believe motivates legislators in general to request specific committee assignments; why 
committee members are granted these assignments; why they themselves choose committees 
assignments; why they felt they are granted committee assignments; what committees 
legislators perceive as desirable or less desirable and why; and lastly if they felt that 
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committee membership is representative of the interest of the whole, a specific party, or 
legislator constituent interest.  Follow-up questions are used to prompt legislators to 
elaborate on their responses, as well as to make sure I correctly understand their answers.  At 
times legislators did veer from the questions asked, providing this author with additional 
contextual information of the legislative process as a whole.  Moreover, in keeping with other 
scholarly works and in order to promote candid legislator responses all respondents remain 
anonymous.  Additionally, information obtained from the interviews is recorded immediately 
following the legislator question and answer session.  For a sample of the questionnaire and a 
copy of the letter provided to each respondent refer to Appendix B. 
Table 5.0: 2012 Louisiana House Interview Demographics 
 
 Total 
Number of 
Interviews 
 % of 
African 
Americans 
Interview 
 % of 
Members 
of the 
Majority 
Party 
Interview 
 % Season 
Member 
Interview 
Number of 
Standing 
Committee 
Chair 
Interview 
% of 
Members 
of a least 
one 
Prominent 
Committee 
Interview 
Louisiana 6  33%  50%  67% 33% 67% 
* The total number of African Americans in the 2012 Louisiana House chamber is 23, whites 81, and Hispanics 1 (Louisiana House of 
Representatives).  For the 2012 Legislative session the majority party is Republicans. In total there are 58 Republicans, 45 Democrats, and 2 
Independents in the whole Louisiana House. Season members are defined as those members who have at least one full four year term in 
office prior to the 2012 legislative session. There are sixteen standing committees in the Louisiana House. Prominent committees are 
identified by legislators as having more notoriety than other committees: Ways and Means, Appropriations, Commerce. Importantly, one 
additional interview conducted is not represented in Table 5.0 of a legislator residing in the 2004-2008 Louisiana House. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.0: Region of the State Represented through Interviews 
*Regions were legislators are not interviewed 
include: 3 and 8.  
 
*Louisiana region map obtained from the State of 
Louisiana Division of Administration at 
www.doa.louisiana.gov/osp/vendcenter/docs/map.
pdf  
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Formal and Informal Committee Assignment Procedures 
 For the purpose of understanding the manner in which committee assignments are 
granted in the 2012 Louisiana House, it is important to first understand the distinction 
between the informal and formal process of Louisiana legislative committee assignments. 
While on one hand, formal knowledge of the committee assignments process is easily 
accessible through Louisiana House Rule 2.5 of the Louisiana constitution, with the partial 
exception of the Appropriations Committee, stating committee assignments are granted by 
the Speaker of the House, who is elected from the majority party, on the other hand, informal 
knowledge of the Louisiana legislative process is lacking.  In an effort to obtain knowledge 
of this informal process legislators are asked, how are Louisiana committees assigned 
informally?   
One legislator observes the informal process of the legislative committee assignment 
process as follows:  
You are asked to rate your preference assignment choices from one to three…. 
Additionally, one legislator explains that he went one step farther:   
When requesting assignments he submitted to the Speaker a resume with his 
occupation and experience which reveal how well suited for the committees 
on which he wanted to reside. 
A further legislator notes the informal role the governor plays in the legislative committee 
assignment process: 
Assignments are dispensed by the Speaker with input from the Governor 
based on our knowledge and his interest. 
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5.3.2 Legislator Assignment Success 
 Turning away, from the procedural elements of the committee assignment process, 
the bulk of the interview questions presented in this chapter pertains to legislator motivations 
and perception of the legislative committee assignment process.  In the first part of the 
interview instrument, legislators are asked whether representatives receive the committee 
assignments they request?  For the most part, minority and majority party legislators as well 
as freshmen and incumbent representatives perceive every effort is made to accommodate at 
least one of the legislators requested committee assignments, or that representatives receive 
their sought after committees at least half of the time.  As one 2012 incumbent Republican 
Louisiana House legislator states:  
Other than the Appropriations Committee, which is hard to get membership 
on because it deals with money, there is every effort to match legislators with 
at least one of their choices. 
 Corroborating this view a Democrat freshmen legislator notes:  
  Yes, mostly everyone gets their top one or two.  
Taking a slightly different view of committee assignment success of legislators, one seasoned 
Republican house assembly member remarks: 
Yes and No. If a lot of legislators want to be on a specific committee and there 
is not enough slots some will get them and some will not.   
Substantiating this view, one Democrat incumbent legislator simply comments: 
  It’s about fifty-fifty, 50% of the time “yes,” and 50% of the time “no.”  
In all, Louisiana House legislators concede that every effort is made to accommodate at least 
one of their requested committee assignments.  However, due in part to the limited number of 
committee seats available, some legislators will not receive their requests.  Furthermore, 
representative assignment success is also dependent upon the type of committee on which 
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they seek membership.  In the main, however, most legislators stated that it is difficult to 
gain membership onto the money committees because of the high demand for these 
committees among legislators.    
5.3.3 Legislator Perception of Factors Affecting Committee Assignment 
Decisions 
 In an effort to understand assembly member’s view of the committee assignment 
process, questions are offered to participants to determine what factors they themselves 
believe are important to achieve successful committee assignments.  Essentially, 
representatives’ beliefs may affect the way legislators maneuver in the committee assignment 
process to obtain their requested committee seats.  Therefore, legislators are asked, not only 
about their awareness of the formal and informal committee assignment process, but also 
why they perceive legislators as a whole do or do not get their requested committee 
assignments.  Specifically, one legislator observes: 
Legislators are chosen for committee membership based on several factors: 
(1) politics evolving around their position, for instance the governor plays an 
important role in the selection of the Speaker who in turn selects committee 
chairs and members. Members are often selected for committee positions if 
they philosophical believe the way the governor does in order to promote the 
governor’s agenda, (2) members’ ability or expertise in a specific area, for 
instance, legislators on the Transportation Committee have a background in 
Transportation Affairs, Appropriations Committee in finance affairs, 
Education Committee members often have a background in Education, and 
the Civil Law and Procedure Committee has a lot of Lawyers.  In sum, 
committee expertise is very important (3) for diversity on the committees, for 
instance gender, race, party affiliation and region all play an import role -  
compared to the past, today’s party caucuses play a much larger role than in 
the past. 
Validating the role expertise plays in legislator committee assignment success, a Democrat 
legislator comments: 
Legislators get the assignments they request based on their background and on 
their knowledge of the issues pertaining to the committee.  
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Adding further insight into legislator committee assignment success by explaining the 
importance of not only the house speaker, and governor but also the role a legislator’s 
constituency plays in their committee assignment triumph, a legislator offered the following,  
Committee members are placed onto committees by Speaker and with input 
by the Governor. Committee assignments in part depend on: party affiliation, 
region. Speakers try to accommodate legislators from certain region who want 
membership onto that committee because it relates to their constituent 
concerns.  
Moreover, several legislators express the importance of seniority.  An incumbent and 
freshmen legislator both remark: 
    Time of service or seniority plays a role. 
Conversely, another legislator credits legislator committee assignment success to the ability 
of legislators to join together in an effort to lobby the Speaker to place an agreed upon 
legislator onto a specific committee, explaining: 
I wanted a member on the Appropriations committee that represented the area 
of the state I was from. In order to achieve this purpose, I united several 
legislators from my area to promote one candidate for membership on this 
particular committee to the Speaker, the Speaker agreed….in part because the 
Speaker could make happy a bunch of legislators at one time. 
Indeed, one legislator explains success in the committee assignment process in light of 
lobbying speaker candidates, stating:  
Most legislators put down a list of the committees they would like to be on 
and committees they would like to chair. When legislators believe they are 
relatively secure in their reelection bid for the next four years, they will begin 
jocking with their peers who are seeking support for their run for 
Speakership… In turn, saying I will support you for Speakership if you 
support me for specific committee assignments and chair assignments… 
However, there are only so many spots on each committee and committee 
chairmanships. Therefore, a Speaker candidate will try to sway legislators to 
be on another popular committee. For example, I have already promised this 
chairmanship to legislator A, but I will put you on another popular committee 
for instance the Appropriations….  
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Confirming this view, an additional legislator offers further insight into committee 
assignment process achievement, commenting: 
…Discussions are made informally with Speaker candidates who are trying to 
win Speakership. The speaker and legislator wills say, I will support you for 
speaker if you place me on the committees I want to be placed on.  
Moreover, one legislator acknowledges the part legislator qualification, occupation, seniority 
on the committee, and governor plays in the success of legislators receiving their requested 
committee assignments, but explains these factors are secondary to the committee 
composition wishes of the Speaker: 
Legislators are placed onto committees based on their qualifications, 
occupation, served on that committee before or as a chairman before, the 
governor plays a role depending on the speaker, who works well with the 
Speaker, what relationship does the legislator have with the Speaker. 
Although, committee assignments are not granted on seniority and not 
necessarily on qualifications, it really depends on the individual Speaker, style 
of the Speaker, and the mixture that the Speaker wants on committees. In 
general, some speakers are more involved in the policy debate others are more 
relaxed and let the body handle their affairs themselves. Same goes with the 
influence of the Governor on the Speaker, it in part depends on the Speaker.  
In total, based on representative responses the following factors are regarded by 
legislators to affect the success of lawmakers in receiving their requested committee seats: 
expertise (occupation, knowledge of the issues pertaining to the committee), governor, 
Speaker of the house, party affiliation, diversity in region, race, and gender, seniority, the 
ability of legislators to join together to petition the Speaker to place an assembly member 
onto a specific committee, and the lobbying of speaker candidates.    
5.3.4 Legislator Individual Assessment of Factors Shaping Committee Success 
In an attempt to differentiate between the general factors legislators perceive to affect 
committee assignment success versus the individual success of the interviewed legislators 
themselves, I ask legislators what factors they believe impacted their committee assignments. 
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In all, respondents did not articulate different factors between the two.  Responding, their 
answer to the question also applied to their own individual perception of the factors affecting 
their legislative committee assignment success.  However, this question did prompt one 
legislator who replied to the inquiry as to why do you think legislators as a whole receive the 
committee assignments they request with the statement: “I don’t know,” but went on to state 
that “He was assigned to his committees based on his occupation and experience.”  
5.3.5 Legislator Committee Request Motivations 
 Equally important, to our understanding of a legislator’s perception of committee 
assignment success, as well as, the success rates of legislators receiving their requested 
committee seats are the criteria or  underlying motivations representatives rely on to 
determine their committee request.  Notably, revealing legislator committee assignment 
motivations (such as to represent constituents interests, to promote good policy, or to gain 
influence within the House) to the Speaker, could affect whether legislators receive their 
preferred assignment.  
As seen, in one Louisiana House legislator explanation of the important role a 
legislator’s constituency interest plays in the assignment of legislators to specific 
committees:  
…Legislator may get passed over for a committee seat, if someone else has 
priority because they are from the area that has particular needs falling under 
that committee.  
Another legislator notes:  
…One of the most important reasons legislators receive their committee 
request is based on their constituent interest… 
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Moreover, a legislator’s motivations and goals for membership may also be important 
implications for upcoming legislation which will pass through the committee.  As expressed 
earlier by one Louisiana House Representative:  
I wanted to be on the Judiciary to reform the penal system…. I was here to 
make a change: “To correct some of Louisiana’s past errors and make it better 
for tomorrow.” 
Indeed, while talking with this member he alluded to the fact that if he were assigned 
membership onto the Judiciary, he would promote policies on the Judiciary solely in line 
with his political philosophy of reforming the penal system.  
Furthermore, an incumbent legislator comments:  
I particularly wanted an assignment on the Highway Committee in order to 
promote the needs of my constituents...and the fact that I ran on issues 
pertaining to this committee.  
Likewise, during the interview with this legislator, he alluded that he sought membership 
onto the Highway committee based on his constituent characteristics, to promote Highway 
bills that specifically support his district.  
 Further, another legislator, express the role constituent as well as his own personal 
philosophy plays in his support for specific legislation: 
I sought membership onto committees primarily for constituent reasons. 
However, my political philosophy is not always in alignment with my district 
on every issue. In these circumstances, sometimes I will vote against my 
personal philosophy in alignment with my constituents and sometimes not, it 
depends on the issues. If my philosophy is not in alignment with my 
constituents, I will try to educate them on why I voted the way I did. 
 In total, understanding legislator committee motivations offers important insight into 
the legislative committee process by not only revealing that legislator committee motivations 
affect representative committee assignment success, but by also letting known the role it may 
play in the type of legislation reported out of committees.  
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5.3.6 Legislator Perceptions of Representative Committee Request Motivations  
In turn, based on the notable role legislator committee motivations play in the 
legislative committee process, I seek to develop an understanding of how Louisiana House 
legislators perceive their own committee motivations, as well as, that  of their fellow 
legislator’s motivations by pursuing the following set of questions: “in general what do you 
believe motivates Louisiana House legislators to request certain committee assignments; do 
legislators’ districts ask them to join certain committees; what about their party; moreover, 
do interest groups motivate individual legislators to join specific committees;” and lastly, 
“specifically speaking, what factors motivate individual legislator’s request for membership 
onto specific committees?”  
Indeed, one legislator states:  
Legislators as a whole are motivated to seek committee assignments based on 
constituents and expertise in a specific area… I was motivated by policy 
expertise, and a background in education.  
Additionally , another representative express not only the role constituents play in lawmaker 
committee motivations, but also his own individual motivation, revealing:  
Constituents, you run on a specific platform and you want to gain membership 
onto committees that meet those needs for instance if you represent a district 
with a lot of rural hospitals you want to be on the committee that deals with 
this issue… 
Likewise, several assembly members perceive legislators as well as themselves as 
driven by multiple motivations when pursuing committee assignment requests, responding:  
Legislators are motivated by their interest- is it something they care about 
personally, their occupation, and constituent needs…. I was personally 
motivated to request membership onto my requested committees based on 
interest (something I cared about), constituent needs, and the ability to make 
change through policies.  
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Said another: 
Legislators want to join committees for constituent reasons- what is the 
biggest topic in their district, occupation, and making policy…I primarily 
sought membership onto specific committees based on constituent reasons. 
However, my background (experience and occupation) in areas falling under a 
specific committee’s jurisdiction also played a role.   
Corroborating the role various motivations play in lawmakers committee request, another 
representative, express:  
Representatives seek committee assignments based on their region  
(constituents), occupation and experience, and party in 2012.  Specifically, 
legislators want to be on a committee that relates to their region. Furthermore, 
in 2012, party is playing more of a role then it did in 2008.  
Adding further insight into the preferences behind assembly members committee 
assignments as well as themselves himself, a legislator disclose the influence of outside 
interest groups on representative committee motivations, pronouncing: 
Some legislators seek committee assignments that can help them finance their 
campaign, for example if you are on the commerce committee banks may give 
you money for your campaign…. For myself, I sought committees that I was 
interested in, those that were fun, based on my constituents and background, 
as well as the fact that sometimes important legislation comes through these 
committees.  
Additionally, when asked the same question one lawmaker states his primary motivation for 
obtaining membership onto a specific committee was policy making opportunities:  
I wanted to be on the Judiciary to reform the penal system. My primary reason 
for wanting to be on specific committees was to promote policies, I believed 
in. I was here to make change: “To correct some of the Louisiana’s pass errors 
and make it better for tomorrow.” 
 On the whole, it appears that assembly members are motivated to seek committee 
assignments based on multiple factors, including: constituents, influencing policy, party, and 
interest groups.  Specifically, as revealed in Table 5.1 and 5.2 a majority of interviewed 
Louisiana House Representatives rank constituent and policy making preferences as the top 
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two motivations for both individual legislator and legislators as a whole when making 
committee request.  Although, seventy one percent of interviewees specifically mentioned 
legislators in general are motivated by constituent motivations compared to fifty-seven 
percent stating policy making concerns.  Conversely, seventy-one percent of representatives 
cited policy making motivations compared to fifty-seven percent of those mentioning 
constituent motivations to explain their own committee assignment preferences.  
Surprisingly, interviewed legislators do not mention gaining “prestige” in the chamber 
through membership onto specific committees, as a motivating factor, for legislators in 
general or for they themselves, to gain membership onto a specific committee.  
Table 5.1:  Louisiana Legislator Committee Request Motivations as a Whole (in 
percentages) 
 
 Total 
Number 
of 
Interviews 
 Constituent Policy 
Making 
Interest 
Group 
 Party Prestige N/A 
Legislators 7  71% 57% .14%  .14% 0% .14% 
*Policy expertise category combines those legislators mentioning both wanting to make good policy, something they are interested in or 
care about, expertise, background , or an occupation  in the policy areas under a specific committees jurisdiction. The N/A categories refer 
to legislators who did not respond to the question. Prestige refers to legislators motivated to gain membership onto a specific committee 
allowing members to gain influence in the House.  
 
 
 
Table 5.2:  Individual Louisiana Legislator Committee Request Motivations (in 
percentages) 
 
 Total 
Number 
of 
Interviews 
 Constituent Policy 
Making 
Interest 
Group 
 Party Prestige N/A 
Legislators 7  57% 71% 0%  0% 0% .14% 
*Policy expertise category combines those legislators mentioning both wanting to make good policy, something they are interested in or 
care about,  expertise, background or an occupation in the policy areas under a specific committees jurisdiction. The N/A category refers to 
legislators who did not respond to the question. Prestige refers to legislators motivated to gain membership onto a specific committee 
allowing members to gain influence in the House.  
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5.3.7 Diverse and Representative Committee Assignments 
Lastly, in an effort to determine whether the overall empirical findings in the 
preceding chapters of this study in favor of the informational and major party cartel theory 
and against the distributive theory are further substantiated in the views of the lower house 
members of the Louisiana State Legislature, as well as, to determine potential underlying 
reasons for this finding, I ask representatives the following question: “in general, do you 
believe committee membership is reflective of the preferences of the chamber as a whole;  if 
not, what preferences do you believe committee membership reflects; is it individual 
legislator district interests, party interests?”  If the informational theory holds true, then 
legislators will perceive the legislator make-up of committees as representative of the 
characteristics of members in the whole chamber.  Conversely, the distributive theory holds 
true if legislators view committees as stacked with members representing specific interests. 
Likewise, the majority party theory is substantiated if legislators perceive committees as 
stacked in favor of the majority party.  
In all, a majority of interviewees perceived the composition of Louisiana House 
committees to accurately reflect the overall composition of the whole legislature.  As seen, in 
one incumbent Democrat legislator’s response:   
Almost always, and purposively the design of committees represent diversity 
or a good blend of the legislature as a whole. For the most part the Governor 
and Speaker can achieve a committee with political philosophies in 
accordance with theirs while still maintaining a diverse (ex. race, gender, 
region) and representative committee to the whole. Alternatively, there are 
only rare cases when this cannot be achieved, and in this case the Governor or 
Speaker will stack the committee with legislators supportive of their 
philosophy.  There are several reasons the Governor wants diverse and 
representative committees: the governor does not want to be seen as not 
diverse, the Governor wants minority opinion shared in that forum (or 
committee), and lastly he/she wants to make sure they reflect positively in a 
broader respect across the country.  
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Likewise, an incumbent Republican state house lawmaker comments:  
In general the legislature tries to balance committees, or create representative 
committees by region, party, and race.  
Furthermore, a seasoned Republican states:  
Yes, I have found with three different speakers that every effort is made to 
accommodate them, but sometimes committee membership is stacked on 
sensitive committees (those committees affecting what the Governor and 
Speaker want). 
Additionally, a former Democrat House legislator expresses:  
Yes, when I served the Speaker tried to create balanced committees 
representing the interest of the whole legislature based on demographics, race, 
and gender.  
Similarly, a Republican incumbent legislator divulges,  
Yes, as a whole the Speaker tries to created balanced committees, however the 
representative nature of committees depends on the Speaker. For instance, … 
the mixture that the Speaker wants on committees. 
Conversely, a Democrat assembly member takes an alternative view of the representative 
nature of 2012 legislator committee assignments noting,  
At one time yes, committees were representative of the demographics of the 
whole legislature, however in 2012 there are some committees that are stacked 
with members to meet the goal of the Governor. That being the case, because 
the governor only needs a certain number of legislators to pass a bill out of 
committee, representatives are thrown a bone and placed onto committees 
who represent views contrary to the Governor.  
 In sum, for the most part, legislators’ responses to these limited interviews 
substantiate the empirical findings in support for the informational found in the preceding 
chapters.  In all, most legislators’ comments fall in line with the major tenets of the 
informational theory.  Therefore, representatives, as a whole, perceive committees in the 
Louisiana House legislature to be representative of the demographic characteristics of the 
whole legislature.  Conversely, support for the major party cartel theory is limited to the 2012 
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legislative session.  Specifically, one legislator states, before 2012 committees members are 
representative of the demographics of the whole legislature; however,  during  this 2012, 
session committees are stacked in the favor of the governor who is a member of the majority 
party.  
5.4 Conclusion 
 On the whole, legislator interviews support several general conclusions.  First, in 
accordance with the self-selection hypothesis of the distributive theory, which states that the 
assignment process primarily allows legislators to self-select onto committees by 
accommodating their committee request (Frisch and Kelly 2006), as a rule 2012 Louisiana 
House legislators remark every effort is made to accommodate at least one of their requested 
committee assignments.  
  Second, legislator request specific committees based on multiple factors such as: 
constituent requirement, desire to influence policy, party affiliation, and interest group 
influence. Specifically, as revealed in Table 5.1 and 5.2, a majority of interviewed Louisiana 
House Representatives rank constituent requirement and policy making preferences as the 
top two motivations for both individual legislator and legislators as a whole when making 
committee request.  This finding provides support for the contention of not only this writer, 
but also of others (Fenno 1973; Bullock III 1976; Smith and Deering 1983), that legislators 
seek committee assignments based on multiple motivations.  
Third, legislators perceive the success of lawmakers in receiving their requested and 
legislators in general requested committee seats as dependent upon different factors: area of  
expertise (occupation, knowledge of the issues pertaining to the committee), governor’s 
inclination, Speaker of the house preference, party affiliation, diversity in region, race, and 
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gender, seniority, the ability of legislators to join together to petition the Speaker to place an 
assembly member onto a specific committee, and the lobbying of speaker candidates.  Worth 
mentioning is, while the Governors do not play a formal role in the legislative committee 
assignment process, they play a significant role in influencing the Speaker to decide the 
makeup of legislative committees.  
Lastly, the findings of this chapter and the previous chapter provide substantial 
support for the informational theory.  Specifically, 2012 assembly members as a whole 
perceive committees in the 2012 Louisiana House legislature to be representative of the 
demographic characteristics of the whole legislature.  Moreover, contrary to the overall 
empirical findings presented in earlier chapters, only one legislator notes support for the 
major party cartel theory in the 2012 legislature, stating  in this session committees are 
stacked in the favor of the governor, a member of the majority party.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Testing the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory in the 1999-2008 
Louisiana House of Representatives this study examines the expectations laid out by each of 
these three theories.  First, Louisiana House committee members represent views different 
from the views of the legislature as a whole; thereby, providing support for the distributive 
theory.  Second, Louisiana House committee members represent views similar to the views 
of the entire legislature, in alignment with the major tends of the informational theory.  Third, 
Louisiana House Democrat committee members represent views similar to the Democratic 
Party in the full House on control committees, providing evidence in favor of the major party 
cartel theory.  Lastly, support for the informational, distributive, and major party cartel 
theory will be mixed in the Louisiana House.  
 Through the evaluation of the informational, distributive, and major party cartel 
theory and the introduction of a more comprehensive measurement of legislator preferences 
at the state level, based on legislator ideology, interest group scores, district characteristics, 
party, occupation, and caucus membership, this study has provided a more complete test of 
the three theories of committee development.  
  Further, this analysis has contributed to our understanding of the legislator 
committee assignment process at the individual state level in an important way.  It has 
highlighted the importance of understanding the contextual and political environment 
surrounding legislator committee assignment at the state level in hypothesizing, testing, and 
explaining the emergence of preference outlier committees and support for the theories of 
legislative organization.  To date, these considerations have been largely absent in the testing 
of the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory at the state level. 
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Additionally, this study’s overall importance is highlighted not only by the 
“increasing number of important policy matters (e.g. welfare, healthcare)…being returned to 
the state legislative arena (Francis 1989 as cited in Overby and Kazee 2000, 702), but also by 
the powerful role today’s committees play in the state legislative process, particularly in 
terms of gatekeeping (Maltzman 1997).  Under this, power committees have the ability to 
stop legislation, through such actions as tabling a bill for further study, from every being 
voted on by the house floor.  For this reason, this study’s finding of mixed support for the 
informational and distributive theory and substantial support for the major party cartel theory 
has important implications for the types of policies emerging from Louisiana distributive 
committees.  Possibly, Louisiana committees providing support for the distributive theory 
could send policies to the House floor that do not benefit the whole legislature, rather the few 
on committees.   It is this study’s hope that by highlighting the existence and potential effects 
of distributive committees on policies in the Louisiana House, that legislators will intensely 
evaluate the policies emerging from these committees.   
Specifically speaking, evaluating several measurement of legislator committee 
preferences, including legislator ideology, interest group scores, district characteristics, 
occupation, and party, this study found the most substantial support for the distributive 
theory in the Agriculture, Ways and Means, Municipal, and Natural Resources Committee. 
However, among these committees, the jurisdiction of the Agriculture and Natural Resource 
Committees offer legislators the most distributive benefits.  In turn, for the most part, support 
is found favoring the informational theory.  
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6.1 Limitations  
Similar to congressional studies and previous state studies, this study also suffers 
from several legislator committee preference measurement limitations.  While, this study has 
sought to minimize these problems through a comprehensive measurement of legislator 
committee preferences such as: legislator ideology, interest group, party affiliation, district 
characteristics, occupation, and legislator caucus and delegation membership, these 
limitations are still present.  
Methodological speaking, Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores are created from 
contested roll call votes.  Notably, because legislators may vote differently on the floor than 
they do in committee meetings (Parker and Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004) these 
scores may not represent legislator true ideology.  For instance, Poole and Rosenthal 
ideology scores are unable to capture legislator preferences revealed through intra-committee 
vote trades (Parker and Parker 1998; Glenn R. Parker et al. 2004) or through logrolls (Hall 
and Grofman 1980). 
One limitation of this study’s use of Poole and Rosenthal’s contested roll call votes is 
the limited number of contested votes in the years 2000 and 2002.  For the year 2000 there 
are only 45 votes and in 2002 only 32 votes were cast.  Debatably, basing a legislator’s 
ideology off of such a scarce sample of votes is problematic in that it offers very few 
opportunities to gage the true ideology of individual legislators.  
Furthermore, similar to ideology scores the use of Louisiana Association of Business 
and Industry (LABI) interest group scores to determine legislator ideology also faces 
limitations. These scores are often based on very few roll call votes and are meant to evaluate 
individuals supportive of their cause.  Traditionally LABI voting scores are based on bills in 
 144 
 
several different policy areas including: Civil Justice, Education, Employee Relations (such 
as issues involving right to work, drug testing, unemployment, and workers compensation), 
Energy (issues involving oil and gas), Environmental Quality, Governmental Reform, Health 
Care, Small Businesses, Taxation and Finance, Trade, Tourism and Transportation, and 
Technology Advancement.  
Notably, because important LABI issues coming up for a vote during legislator 
sessions vary from year to year, such as bills levying new taxes  which are only offered 
during odd years, legislator LABI voting records are likely to fluctuate, sometimes radically 
depending on the issue (LABI).  Therefore, a legislator’s voting record for one year may not 
reflect their pro-conservative business ideology (LABI), therein resulting in a miss-
measurement of legislator ideology.  
  Additionally, similar to Poole and Rosenthal ideology scores as well as LABI interest 
group scores, district characteristics also face limitations.  Relying on Adler and Lapinski’s 
(1997) study, this dissertation uses district characteristics to determine how compelling 
individual committee membership is to a particular legislator.  The more compelling this 
membership is the higher the likelihood that a legislator will seek membership onto that 
particular committee.  For instance, under this premise a legislator representing a district with 
a majority of its constituents employed in agriculture will seek membership onto the 
agriculture committee.  
One drawback of this legislator committee preference indicator is the potential miss-
measurement of legislator district characteristics.  For example, legislators seeking 
membership onto the Health and Welfare Committee may be compelled to join this 
committee based on  district characteristics other than the percentage of districts with 
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disabilities, percent employed in healthcare, percent of district aged 55 or older, and percent 
below poverty line.  Arguably, by not capturing the correct district characteristics enticing 
legislators to join specific committees, this study could bias itself against support for the 
distributive theory.  
Sidestepping some of the limitations, legislator caucus and delegation membership 
offers an alternative measurement of legislator district characteristics.  Research shows 
legislators choose caucus membership based on their constituent characteristics, even after 
controlling for party, committee, electoral security, and seniority (Miler 2011). 
Hypothetically, the amount of caucus and delegations as well as the areas of interests they 
cover, allows scholars to capture several legislator district characteristics at one time through 
their membership onto each caucus or delegation.  For instance, legislators representing 
heterogeneous districts may seek membership onto several caucuses and delegations to 
represent their constituents.  However, similar to previous measurements of legislator 
committee preferences caucus membership and delegation also face limitations.  For 
example, the policy interests of individual caucuses and delegations do not directly relate to 
the jurisdiction of all committees in this analysis such as: Appropriations, Civil Law, 
Judiciary, Retirement, and Ways and Means.  Because of that exclusion, this measurement 
cannot be universally applied to all committees, therein providing only a partial test of the 
informational and distributive theory.   
Additionally, the measurement of legislator occupation suffers from several 
measurement issues.  First, a legislator’s occupation does not necessarily mean they an 
interest in committees related to their job field.  Second, this measurement’s problems can 
been seen in the fact that legislators may not represent enough occupations falling under the 
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jurisdiction of each committee to determine correctly whether legislators seek membership 
onto committees based on their occupation.  This limitation can be seen in this dissertation, 
where the following committees were excluded based on lack of legislator occupations 
related to the jurisdiction of each committee including:  Appropriations, Environment, 
Governmental Affairs, Labor, Municipal, Natural Resources, Retirement, Transportation, and 
Ways and Means. 
6.2 Implications 
 Taking these limitations into account, this dissertation offers several important 
contributions to the study of committee organization.  Notably, one major contribution of this 
dissertation revolves around the use of several different measurements of legislator 
preferences.  Indeed, unlike legislator ideology based on Poole and Rosenthal W-nominate 
scores, the measurements of occupation, legislator caucus membership, and constituent 
characteristics appear to offer a better measurement of legislator preferences.  As previously 
stated, legislator ideology scores are based on legislator votes on bills occurring in each 
legislative session.  However, not every bill is relevant to every issue and not every issue is 
relevant in every session.  Therefore, representative ideologies are likely to fluctuate from 
year to year.  Conversely, measurements of constituent characteristics, caucus membership, 
and occupation are not faced with similar problems.  For the simple reason that, for the most 
part, a legislator’s previous occupation or district characteristics remains constant from 
session to session.   
Furthermore, research on the distributive, informational, and major party cartel theory 
has been plagued by theoretical and methodological debates.  Support for these theories has 
traditionally been in favor of the informational theory and has varied according to 
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measurements, statistical methods, and time periods analyzed.  Using similar legislator 
preference measurements as previous studies, this analysis finds substantial support for the 
informational theory.  However, while this support is still strong it is somewhat diminished 
with the introduction of legislator party caucus membership.  Under this measurement there 
is an increase in support for the distributive theory.  Possibly, this increase points to the fact 
that this measurement is capturing an element of legislator committee preferences not 
previously measured through either current measurements of preference outliers such as 
ideology, interest group, party, district characteristics, or legislator occupation.  In turn, 
highlighting the importance of continuing to develop and improve on current measurements 
of legislator preferences.  
Secondly, in contrast to previous state studies which only look at a few measurements 
of legislator preferences, by providing a comprehensive measurement of legislator committee 
preferences, this study was able to provide a more robust test of the informational, 
distributive, and major party cartel theory and therein provide more substantiated support for 
its findings.  It also points to the stability of support for the informational theory across 
different measurements of legislator committee preferences.    
6.3 Further Research 
 In the future this dissertation provides several avenues of research. Importantly, the 
governor is extraordinarily influential in Louisiana committee assignments.  This analysis 
neither evaluates governor policy initiatives for a given year, nor does it scrutinize the 
stacking of committees with members supportive of the governor’s agenda representing these 
issues.  Next, as a whole, Louisiana preference outlier committees are not always the same 
across an election cycle.  During one legislative session a committee is a preference outlier 
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and not at another session.  While this study has evaluated several possible reasons for this 
finding, one such explanation might be that the composition of the legislator changes from 
year to year as a result of either legislator turnover at the end of an election cycle or legislator 
resignation because of such reasons as illness or employment, which in turn might lead to 
changes in legislator ideology, interests, party, or occupation.  Therefore, committee 
composition represents the characteristics of the legislature during that given year.  Having 
said that, this dissertation still does not have a firm explanation of why preference outlier 
instability exists overtime.  This challenge offers, therefore, a line of research for future 
scholars to unstitch.  
 Moreover, scholars may want to pursue an extension of this dissertation’s time 
period in order to include the year 2011.  During that time, Louisiana House district lines 
were redrawn, resulting in the changing the demographic characteristics of several House 
districts, allows scholars the opportunity to determine potential effects of this case on 
legislator committee assignment preferences and support for the distributive, informational, 
and major party cartel theory.  
Further, party research leaves open a line of research for future scholars to 
investigate. This study finds substantial support for the major party cartel theory in the state 
of Louisiana, which is not dependent upon the same ideology of the governor nor the 
majority of the Louisiana House.  It would be interesting to determine whether these results 
differ depending on the ideological extremism of the governor.  For instance, hypothetically 
suppose the governor were a far left liberal and the whole legislator’s ideology were less 
extreme, would one still see substantial support for the major party cartel theory?  
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Lastly, research on committee organization, in light of the informational, distributive, 
and major party cartel theory at the state senate level is lacking.  It would be interesting to 
see if the results found in the House mirror those in the Senate.  Unlike in the Louisiana 
House the Senate has only 39 seats.  Arguably, as espoused by Prince and Overby (2005), 
this difference may have substantial impacts on support for the informational and distributive 
theory as well. Initially, because state senators generally represent larger and more 
heterogeneous districts than state representatives, senators may have a more difficult time 
determining which committees offer the most benefits to the their constituents as a whole, in 
turn resulting in less support for the distributive theory (Prince and Overby 2005). 
 At the same time, in contrast, as Prince and Overby (2005) note state senates may 
find more support for the distributive theory  because of the fact that state senates often have 
the same amount of committees as the house but their members are “spread more thinly than 
house members” (Prince and Overby 2005) on these committees.  Therefore, “it is possible 
that state senates-which are informationally overtaxed relative to lower chambers---are 
organized along less informational lines than are analogous lower houses and rely heavily on 
the lower houses for the information needed to pass good laws (Prince and Overby 2005, 9).” 
Therein, resulting in more preference outlier committees at the senate than house level; 
which is in fact what they find in their article “Legislative Organization Theory and 
Committee Preference Outliers in State Senates.”  
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APPENDIX A: EXTRA RELEVANT MATERIAL 
 
Table A.1: District Characteristics of Caucus Members 
 
Louisiana Caucus and Delegation 1999 2000 2004 2008 
  
    Acadian Caucus 
    % of district Black N N N N 
%  of district employed in farming Y (over) Y(over) Y(over) Y (over) 
Avg. of district household income N N N N 
%  of district employed in manufacturing Y (over) Y(over) Y(over) Y (over) 
% of district employed in service industry Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% of district employed in government Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% of district age 55 or older N N N N 
% of district receive social security benefits N N N N 
% of district attending public schools Y (over) Y(over) Y(over) Y (over) 
% employed in wholesale and retail trade N N N N 
% employed in transportation N N N N 
% of individuals with disabilities N N N N 
% employed in finance and insurance Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y (under) 
% employed in healthcare Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
District contains correctional institution N N N N 
 
Jefferson Delegation 
    % of district Black N N N N 
%  of district employed in farming N N N N 
Avg. of district household income Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) 
%  of district employed in manufacturing N N N N 
% of district employed in service industry N N N N 
% of district employed in government N N N N 
% of district age 55 or older N N N N 
% of district receive social security benefits N N N N 
% of district attending public schools N N N N 
% employed in wholesale and retail trade Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) 
% employed in transportation Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) 
% of individuals with disabilities N N N N 
% employed in finance and insurance N N N N 
% employed in healthcare N N N N 
District contains correctional institution N N N N 
 
Black Caucus 
    % of district Black Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) 
%  of district employed in farming Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
Avg. of district household income Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
%  of district employed in manufacturing N N N N 
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(table continued)     
% of district employed in service industry Y(over) Y (over) Y(over) Y(over) 
% of district employed in government Y (over) Y (over) Y (over) Y(over) 
% of district age 55 or older N N N N 
% of district receive social security benefits N N N N 
% of district attending public schools Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
% employed in wholesale and retail trade Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% employed in transportation N N N N 
% of individuals with disabilities Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
% employed in finance and insurance Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% employed in healthcare Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
District contains correctional institution N N N N 
 
Orleans 
    % of district Black N N N N 
%  of district employed in farming Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
Avg. of district household income Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
%  of district employed in manufacturing N N N N 
% of district employed in service industry Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
% of district employed in government N N N N 
% of district age 55 or older N N N N 
% of district receive social security benefits N N N N 
% of district attending public schools Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% employed in wholesale and retail trade N N N N 
% employed in transportation N N N N 
% of individuals with disabilities Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% employed in finance and insurance N N N N 
% employed in healthcare N N N N 
District contains correctional institution N N N N 
 
Rural Caucus 
    % of district Black N N N N 
%  of district employed in farming Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
Avg. of district household income Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
%  of district employed in manufacturing Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
% of district employed in service industry Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% of district employed in government Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% of district age 55 or older N N N N 
% of district receive social security benefits N N N N 
% of district attending public schools N N N N 
% employed in wholesale and retail trade N N N N 
% employed in transportation N N N N 
% of individuals with disabilities N N N N 
% employed in finance and insurance N N N N 
% employed in healthcare N N N N 
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(table continued) 
District contains correctional institution Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
 
Capital Region Delegation  
    % of district Black N/A N/A N/A N 
%  of district employed in farming N/A N/A N/A N 
Avg. of district household income N/A N/A N/A N 
%  of district employed in manufacturing N/A N/A N/A N 
% of district employed in service industry N/A N/A N/A N/A 
% of district employed in government N/A N/A N/A Y 
% of district age 55 or older N/A N/A N/A N(under) 
% of district receive social security benefits N/A N/A N/A N 
% of district attending public schools N/A N/A N/A N 
% employed in wholesale and retail trade N/A N/A N/A Y(under) 
% employed in transportation N/A N/A N/A N 
% of individuals with disabilities Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
% employed in finance and insurance Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) Y(over) 
% employed in healthcare Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) Y(under) 
District contains correctional institution N N N N 
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Table A.2 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
  1999 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                42% (N=12)                51% (N=91)                .3346 .563 
Agriculture                33% (N=15)                52% (N=88)                   1.8389 .175 
Appropriations                58% (N=19)                48% (N=84)                .6545 .419 
Civil Law                67% (N=12)                47% (N=91)              1.5985 .206 
Commerce                47% (N=17)                50% (N=86)                .0491 .825 
Education                65% (N=17)                47% (N=86)              1.8797 .170 
Environment                58% (N=12)                48% (N=91)                .4226 .516 
Health and Welfare                31% (N=16)                53% (N=87)              2.5279 .112 
Government Affairs                54% (N=13)                49% (N=90)                .1117          .738 
Insurance                58% (N=12)                48% (N=91)               . 4226          .516 
Judiciary                42% (N=12)                51% (N=91)               . 3346          .563 
Labor                47% (N=15)                50% (N=88)                .0570 .811 
Municipal                46% (N=13)                50% (N=90)                .0672 .795 
Natural Resources                56% (N=18)                48% (N=85)                .3184 .573 
Retirement                73% (N=11)                47% (N=92)              2.6546 .103 
Transportation                38% (N=13)                51% (N=90)                .7271 .394 
Ways and Means               .05% (N=19)                60% (N=84)            18.2502 .000*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 161 
 
Table A.3 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                62% (N=13)                               48% (N=92)                .8568                .355 
Agriculture                41% (N=17)                51% (N=88)                .5654                .452 
Appropriations                63% (N=19)                47% (N=86)              1.7250                .189 
Civil Law                58% (N=12)                48% (N=93)                .4206                .517 
Commerce                47% (N=17)                50% (N=88)                .0493                .824 
Education                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)                .0948                .758 
Environment                54% (N=13)                49% (N=92)                .1109                .739 
Health and Welfare                41% (N=17)                51% (N=88)                .5654                .452 
Government Affairs                60% (N=15)                48% (N=90)                .7683                .381 
Insurance                60% (N=15)                48% (N=90)                .7683                .381 
Judiciary                50% (N=14)                49% (N=91)                .0015                .969 
Labor                69% (N=16)                46% (N=89)              2.7913                .095* 
Municipal                36% (N=14)                52% (N=91)              1.2323                .267 
Natural Resources                60% (N=15)                48% (N=90)                .7683                .381 
Retirement                80% (N=10)                46% (N=95)              4.1066                .043** 
Transportation                57% (N=14)                48% (N=91)                .3751                .540 
Ways and Means                16% (N=19)                57% (N=86)             10.5606                .001*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.4 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                18% (N=11)                53% (N=94)               4.8284                .028** 
Agriculture                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)                .0948                .758 
Appropriations                63% (N=19)                47% (N=86)               1.7250                .189 
Civil Law                70% (N=10)                47% (N=95)               1.8538                .173 
Commerce                29% (N=17)                53% (N=88)               3.2822                .070* 
Education                71% (N=17)                45% (N=88)               3.6004                .058* 
Environment                62% (N=13)                48% (N=92)                .8568                .355 
Health and Welfare                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)                .0948                .758 
Government Affairs                53% (N=15)                49%  (N=90)                .1016                .750 
Insurance                63% (N=16)                47% (N=89)               1.2715                .259 
Judiciary                23% (N=13)                53% (N=92)               4.1514                .042** 
Labor                71% (N=17)                45% (N=88)               3.6004                .058* 
Municipal                58% (N=12)                48% (N=93)                .4206                .517 
Natural Resources                47% (N=15)                50% (N=90)                .0571                .811 
Retirement                64% (N=11)                48% (N=94)                .9790                .322 
Transportation                69% (N=16)                46% (N=89)               2.7913                .095* 
Ways and Means                 6% (N=18)                59% (N=87)              16.8004                .000*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.5 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                55% (N=11)                49% (N=94)                .1239                .725 
Agriculture                71% (N=17)                45% (N=88)               3.6004                .058* 
Appropriations                68% (N=19)                45% (N=86)               3.3139                .069* 
Civil Law                13% (N=8)                53% (N=97)               4.7486                .029** 
Commerce                38% (N=16)                52% (N=89)               1.0917                .296 
Education                50% (N=18)                49% (N=87)                .0020                .965 
Environment                50% (N=14)                49% (N=91)                .0015                .969 
Health and Welfare                47% (N=17)                50% (N=88)                .0493                .824 
Government Affairs                33% (N=15)                52% (N=90)               1.8351                .176 
Insurance                35% (N=17)                52% (N=88)               1.6430                .200 
Judiciary                42% (N=12)                51% (N=93)                .3346                .563 
Labor                38% (N=16)                52% (N=89)               1.0917                .296 
Municipal                29% (N=14)                53% (N=91)               2.8369                .092* 
Natural Resources                47% (N=15)                50% (N=90)                .0571                .811 
Retirement                55% (N=11)                49% (N=94)                .1239                .725 
Transportation                39% (N=18)                52% (N=87)                .9829                .321 
Ways and Means                83% (N=18)                43% (N=87)               9.9339                .002*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.6 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                45% (N=11)                50% (N=94)                .0814                .775 
Agriculture                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)                .0948                .758 
Appropriations                58% (N=19)                48% (N=86)                .6503                .420 
Civil Law                10% (N=10)                54% (N=95)               6.9069                .009*** 
Commerce                40% (N=15)                51% (N=90)                .6350                .426 
Education                41% (N=17)                51% (N=88)                .5654                .452 
Environment                71% (N=14)                46% (N=91)               3.1006                .078* 
Health and Welfare                50% (N=16)                49% (N=89)                .0017                .967 
Government Affairs                53% (N=15)                49% (N=90)                .1016                .750 
Insurance                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)                .0948                .758 
Judiciary                58% (N=12)                48% (N=93)                .4206                .517 
Labor                31% (N=16)                53% (N=89)               2.5216                .112 
Municipal                29% (N=14)                53% (N=91)               2.8369                .092* 
Natural Resources                47% (N=17)                50% (N=88)                .0493                .824 
Retirement                55% (N=11)                49% (N=94)                .1239                .725 
Transportation                39% (N=18)                52% (N=87)                .9829                .321 
Ways and Means                47% (N=17)                50% (N=88)                .0493                .824 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.7 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2004 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                36% (N=11)                51% (N=94)              .8513                .356 
Agriculture                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)              .0948                .758 
Appropriations                32% (N=19)                53% (N=86)            2.9883                .084* 
Civil Law                50% (N=8)                49% (N=97)              .0008                .978 
Commerce                63% (N=19)                47% (N=86)            1.7250                .189 
Education                63% (N=16)                47% (N=89)            1.2715                .259 
Environment                60% (N=10)   48% (N=95)              .4853                .486 
Health and Welfare                42% (N=19)                51% (N=86)              .5107                .475 
Government Affairs                30% (N=10)                52% (N=95)            1.6854                .194 
Insurance                72% (N=18)                45% (N=87)            4.4775                .034** 
Judiciary                36% (N=14)                52% (N=91)            1.2323                .267 
Labor                50% (N=10)                49% (N=95)              .0010                .975 
Municipal                42% (N=12)                51% (N=93)              .3346                .563 
Natural Resources                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)              .7018                .402 
Retirement                56% (N=9)                49% (N=96)              .1433                .705 
Transportation                72% (N=18)                45% (N=87)            4.4775                .034** 
Ways and Means                21% (N=19)                56% (N=86)            7.5224                .006*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.8 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2005 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                  2% (N=15)                54% (N=90)            6.1021                .014 
Agriculture                50% (N=14)                49% (N=91)              .0015                .969 
Appropriations                32% (N=19)                53% (N=86)            2.9883                .084* 
Civil Law                60% (N=10)                48% (N=95)              .4853                .486 
Commerce                58% (N=19)                48% (N=86)              .6503                .420 
Education                73% (N=15)                46% (N=90)            3.9686                .046** 
Environment                43% (N=7)                50% (N=98)               .1333                .715 
Health and Welfare                47% (N=19)                50% (N=86)              .0431                .836 
Government Affairs                44% (N=9)                50% (N=96)              .1016                .750 
Insurance                82% (N=17)                43% (N=88)            8.7453                .003*** 
Judiciary                56% (N=16)                48% (N=89)              .3416                .559 
Labor                55% (N=11)                49% (N=94)              .1239                .725 
Municipal                42% (N=12)                51% (N=93)              .3346                .563 
Natural Resources                50% (N=16)                 49% (N=89)              .0017                .967 
Retirement                64% (N=11)                48% (N=94)              .9790                .322 
Transportation                26% (N=19)                43% (N=86)            8.0340                .005*** 
Ways and Means                26% (N=19)                55% (N=86)            4.9983                .025** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.9 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2006 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above median % Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                46% (N=13)                50% (N=92)             .0674                .795 
Agriculture                50% (N=14)                49% (N=91)             .0015                .969 
Appropriations                44% (N=18)                51% (N=87)             .2242                .636 
Civil Law                44% (N=9)                50% (N=96)             .1016                .750 
Commerce                61% (N=18)                47% (N=87)           1.1668                .280 
Education                65% (N=17)                47% (N=88)           1.8703                .171 
Environment                50% (N=8)                49% (N=97)             .0008                .978 
Health and Welfare                59% (N=17)                47% (N=88)             .7018                .402 
Government Affairs                50% (N=10)                49% (N=95)             .0010                .975 
Insurance                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)             .7018                .402 
Judiciary                41% (N=17)                51% (N=88)             .5654                .452 
Labor                45% (N=11)                50% (N=94)             .0814                .775 
Municipal                42% (N=12)                51% (N=93)             .3346                .563 
Natural Resources                53% (N=15)                49% (N=90)             .1016                .750 
Retirement                73% (N=11)                47% (N=94)            2.6464                .104 
Transportation                84% (N=19)                42% (N=86)           11.1653                .001*** 
Ways and Means                17% (N=18)                56% (N=87)             9.3821                .002*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.10 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W-
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2007 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                38% (N=13)                51% (N=92)              .7263                .394 
Agriculture                36% (N=14)                52% (N=91)             1.2323                .267 
Appropriations                42% (N=19)                51% (N=86)               .5107                .475 
Civil Law                56% (N=9)                49% (N=96)               .1433                .705 
Commerce                65% (N=17)                47% (N=88)             1.8703                .171 
Education                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)               .7018                .402 
Environment                50% (N=8)                49% (N=97)               .0008                .978 
Health and Welfare                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)               .7018                .402 
Government Affairs                44% (N=9)                50% (N=96)               .1016                .750 
Insurance                71% (N=17)                45% (N=88)             3.6004                .058* 
Judiciary                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)               .0948                .758 
Labor                45% (N=11)                50% (N=94)               .0814                .775 
Municipal                33% (N=12)                52% (N=93)             1.4207                .233 
Natural Resources                44% (N=16)                51% (N=89)               .2517                .616 
Retirement                73% (N=11)                47% (N=94)             2.6464                .104 
Transportation                79% (N=19)                43% (N=86)             8.0340                
.005*** 
Ways and Means                16% (N=19)                57% (N=86)           10.5606                
.001*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.11 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal’s W 
scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2008 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above median % Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=14)                49% (N=89)             .0015                .969 
Agriculture                47% (N=19)                50% (N=84)             .0429                .836 
Appropriations                58% (N=24)                47% (N=79)             .9735                .324 
Civil Law                50% (N=14)                49% (N=89)             .0015                .969 
Commerce                42% (N=19)                51% (N=84)             .5116                .474 
Education                40% (N=15)                51% (N=88)             .6358                .425 
Environment                53% (N=17)                49% (N=86)             .0956                .757 
Health and Welfare                41% (N=17)                51% (N=86)             .5663                .452 
Government Affairs                53% (N=19)                49% (N=84)             .0906                .763 
Insurance                50% (N=10)                49% (N=93)             .0010                .974 
Judiciary                31% (N=16)                53% (N=87)           2.5279                .112 
Labor                56% (N=9)                49% (N=94)             .1440                .704 
Municipal                32% (N=19)                54% (N=84)           2.9981                .083* 
Natural Resources                53% (N=17)                49% (N=86)             .0956                .757 
Retirement                73% (N=11)                47% (N=92)           2.6546                .103 
Transportation                42% (N=19)                51% (N=84)             .5116                .474 
Ways and Means                47% (N=19)                50% (N=84)             .0429                .836 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.12 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
1999 
 Louisiana House Standing 
Committee 
Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice .1679 (N=12) .1535 (N=91) -.01442 -.0879 
Agriculture .1657 (N=15) .1534 (N=88) -.0124 -.0828 
Appropriations .2115 (N=19) .1424 (N=84) -.0690 .5094 
Civil Law .2955 (N=12) .1367 (N=91) -.1588 -.9727 
Commerce .1291 (N=17) .1603 (N=86) .0313 .2207 
Education .2561 (N=17) .1352 (N=86) -.1209 -.8558 
Environment .1776 (N=12) .1522 (N=91) -.0254 -.1546 
Health and Welfare -.0966 (N=16) .2015 (N=87) .2981     2.096** 
Government Affairs .1061 (N=13) .1623 (N=90) .0562 .3548 
Insurance .1813 (N=12) .1517 (N=91) -.0296 -.1805 
Judiciary .0578 (N=12) .1680 (N=91) .1102 .6731 
Labor .1557 (N=15) .1551 (N=88) -.0006 -.0039 
Municipal -.0126 (N=13) .1794 (N=90) .1920 1.2206 
Natural Resources .3273 (N=18) .1187 (N=85) -.2086 -1.523 
Retirement .3252 (N=11) .1348 (N=92) -.1903 -1.124 
Transportation .0767 (N=13) .1665 (N=90) .0898 .5676 
Ways and Means -.1912 (N=19) .2335 (N=84) .4247    3.2934*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
 
 171 
 
Table A.13 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2000 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice               -.0617 (N=13)                                      -.1981 (N=92)                              -.1364                                      -.762                                           
Agriculture               -.2639 (N=17)               -.1653 (N=88)                .0986                .615 
Appropriations               -.0603 (N=19)               -.2080 (N=86)               -.1477               -.966 
Civil Law               -.0144 (N=12)               -.2028 (N=93)               -.1883              -1.018 
Commerce               -.1922 (N=17)               -.1791 (N=88)                .0131                .081 
Education               -.1246 (N=17)               -.1922 (N=88)               -.0676               -.421 
Environment               -.0313 (N=13)               -.2024 (N=92)               -.1711               -.957 
Health and Welfare               -.2355 (N=17)               -.1707 (N=88)                .0648                .404 
Government Affairs               -.0545 (N=15)               -.2023 (N=90)               -.1478               -.878 
Insurance               -.1559 (N=15)                                   -.1855 (N=90)               -.0296               -.175 
Judiciary               -.2077 (N=14)               -.1772 (N=91)                .0306                .176 
Labor               -.0035 (N=16)               -.2132 (N=89)               -.2097              -1.284 
Municipal               -.1986 (N=14)               -.1786 (N=91)                .0200                .115 
Natural Resources               -.0444 (N=15)               -.2040 (N=90)               -.1596               -.949 
Retirement                .1441 (N=10)               -.2155 (N=95)               -.3596              -1.813 
Transportation               -.0984 (N=14)                .1940 (N=91)               -.0955               -.550 
Ways and Means               -.6272 (N=19)               -.0827 (N=86)                .5444               3.782*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.14 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice               -.1109 (N=11)                                        .1021 (N=94)                                                          .2130                                                                       1.303                                                                                                                    
Agriculture                .1165 (N=17)                .0727 (N=88)               -.0439               -.320 
Appropriations                .0931 (N=19)                .0768 (N=86)               -.0163               -.124 
Civil Law                .3028 (N=10)                .0563 (N=95)               -.2465              -1.448 
Commerce                .0269 (N=17)                .0900 (N=88)                .0631                .461 
Education                .2381 (N=17)                .0492 (N=88)               -.1889              -1.392 
Environment                .2264 (N=13)                .0591 (N=92)               -.1673              -1.098 
Health and Welfare                .0138 (N=17)                .0925 (N=88)                .0787                .575 
Government Affairs                .0738 (N=15)                .0808 (N=90)                .0070                .048 
Insurance                .2372 (N=16)                .0515 (N=89)               -.1857              -1.334 
Judiciary               -.1815 (N=13)                .1167 (N=92)                .2981               1.982* 
Labor                .2888 (N=17)                .0394 (N=88)               -.2494              -1.850 
Municipal                .0891 (N=12)                .0786 (N=93)               -.0105               -.066 
Natural Resources                .1140 (N=15)                .0741 (N=90)               -.0399               -.277 
Retirement                .2182 (N=11)                .0636 (N=94)               -.1546               -.942 
Transportation                .1649 (N=16)                .0645 (N=89)               -.1005               -.717 
Ways and Means               -.3094 (N=18)                .1603 (N=87)                .4697               3.737*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.15 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.1195 (N=11)               -.2499 (N=94)                                                                             -.1304                                                                          -.999                                    
Agriculture -.1711 (N=17) -.2489 (N=88)               -.0777               -.715 
Appropriations -.1181 (N=19) -.2624 (N=86)               -.1443              -1.395 
Civil Law -.5809 (N=8) -.2079 (N=97)                .3730               2.539** 
Commerce -.1862 (N=16) -.2453 (N=89)               -.0591               -.529 
Education -.2602 (N=18) -.2313 (N=87)                .0289                .271 
Environment -.2826 (N=14) -.2291 (N=91)                .0535                .453 
Health and Welfare -.1954 (N=17) -.2442 (N=88)               -.0488               -.447 
Government Affairs           -.2789 (N=15)           -.2292 (N=90)                .0498                .434 
Insurance           -.3676 (N=17)           -.2109 (N=88)                .1567               1.452 
Judiciary           -.2463 (N=12)           -.2350 (N=93)                .0114                .090 
Labor -.3388 (N=16)           -.2178 (N=89)                .1210               1.088 
Municipal -.2904 (N=14)           -.2280 (N=91)                .0624                .529 
Natural Resources -.3763 (N=15)           -.2129 (N=90)                .1633               1.437 
Retirement -.3045 (N=11)           -.2283 (N=94)                 .0763                .582 
Transportation -.3016 (N=18)           -.2228 (N=87)                .0789                .742 
Ways and Means -.0186 (N=18)           -.2813 (N=87)               -.2628              -2.541** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.16 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
                      
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
Member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice               -.0759 (N=11)                               -.2550 (N=94)                         -.1791                          -1.378                         
Agriculture               -.2052 (N=17)               -.2423 (N=88)               -.0371               -.340 
Appropriations               -.1177 (N=19)               -.2625 (N=86)               -.1447              -1.400 
Civil Law               -.4713 (N=10)               -.2115 (N=95)                .2598               1.932 
Commerce               -.3629 (N=15)               -.2152 (N=90)                .1477               1.297 
Education               -.3598 (N=17)               -.2124 (N=88)                .1474               1.364 
Environment               -.1017 (N=14)               -.2570 (N=91)               -.1533               -1.325 
Health and Welfare               -.2521 (N=16)               -.2334 (N=89)                .0187                .167 
Government Affairs               -.0597 (N=15)               -.2657 (N=90)               -.2060              -1.823 
Insurance               -.3564 (N=17)               -.2131 (N=88)                .1433               1.325 
Judiciary               -.1882 (N=12)               -.2425 (N=93)               -.0542               -.430 
Labor               -.3344 (N=16)               -.2186 (N=89)                .1157               1.041 
Municipal               -.3474 (N=14)               -.2192 (N=91)                .1282               1.091 
Natural Resources               -.2389 (N=17)               -.2358 (N=88)                .0031                .029 
Retirement               -.3197 (N=11)               -.2265 (N=94)                .0932                .712 
Transportation               -.2870 (N=18)               -.2258 (N=87)                .0612                .575 
Ways and Means               -.2525 (N=17)               -.2331 (N=88)                .0193                .177 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.17 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2004 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.0122 (N=11) .0594 ((N=94) .0716 .4374 
Agriculture .1405 (N=17) .0348 (N=88) -.1058 -.7788 
Appropriations -.1538 (N=19) .0973 (N=86) .2511 1.963* 
Civil Law .0795 (N=8) .0496 (N=97) -.0299  -.1580 
Commerce .2238 (N=19) .0139 (N=86) -.2099 -1.6318 
Education .2361 (N=16) .0188 (N=89) -.2173 -1.5752 
Environment .1679 (N=10) .0397 (N=95) -.1282   -.7523 
Health and Welfare -.0319 (N=19) .0704 (N=86) .1023    .7874 
Government Affairs -.3076 (N=10) .0897 (N=95) .3973   2.389** 
Insurance .1973 (N=18) .0218 (N=87) -.1755 -1.3300 
Judiciary -.0479 (N=14) .0673 (N=91) .1152    .7828 
Labor .0305 (N=10) .0541 (N=95) .0236    .1384 
Municipal -.24 (N=12) .0896 (N=93) .3296      2.1359** 
Natural Resources .1355 (N=17) .0357 (N=88) -.0998  -.7347 
Retirement .1659 (N=9) .0412 (N=96) -.1247  -.6974 
Transportation .2998 (N=18) .0006 (N=87) -.2992    -2.3048** 
Ways and Means -.2801 (N=19) .1252 (N=86) .4053       3.2680*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.18 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2005 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.3025 (N=15) -.0317 (N=90) .2708 1.9081* 
Agriculture -.0898 (N=14) -.0674 (N=91) .0224 .1507 
Appropriations -.2834 (N=19) -.0233 (N=86) .2600 2.0202** 
Civil Law .0402 (N=10) -.0820 (N=95) -.1222 -.7118 
Commerce .0733 (N=19) -.1021 (N=86) -.1754 -1.3485 
Education .169 (N=15) -.1103 (N=90) -.2793 -1.9703* 
Environment -.082 (N=7) -.0696 (N=98) .0124 .0615 
Health and Welfare -.0718 (N=19) -.0701 (N=86) .0018 .0136 
Government Affairs -.1822 (N=9) -.0599 (N=96) .1223 .6793 
Insurance .1161 (N=17) -.1064 (N=88) -.2225 -1.6435 
Judiciary -.0454 (N=16) -.0749 (N=89) -.0295 -.2099 
Labor -.0759 (N=11) -.0697 (N=94) .0062 .0374 
Municipal -.2034 (N=12) -.0532 (N=93) .1502 .9499 
Natural Resources .0415 (N=16) -.0905 (N=89) -.1320 -.9429 
Retirement .2588 (N=11) -.1089 (N=94) -.3677 -2.2846** 
Transportation .3557 (N=19) -.1645 (N=86) -.5203 -4.3061*** 
Ways and Means -.4579 (N=19) .0152 (N=86) .4731 3.8564*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.19 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2006 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.2062 (N=13) -.0569 (N=92) .1493 1.0058 
Agriculture -.105 (N=14) -.0709 (N=91) .0341 .2362 
Appropriations -.2595 (N=18) -.0373 (N=87) .2222 1.7289* 
Civil Law -.0318 (N=9) -.0795 (N=96) -.0477 -.2722 
Commerce .0671 (N=18) -.1049 (N=87) -.1719 -1.3306 
Education .0744 (N=17) -.1044 (N=88) -.1788 -1.3525 
Environment -.0956 (N=8) -.0738 (N=97) .0219 .1181 
Health and Welfare .0045 (N=17) -.0909 (N=88) -.0954 -.7172 
Government Affairs -.2643 (N=10) -.0555 (N=95) .2088 1.2569 
Insurance .063 (N=17) -.1022 (N=88) -.1652 -1.2479 
Judiciary -.0495 (N=17) -.0804 (N=88) -.0310 -.2323 
Labor -.1131 (N=11) -.0710 (N=94) .0421 .2623 
Municipal -.2473 (N=12) -.0533 (N=93) .1940 1.2661 
Natural Resources .0829 (N=15) -.1018 (N=90) -.1848 -1.3273 
Retirement .2225 (N=11) -.1103 (N=94) -.3328 -2.1197** 
Transportation .3296 (N=19) -.1649 (N=86) -.4945 -4.1928*** 
Ways and Means -.4057 (N=18) -.0071 (N=87) .3986 3.2073*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.20 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2007 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.2588 (N=13) -.0799 (N=92) .1789 1.0905 
Agriculture -.2304 (N=14) -.0824 (N=91) .1480 .9296 
Appropriations -.3205 (N=19) -.0538 (N=86) .2667 1.9228* 
Civil Law -.0477 (N=9) -.1072 (N=96) -.0595 -.3068 
Commerce .0993 (N=17) -.1410 (N=88) -.2404 -1.6506 
Education -.0081 (N=17) -.1203 (N=88) -.1122 -.7627 
Environment -.0744 (N=8) -.1044 (N=97) -.0300 -.1465 
Health and Welfare -.0222 (N=17) -.1175 (N=88) -.0954 -.6477 
Government Affairs -.2777 (N=9) -.0856 (N=96) .1920 .9939 
Insurance .1034 (N=17) -.1418 (N=88) -.2452 -1.6848* 
Judiciary -.0539 (N=17) -.1114 (N=88) -.0575 -.3902 
Labor -.1392 (N=11) -.0978 (N=94) .0414 .2335 
Municipal -.3066 (N=12) -.0757 (N=93) .2309 1.3637 
Natural Resources .0238 (N=16) -.1247 (N=89) -.1485 -.9869 
Retirement .2245 (N=11) -.1403 (N=94) -.3648 -2.0990** 
Transportation .2462 (N=19) -.1790 (N=86) -.4252 -3.1541*** 
Ways and Means -.4381 (N=19) -.0279 (N=86) .4102 .0031*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.21 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal w scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2008 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice .1279 (N=14) .1233 (N=89) -.0047 -.0291 
Agriculture .2209 (N=19) .1019 (N=84) -.1190 -.8423 
Appropriations .216 (N=24) .0959 (N=79) -.1201 -.9271 
Civil Law .2192 (N=14) .1089 (N=89) -.1103 -.6891 
Commerce -.0297 (N=19) .1586 (N=84) .1884 1.3404 
Education -.1418 (N=15) .1692 (N=88) .3110 2.0352** 
Environment .1912 (N=17) .1106 (N=86) -.0807 -.5452 
Health and Welfare .2018 (N=17) .1085 (N=86) -.0933 -.6308 
Government Affairs .2082 (N= 19) .1048 (N=84) -.1033 -.7307 
Insurance .1077 (N=10) .1256 (N=93) .0179 .0966 
Judiciary -.0979 (N=16) .1647 (N=87) .2626 1.7561* 
Labor .0883 (N=9) .1273 (N=94) .0390 .2001 
Municipal -.0816 (N=19) .1704 (N=84) .2520 1.8059* 
Natural Resources 1.9124 (N=17) .1106 (N=86) -.0807 -.5452 
Retirement .2516 ( N=11) .1086 (N=92) -.1430 -.8058 
Transportation .0135 (N=19) .1489 (N=84) .1353 .9588 
Ways and Means .1361 (N=19) .1211 (N=84) -.0150 -.1056 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.22 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
1999 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                42% (N=12)                47% (N=90)             .1065                .744 
Agriculture                47% (N=15)                46% (N=87)             .0024                .961 
Appropriations                53% (N=19)                45% (N=83)             .4036                .525 
Civil Law                67% (N=12)                43% (N=90)           2.3202                .128 
Commerce                53% (N=17)                45% (N=85)             .3867                .534 
Education                65% (N=17)                42% (N=85)           2.8489                .091* 
Environment                42% (N=12)                47% (N=90)             .1065                .744 
Health and Welfare                25% (N=16)                50% (N=86)           3.3934                .065* 
Government Affairs                38% (N=13)                47% (N=89)             .3479                .555 
Insurance                33% (N=12)                48% (N=90)             .8891                .346 
Judiciary                17% (N=12)                50% (N=90)           4.7350                 .030** 
Labor                47% (N=15)                46% (N=87)             .0024                .961 
Municipal                38% (N=13)                47% (N=89)             .3479                .555 
Natural Resources                72% (N=18)                40% (N=84)           6.0127                .014** 
Retirement                82% (N=11)                42% (N=91)           6.3386                .012** 
Transportation                31% (N=13)                48% (N=89)           1.4054                .236 
Ways and Means                21% (N=19)                52% (N=83)           5.8856                .015** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.23 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                46% (N=13)                50% (N=92)                .0674                .795 
Agriculture                18% (N=17)                56% (N=88)               8.2452                .004*** 
Appropriations                53% (N=19)                49% (N=86)                .0896                .765 
Civil Law                75% (N=12)                46% (N=93)               3.5177                .061* 
Commerce                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)                .0948                .758 
Education                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)                .0948                .758 
Environment                54% (N=13)                49% (N=92)                .1109                .739 
Health and Welfare                41% (N=17)                51% (N=88)                .5654                .452 
Government Affairs                67% (N=15)                47% (N=90)               2.0573                .151 
Insurance                73% (N=15)                46% (N=90)               3.9686                .046** 
Judiciary                50% (N=14)                49% (N=91)                .0015                .969 
Labor                63% (N=16)                47% (N=89)               1.2715                .259 
Municipal                43% (N=14)                51% (N=91)                .2872                .592 
Natural Resources                40% (N=15)                51% (N=90)                .6350                .426 
Retirement                90% (N=10)                45% (N=95)               7.2438                .007*** 
Transportation                50% (N=14)                49% (N=91)                .0015                .969 
Ways and Means                16% (N=19)                57% (N=86)              10.5606                .001*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.24 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                36% (N=11)                51% (N=94)                .8513                .356 
Agriculture                47% (N=17)                50% (N=88)                .0493                .824 
Appropriations                53% (N=19)                49% (N=86)                .0896                .765 
Civil Law                70% (N=10)                47% (N=95)               1.8538                .173 
Commerce                35% (N=17)                52% (N=88)               1.6430                .200 
Education                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)                .7018                .402 
Environment                69% (N=13)                47% (N=92)               2.3051                .129 
Health and Welfare                47% (N=17)                50% (N=88)                .0493                .824 
Government Affairs                53% (N=15)                49% (N=90)                .1016                .750 
Insurance                56% (N=16)                48% (N=89)                .3416                .559 
Judiciary                46% (N=13)                50% (N=92)                .0674                .795 
Labor                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)                .7018                .402 
Municipal                42% (N=12)                51% (N=93)                .3346                .563 
Natural Resources                47% (N=15)                50% (N=90)                .0571                .811 
Retirement                64% (N=11)                48% (N=94)                .9790                .322 
Transportation                44% (N=16)                51% (N=89)                .2517                .616 
Ways and Means                22% (N=18)                55% (N=87)               6.4777                .011** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.25 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                36% (N=11)                52% (N=93)                .9150                .339 
Agriculture                41% (N=17)                52% (N=87)                .6329                .426 
Appropriations                53% (N=19)                49% (N=85)                .0644                .800 
Civil Law                63% (N=8)                49% (N=96)                .5417                .462 
Commerce                38% (N=16)                52% (N=88)               1.1818                .277 
Education                59% (N=17)                48% (N=87)                .6329                .426 
Environment                69% (N=13)                47% (N=91)               2.1978                .138 
Health and Welfare                41% (N=17)                52% (N=87)                .6329                .426 
Government Affairs                53% (N=15)                49% (N=89)                .0779                .780 
Insurance                59% (N=17)                48% (N=87)                .6329                .426 
Judiciary                50% (N=12)                50% (N=92)                .0000               1.000 
Labor                56% (N=16)                49% (N=88)                .2955                .587 
Municipal                62% (N=13)                48% (N=91)                .7912                .374 
Natural Resources                60% (N=15)                48% (N=89)                .7011                .402 
Retirement                64% (N=11)                48% (N=93)                .9150                .339 
Transportation                61% (N=18)                48% (N=86)               1.0749                .300 
Ways and Means                11% (N=18)                58% (N=86)              13.1680                .000*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.26 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                 9% (N=11)               29% (N=94)               1.9409                .164 
Agriculture               29% (N=17)               26% (N=88)                .0782                .780 
Appropriations               21% (N=19)               28% (N=86)                .3739                .541 
Civil Law               50% (N=10)               24% (N=95)               3.0772                .079* 
Commerce               33% (N=15)               26% (N=90)                .3977                .528 
Education               35% (N=17)               25% (N=88)                .7721                .380 
Environment               21% (N=14)               27% (N=91)                .2266                .634 
Health and Welfare               25% (N=16)               27% (N=89)                .0268                .870 
Government Affairs               33% (N=15)               26% (N=90)                .3977                .528 
Insurance               29% (N=17)               26% (N=88)                .0782                .780 
Judiciary               25% (N=12)               27% (N=93)                .0192                .890 
Labor               50% (N=16)               22% (N=89)               5.2554                .022** 
Municipal               21% (N=14)               27% (N=91)                .2266                .634 
Natural Resources               24% (N=17)               27% (N=88)                .1021                .749 
Retirement               18% (N=11)               28% (N=94)                .4523                .501 
Transportation               33% (N=18)               25% (N=87)                .4937                .482 
Ways and Means                6% (N=17)               31% (N=88)               4.4808                .034** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.27 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2004 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                55% (N=11)                44% (N=93)             .4345                .510 
Agriculture                63% (N=16)                42% (N=88)           2.2869                .130 
Appropriations                22% (N=18)                50% (N=86)           4.6369                .031** 
Civil Law                50% (N=8)                45% (N=96)             .0809                .776 
Commerce                53% (N=19)                44% (N=85)             .5194                .471 
Education                60% (N=15)                43% (N=89)           1.5517                .213 
Environment                50% (N=10)                45% (N=94)             .1032                .748 
Health and Welfare                42% (N=19)                46% (N=85)             .0894                .765 
Government Affairs                40% (N=10)                46% (N=94)             .1204                .729 
Insurance                61% (N=18)                42% (N=86)           2.2270                .136 
Judiciary                43% (N=14)                46% (N=90)             .0356                .850 
Labor                60% (N=10)                44% (N=94)             .9794                .322 
Municipal                25% (N=12)                48% (N=92)           2.2330                .135 
Natural Resources                41% (N=17)                46% (N=87)             .1323                .716 
Retirement                56% (N=9)                44% (N=95)             .4272                .513 
Transportation                83% (N=18)                37% (N=86)         12.7846                .000*** 
Ways and Means               11% (N=19)                53% (N=85)         11.2790                .001*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.28 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2005 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                27% (N=15)                52% (N=90)             3.3615                .067* 
Agriculture                57% (N=14)                47% (N=91)               .4751                .491 
Appropriations                37% (N=19)                51% (N=86)             1.2776                .258 
Civil Law                50% (N=10)                48% (N=95)               .0090                .924 
Commerce                68% (N=19)                44% (N=86)             3.6590                .056* 
Education                73% (N=15)                44% (N=90)             4.2956                .038** 
Environment                14% (N=7)                51% (N=98)             3.5294                .060* 
Health and Welfare                42% (N=19)                50% (N=86)               .3883                .533 
Government Affairs                33% (N=9)                50% (N=96)               .9150                .339 
Insurance                71% (N=17)                44% (N=88)             3.9362                .047** 
Judiciary                38% (N=16)                51% (N=89)               .9263                .336 
Labor                55% (N=11)                48% (N=94)               .1756                .675 
Municipal                42% (N=12)                49% (N=93)               .2586                .611 
Natural Resources                63% (N=16)                46% (N=89)             1.4660                .226 
Retirement                73% (N=11)                46% (N=94)             2.8702                .090* 
Transportation                84% (N=19)                41% (N=86)           11.7954                .001*** 
Ways and Means                21% (N=19)                55% (N=86)             7.0326                .008*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.29 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2006 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                23% (N=13)                53% (N=92)             4.1514                .042** 
Agriculture                43% (N=14)                51% (N=91)               .2872                .592 
Appropriations                28% (N=18)                54% (N=87)             4.1096                .043** 
Civil Law                44% (N=9)                50% (N=96)               .1016                .750 
Commerce                67% (N=18)                46% (N=87)             2.5539                .110 
Education                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)               .7018                .402 
Environment                38% (N=8)                51% (N=97)               .5008                .479 
Health and Welfare                65% (N=17)                47% (N=88)             1.8703                .171 
Government Affairs                50% (N=10)                49% (N=95)               .0010                .975 
Insurance                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)               .7018                .402 
Judiciary                47% (N=17)                50% (N=88)               .0493                .824 
Labor                45% (N=11)                50% (N=94)               .0814                .775 
Municipal                33% (N=12)                52% (N=93)             1.4207                .233 
Natural Resources                53% (N=15)                49% (N=90)               .1016                .750 
Retirement                73% (N=11)                47% (N=94)             2.6464                .104 
Transportation                89% (N=19)                41% (N=86)           14.8107                .000*** 
Ways and Means                17% (N=18)                56% (N=87)             9.3821                .002*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.30 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2007 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                46% (N=13)                50% (N=92)             .0674                .795 
Agriculture                29% (N=14)                53% (N=91)           2.8369                .092* 
Appropriations                21% (N=19)                56% (N=86)           7.5224                .006*** 
Civil Law                56% (N=9)                49% (N=96)             .1433                .705 
Commerce                65% (N=17)                47% (N=88)           1.8703                .171 
Education                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)             .0948                .758 
Environment                50% (N=8)                49% (N=97)             .0008                .978 
Health and Welfare                53% (N=17)                49% (N=88)             .0948                .758 
Government Affairs                56% (N=9)                49% (N=96)             .1433                .705 
Insurance                59% (N=17)                48% (N=88)             .7018                .402 
Judiciary                41% (N=17)                51% (N=88)             .5654                .452 
Labor                45% (N=11)                50% (N=94)             .0814                .775 
Municipal                33% (N=12)                52% (N=93)           1.4207                .233 
Natural Resources                50% (N=16)                49% (N=89)             .0017                .967 
Retirement                73% (N=11)                47% (N=94)           2.6464                .104 
Transportation                84% (N=19)                42% (N=86)         11.1653                .001*** 
Ways and Means                26% (N=19)                55% (N=86)           4.9983                .025** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.31 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2008 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                36% (N=14)                42% (N=89)             .1719                .678 
Agriculture                26% (N=19)                44% (N=84)           2.0174                .156 
Appropriations                42% (N=24)                41% (N=79)             .0103                .919 
Civil Law                57% (N=14)                38% (N=89)           1.7971                .180 
Commerce                21% (N=19)                45% (N=84)           3.7532                .053* 
Education                47% (N=15)                40% (N=88)             .2522                .616 
Environment                29% (N=17)                43% (N=86)           1.0890                .297 
Health and Welfare                53% (N=17)                38% (N=86)           1.2476                .264 
Government Affairs                47% (N=19)                39% (N=84)             .4192                .517 
Insurance                20% (N=10)                43% (N=93)           1.9797                .159 
Judiciary                38% (N=16)                41% (N=87)             .0842                .772 
Labor                44% (N=9)                40% (N=94)             .0549                .815 
Municipal                37% (N=19)                42% (N=84)             .1494                .699 
Natural Resources                29% (N=17)                43% (N=86)           1.0890                .297 
Retirement                45% (N=11)                40% (N=92)             .1116                .738 
Transportation                37% (N=19)                42% (N=84)             .1494                .699 
Ways and Means                47% (N=19)                39% (N=84)             .4192                .517 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
 
 190 
 
Table A.32 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
1999 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 52.75 (N=12) 55.9 (N=90) 3.15 .3327 
Agriculture .1657 (N=15) .1534 (N=88) -.0124 -.0828 
Appropriations 60.7895 (N=19) 54.3253 (N=83) -6.464 -.8274 
Civil Law 62.3333 (N=12) 54.6222 (N=90) -7.7111 -.8168 
Commerce 57.1177 (N=17) 55.2118 (N=85) -1.906 -0.2328 
Education 60.1177 (N=17) 54.6118 (N=85) -5.5059 -.6739 
Environment 56.1667 (N=12) 55.4444 (N=90) -.72222 -.0762 
Health and Welfare 44.4375 (N=16) 57.5930 (N=86) 13.1555 1.5872 
Government Affairs 53.3846 (N=13) 55.8427 (N=89) 2.4581 .2687 
Insurance 52.0833 (N=12) 55.9889 (N=90) 3.9056 .4127 
Judiciary 50.75 (N=12) 56.1667 (N=90) 5.4167 .5728 
Labor 52.2667 (N=15) 56.0920 (N=87) 3.8253 .4443 
Municipal 50.5385 (N=13) 56.2584 (N=89) 5.7200 .6262 
Natural Resources 68.7222 (N=18) 52.7024 (N=84) -16.0198 -2.0423* 
Retirement 72.6364 (N=11) 53.4615 (N=91) -19.1748 -1.9869* 
Transportation 47.1539 (N=13) 56.7528 (N=89) 9.5990 1.0547 
Ways and Means 39.6842 (N=19) 59.1566 (N=83) 19.4724 2.5644** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.33 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice              43.0769 (N=13)                                43.5543 (N=92)                                   .4774                                     .054                          
Agriculture              26.8824 (N=17)              46.7045 (N=88)              19.8222               2.587** 
Appropriations              42.4737 (N=19)              43.7209 (N=86)               1.2472                .165 
Civil Law              60.5833 (N=12)              41.2903 (N=93)             -19.2930              -2.155** 
Commerce              43.3529 (N=17)              43.5227 (N=88)                .1698                .021 
Education              45.1765 (N=17)              43.1705 (N=88)               -2.0060               -.254 
Environment              50.9231 (N=13)              42.4457 (N=92)              -8.4774               -.963 
Health and Welfare              44.2353 (N=17)              43.3523 (N=88)               -.8830               -.112 
Government Affairs              50.6667 (N=15)              42.3000 (N=90)              -8.3667              -1.010 
Insurance              51.6000 (N=15)              42.1444 (N=90)              -9.4556              -1.143 
Judiciary              45.4286 (N=14)              43.1978 (N=91)              -2.2308               -.260 
Labor              54.1875 (N=16)              41.5730 (N=89)             -12.6145              -1.575 
Municipal              41.0714 (N=14)              43.8681 (N=91)               2.7967                .327 
Natural Resources              46.2667 (N=15)              43.0333 (N=90)              -3.2333               -.389 
Retirement              62.3000 (N=10)              41.5158 (N=95)             -20.7842              -2.141** 
Transportation              44.0714 (N=14)              43.4066 (N=91)               -.6648               -.078 
Ways and Means              27.5263 (N=19)              47.0233 (N=86)              19.4969               2.665*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.34 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
Member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
difference 
 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice              57.7273 (N=11)                                63.0638 (N=94)                        5.3366                                 .544                                                        
Agriculture              61.1176 (N=17)              62.7727 (N=88)               1.6551                .203 
Appropriations              66.7368 (N=19)              61.5698 (N=86)              -5.1671               -.662 
Civil Law              76.4000 (N=10)              61.0421 (N=95)             -15.3579              -1.514 
Commerce              55.1765 (N=17)              63.9205 (N=88)               8.7440               1.076 
Education              67.4706 (N=17)              61.5455 (N=88)              -5.9251               -.727 
Environment              69.7692 (N=13)              61.4783 (N=92)              -8.2910               -.911 
Health and Welfare              56.4118 (N=17)              63.6818 (N=88)               7.2701                .893 
Government Affairs              64.2000 (N=15)              62.2222 (N=90)              -1.9778               -.230 
Insurance              72.1250 (N=16)              60.7753 (N=89)             -11.3497              -1.367 
Judiciary              58.4615 (N=13)              63.0761 (N=92)               4.6145                .506 
Labor              65.7059 (N=17)              61.8864 (N=88)              -3.8195               -.468 
Municipal              59.9167 (N=12)              62.8387 (N=93)               2.9220                .309 
Natural Resources              59.4667 (N=15)              63.0111 (N=90)               3.5444                .412 
Retirement              70.9091 (N=11)              61.5213 (N=94)              -9.3878               -.959 
Transportation              61.3750 (N=16)              62.7079 (N=89)               1.3329                .159 
Ways and Means              42.8333 (N=18)              66.5747 (N=87)              23.7414               3.109*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.35 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice              59.1818 (N=11)                        63.0430 (N=93)                         3.8612                            .405                                        
Agriculture              59.7059 (N=17)              63.2069 (N=87)               3.5010                .442 
Appropriations              65.6842 (N=19)              61.9529 (N=85)              -3.7313               -.492 
Civil Law              74.6250 (N=8)              61.6354 (N=96)             -12.9896              -1.188 
Commerce              58.7500 (N=16)              63.3409 (N=88)               4.5909                .565 
Education              66.0000 (N=17)              61.9770 (N=87)              -4.0230               -.508 
Environment              67.6923 (N=13)              61.9121 (N=91)              -5.7802               -.653 
Health and Welfare              55.7647 (N=17)              63.9770 (N=87)               8.2123               1.040 
Government Affairs              62.7333 (N=15)              62.6180 (N=89)               -.1154               -.014 
Insurance              69.4118 (N=17)              61.3103 (N=87)              -8.1014              -1.026 
Judiciary              63.6667 (N=12)              62.5000 (N=92)              -1.1667               -.127 
Labor              64.3125 (N=16)              62.3295 (N=88)              -1.9830               -.244 
Municipal              62.2308 (N=13)              62.6923 (N=91)                .4615                .052 
Natural Resources              66.2000 (N=15)              62.0337 (N=89)              -4.1663               -.499 
Retirement              70.8182 (N=11)              61.6667 (N=93)              -9.1515               -.964 
Transportation              66.0556 (N=18)              61.9186 (N=86)              -4.1370               -.534 
Ways and Means              40.8889 (N=18)              67.1860 (N=86)              26.2972               3.600** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.36 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees 
                      
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
Member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice              63.3636 (N=11)                                67.8085 (N=94)                        4.4449                            .695                                         
Agriculture              67.0588 (N=17)              67.3977 (N=88)                .3389                .064 
Appropriations              61.2632 (N=19)              68.6860 (N=86)               7.4229               1.470 
Civil Law              78.5000 (N=10)              66,1684 (N=95)             -12.3316              -1.875 
Commerce              71.1333 (N=15)              66.7111 (N=90)              -4.4222               -.790 
Education              70.3529 (N=17)              66,7614 (N=88)              -3.5916               -.675 
Environment              68.9286 (N=14)              67.0989 (N=91)              -1.8297               -.317 
Health and Welfare              63.1875 (N=16)              68.0899 (N=89)               4.9024                .901 
Government Affairs              67.8000 (N=15)              67.2667 (N=90)               -.5333               -.095 
Insurance              72.7059 (N=17)              66.3068 (N=88)              -6.3991              -1.209 
Judiciary              64.0833 (N=12)              67.7634 (N=93)               3.6801                .597 
Labor              71.6875 (N=16)              66.5618 (N=89)              -5.1257               -.942 
Municipal              68.5714 (N=14)              67.1538 (N=91)              -1.4176               -.245 
Natural Resources              66.7059 (N=17)              67.4659 (N=88)                .7600                .143 
Retirement              64.9091 (N=11)              67.6277 (N=94)               2.7186                .424 
Transportation              65.8333 (N=18)              67.6552 (N=87)               1.8218                .350 
Ways and Means              61.4706 (N=17)              68.4773 (N=88)               7.0067               1.325 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.37 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2004 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 68.8182 (N=11) 73.7850 (N=93) 4.9668 .8493 
Agriculture 78.625 (N=16) 72.2841 (N=88) -6.3409 -1.2777 
Appropriations 65.6667 (N=18) 74.8488 (N=86) 9.1822 1.9606* 
Civil Law 74.25 (N=8) 73.1771 (N=96) -1.0729 -.1584 
Commerce 75.7895 (N=19) 72.6941 (N=85) -3.0954 -.6642 
Education 83.2 (N=15) 71.5843 (N=89) -11.6157 -2.3200** 
Environment 72.9 (N=10) 73.2979 (N=94) .3979 .0650 
Health and Welfare 67.1579 (N=19) 74.6235 (N=85) 7.4656 1.6188 
Government Affairs 69.1 (N=10) 73.7021 (N=94) 4.6021 .7538 
Insurance 77.7222 (N=18) 72.3256 (N=86) -5.3966 -1.1384 
Judiciary 69.5714 (N=14) 73.8333 (N=90) 4.2619 .8086 
Labor 73.9 (N=10) 73.1915 (N=94) -.7085 -.1157 
Municipal 63.25 (N=12) 74.5652 (N=92) 11.3152 2.0436** 
Natural Resources 76.7647 (N=17) 72.5747 (N=87) -4.1900 -.8616 
Retirement 79.3333 (N=9) 72.6842 (N=95) -6.6491 -1.0413 
Transportation 88.0556 (N=18) 70.1628 (N=86) -17.8928 -4.0394*** 
Ways and Means 61.1053 (N=19) 75.9765 (N=85) 14.8712 .0011*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.38 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2005 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 59.7333 (N=15) 68.8778 (N=90) 9.1444 1.3531 
Agriculture 75.2857 (N=14) 66.3846 (N=91) -8.9011 -1.2783 
Appropriations 61.6316 (N=19) 68.8837 (N=86) 7.2521 1.1781 
Civil Law 72.5 (N=10) 67.0526 (N=95) -5.4474 -.6717 
Commerce 76.9474 (N=19) 65.5 (N=86) -11.4474 -1.8786* 
Education 79.6 (N=15) 65.5667 (N=90) -14.0333 -2.1020* 
Environment 59.5714 (N=7) 68.1429 (N=98) 8.5714 ..8997 
Health and Welfare 66.6842 (N=19) 67.7674 (N=86) 1.0832 .1748 
Government Affairs 61 (N=9) 68.1875 (N=96) 7.1875 .8463 
Insurance 71.8824 (N=17) 66.7386 (N=88) -5.1437 -.7966 
Judiciary 62.1875 (N=16) 68.5393 (N=89) 6.3518 .9611 
Labor 64.8182 (N=11) 67.8936 (N=94) 3.0754 .3951 
Municipal 59 (N=12) 68.6774 (N=93) 9.6774 1.3011 
Natural Resources 77.5 (N=16) 65.7865 (N=89) -11.7135 -1.7918* 
Retirement 80.2727 (N=11) 66.0851 (N=94) -14.1876 -1.8513* 
Transportation 84.4211 (N=19) 63.8488 (N=86) -20.5722 -3.5129*** 
Ways and Means 48.3158 (N=19) 71.8256 (N=86) 23.5098 4.0902*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.39 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2006 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 61 (N=13) 64.8478 (N=92) 3.8478 .5604 
Agriculture 64.7143 (N=14) 64.3187 (N=91) -.3956 -.0594 
Appropriations 55.9444 (N=18) 66.1149 (N=87) 10.1705 1.7165* 
Civil Law 62.8889 (N=9) 64.5104 (N=96) 1.6215 .2005 
Commerce 72 (N=18) 62.7931 (N=87) -9.2069 -1.5499 
Education 68.4706 (N=17) 63.5796 (N=88) -4.8910 -.7980 
Environment 61.125 (N=8) 64.6392 (N=97) 3.5142 .4120 
Health and Welfare 69.0588 (N=17) 63.4659 (N=88) -5.5929 -.9133 
Government Affairs 55.3 (N=10) 65.3263 (N=95) 10.0263 1.3103 
Insurance 71 (N=17) 63.0909 (N=88) -7.9091 -1.2968 
Judiciary 64.7059 (N=17) 64.3068 (N=88) -.3991 -.0649 
Labor 58.3636 (N=11) 65.0745 (N=94) 6.7108 .9111 
Municipal 53 (N=12) 65.8387 (N=93) 12.8387 1.8327* 
Natural Resources 69.8667 (N=15) 63.4556 (N=90) -6.4111 -.9953 
Retirement 72.2727 (N=11) 63.4468 (N=94) -8.8259 -1.2018 
Transportation 80.6842 (N=19) 60.7674 (N=86) -19.9168 -3.5912*** 
Ways and Means 50.7222 (N=18) 67.1954 (N=87) 16.4732 2.8471*** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
 
 
 
 198 
 
Table A.40 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2007 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 56 (N=13) 63.5326 (N=92) 7.5326 .9238 
Agriculture 51.2857 (N=14) 64.3407 (N=91) 13.0550 1.6677* 
Appropriations 44.9474 (N=19) 66.5 (N=86) 21.5526 3.2288** 
Civil Law 61.7778 (N=9) 62.6771 (N=96) .8993 .0934 
Commerce 74.1765 (N=17) 60.3636 (N=88) -13.8128 -1.9203* 
Education 68.5882 (N=17) 61.4432 (N=88) -7.1451 -.9806 
Environment 59.625 (N=8) 62.8454 (N=97) 3.2204 .3170 
Health and Welfare 65.1765 (N=17) 62.1023 (N=88) -3.0742 -.4203 
Government Affairs 60.4444 (N=9) 62.8021 (N=96) 2.3576 .2448 
Insurance 70.6471 (N=17) 61.0455 (N=88) -9.6016 -1.3227 
Judiciary 62.4118 (N=17) 62.6364 (N=88) .2246 .0307 
Labor 61 (N=11) 62.7872 (N=94) 1.7872 .2030 
Municipal 55.5 (N=12) 63.5161 (N=93) 8.0161 .9499 
Natural Resources 67.0625 (N=16) 61.7978 (N=89) -5.2647 -.7033 
Retirement 71.8182 (N=11) 61.5213 (N=94) -10.2969 -1.1772 
Transportation 83.2632 (N=19) 58.0349 (N=86) -25.2283 -3.8523*** 
Ways and Means 47.4211 (N=19) 65.9535 (N=86) 18.5324 2.7405** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.41 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2008 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non-Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 66.3571 (N=14) 66.5169 (N=89) .1597 .0446 
Agriculture 64.4737 (N=19) 66.9524 (N=84) 2.4787 .7858 
Appropriations 65.75 (N=24) 66.7215 (N=79) .9715 .3348 
Civil Law 68.0714 (N=14) 66.2472 (N=89) -1.8242 -.5101 
Commerce 63.8947 (N=19) 67.0833 (N=84) 3.1886 1.0129 
Education 65.8 (N=15) 66.6136 (N=88) .8136 .2339 
Environment 67.2353 (N=17) 66.3488 (N=86) -.8865 -.2682 
Health and Welfare 68.0588 (N=17) 66.1861 (N=86) -1.8728 -.5674 
Government Affairs 67.7895 (N=19) 66.2024 (N=84) -1.5871 -.5022 
Insurance 64.9 (N=10) 66.6667 (N=93) 1.7666 .4266 
Judiciary 65 (N=16) 66.7701 (N=87) 1.7701 .5232 
Labor 66.5556 (N=9) 66.4894 (N=94) -.0662 -.0152 
Municipal 66.2105 (N=19) 66.5595 (N=84) .3490 .1103 
Natural Resources 67.2353 (N=17) 66.3488 (N=86) -.8865 -.2682 
Retirement 66.6364 (N=11) 66.4783 (N=92) -.1581 -.0398 
Transportation 65.7368 (N=19) 66.6667 (N=84) .9298 .2940 
Ways and Means 67.6842 (N=19) 66.2262 (N=84) -1.4580 -.4613 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.42: Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees 
1999 
Louisiana Standing 
Committees 
% Committee members 
above median  
% Non-committee members 
above median  
Chi-Square for Median 
Difference 
Prob-
Value 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
% African American 
 
 
58% (N=12) 
 
 
46% (N=93) 
 
 
 
.6235 
 
 
 
.430 
 
 
Agriculture 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
 
94% (N=16) 
 
38% (N=89) 
 
16.8131 
 
   .000*** 
Education 
Median family income 
 
 
41% (N=17) 
 
51% (N=88) 
 
 
 
.5654 
 
 
 
.452 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
69% (N=16) 
 
43% (N=89) 
 
3.6986 
 
 .054* 
Judiciary 
% African Americans 
 
50% (N=12) 
 
 
 
47% (N=93) 
 
 
 
.0308 
 
 
 
.861 
 
 
Labor 
% in manufacturing 
 
27% (N=15) 
 
50% (N=90) 
 
2.8125 
 
.094* 
     
 
Retirement 
% of district age 55 or older 
% on social security 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
36% (N=11) 
 
46% (N=94) 
47% (N=94) 
 
.3065 
.4329 
 
.580 
.511 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A-43: Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees  
2000 
Louisiana Standing 
Committees 
% Committee members 
above median  
% Non-committee members 
above median  
Chi-Square for Median 
Difference 
Prob-
Value 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
% African American 
 
62% (N=13)  
 
 
46% (N=92)  
 
 
1.1525 
 
.283 
Agriculture 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
94% (N=17) 
 
38% (N=88) 
 
18.3502 
 
   .000*** 
Education 
Median family income 
 
 
 
63% (N=16) 
 
 
 
47% (N=89) 
 
 
 
1.2715 
 
 
 
.259 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
71% (N=17) 
 
42% (N=88) 
 
4.6637 
 
 .031** 
Judiciary 
% African American 
 
 
 
71% (N=14) 
 
 
 
44% (N=91) 
 
 
 
3.6713 
 
 
 
..055* 
 
 
Labor 
% in manufacturing 
 
38% (N=16) 
 
48% (N=89) 
 
.6373 
 
.425 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Retirement 
% of district age 55 or older 
% on social security 
 
 
50% (N=10) 
40% (N=10)  
 
46% (N=95) 
46% (N=95)  
 
.0493 
.1454 
 
.824 
.703 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A.44: Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2001 
Louisiana Standing 
Committees 
% Committee members 
above median  
% Non-committee members 
above median  
Chi-Square for Median 
Difference 
Prob-
Value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
% African American 
 
 
 
 
64% (N=11)   
 
 
 
 
46% (N=94)  
 
 
 
 
1.2638 
 
 
 
 
.261 
 
 
Agriculture 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
94% (N=17) 
 
38% (N=88) 
 
18.3502 
 
   .000*** 
Education 
Median family income 
 
 
59% (N=17) 
 
 
 
48% (N=88) 
 
 
 
.7018 
 
 
 
.402 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
65% (N=17) 
 
43% (N=88) 
 
2/6521 
 
 .103 
Judiciary 
% African Americans 
 
75% (N=12)  
 
 
 
44% (N=93)  
 
 
 
4.0722 
 
 
 
 .044** 
 
 
Labor 
% in manufacturing 
 
35% (N=17) 
 
49% (N=88) 
 
1.0541 
 
.305 
 
 
 
 
   
Retirement 
% of district age 55 or older 
% on social security 
 
 
45% (N=11) 
36% (N=11)  
 
47% (N=94)  
47% (N=94)   
 
.0073 
.4329  
 
.932 
.511 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A.45: Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2002 
Louisiana standing 
committees 
% Committee members 
above median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for Median 
Difference 
Prob- 
values 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
64% (N=11) 
 
45% (N=11) 
 
40% (N=10) 
 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
 
48% (N=94) 
 
50% (N=94) 
 
51% (N=92) 
 
 
 
49% (N=94) 
 
 
.9790 
 
.0814 
 
.4435 
 
 
 
.1239 
 
 
.322 
 
.775 
 
.505 
 
 
 
.457 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
82% (N=17) 
 
 
88% (N=17) 
 
 
 
26% (N=88) 
 
 
29% (N=85) 
 
 
19.7305 
 
 
20.5645 
 
 
.000*** 
 
 
.000*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
38% (N=8) 
 
75% (N=8) 
 
 
51% (N=94) 
 
47% (N=97) 
 
 
.5426 
 
2.2484 
 
 
.461 
 
.134 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or 
retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate 
 
 
19% (N=16) 
 
 
19% (N=16) 
 
 
30% (N=89) 
 
 
30% (N=89) 
 
 
.8922 
 
 
.8922 
 
 
.345 
 
 
.345 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary 
and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
29% (N=17) 
59% (N=17) 
 
 
 
45% (N=88) 
 
 
48% (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
1.4973 
 
 
.7018 
 
 
 
 
.221 
 
 
.402 
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(table continued) 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
53% (N=17) 
 
53% (N=17) 
 
47% (N=17) 
 
65% (N=17) 
 
 
48% (N=88) 
 
41% (N=88) 
 
40% (N=88) 
 
47% (N=88) 
 
 
.1551 
 
.8422 
 
.3128 
 
1.8703 
 
 
.694 
 
.359 
 
.576 
 
.171 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public 
administration 
 
 
40% (N=15) 
 
 
48% (N=90) 
 
 
.3125 
 
 
.576 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
75% (N=12) 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
50% (N=12) 
 
67% (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
46% (N=93) 
 
49% (N=91) 
 
49% (N=93) 
 
47% (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
3.5177 
 
.1019 
 
.0012 
 
1.5928 
 
 
 
 
.061* 
 
.750 
 
.972 
 
.207 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
50% (N=16) 
 
 
43% (N=89) 
 
 
.2939 
 
 
.588 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local 
government 
 
 
 
 
43% (N=17) 
 
 
 
 
41% (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.0242 
 
 
 
 
 
.876 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
30% (N=10) 
 
 
42% (N=95) 
 
 
.5483 
 
 
.459 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and 
warehousing 
 
 
47% (N=17) 
 
 
34% (N=88) 
 
 
1.0375 
 
 
.308 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 **p=<.05 ***p=<.01 
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Table A.46: Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2003 
Louisiana 
standing 
committees 
% Committee 
members above 
median 
% Non-committee members above 
median 
Chi-square for Median 
Difference 
Prob- 
values 
Administration of 
Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban 
area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty 
line 
 
 
 
64% (N=11) 
 
45% (N=11) 
 
40% (N=10) 
 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
 
 
48% (N=94) 
 
50% (N=94) 
 
51% (N=92) 
 
 
 
49% (N=94) 
 
 
 
.9790 
 
.0814 
 
.4435 
 
 
 
.1239 
 
 
 
.322 
 
.775 
 
.505 
 
 
 
.725 
 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in 
agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
% of district living in 
rural farming areas 
 
 
 
 
82% (N=17) 
 
 
 
88% (N=17) 
 
 
 
 
26% (N=88) 
 
 
 
29% (N=85) 
 
 
 
19.7305 
 
 
 
20.5645 
 
 
 
.000*** 
 
 
 
.000*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in 
urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
 
30% (N=10) 
 
 
70% (N=10) 
 
 
52% (N=92) 
 
 
47% (N=95) 
 
 
1.7739 
 
 
1.8538 
 
 
.183 
 
 
.173 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed 
in wholesale or retail 
trade 
 
% of district employed 
in finance, insurance, 
and real estate 
 
 
21% (N=14) 
 
 
 
14% (N=14) 
 
 
30% (N=91) 
 
 
 
31% (N=91) 
 
 
.4038 
 
 
 
1.6154 
 
 
.525 
 
 
 
.204 
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(table continued) 
Education 
 
% of district attending 
public elementary and 
high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
35% (N=17) 
                   59% (N=17) 
 
 
 
44% (N=88) 
 
 
48% (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
.4738 
 
 
.7018 
 
 
 
 
.491 
 
 
.402 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with 
disabilities 
 
% of district employed 
in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or 
over 
 
% of pop. below 
poverty 
 
 
56% (N=16) 
 
63% (N=16) 
 
44% (N=16) 
 
63% (N=16) 
 
 
47% (N=89) 
 
39% (N=89) 
 
40% (N=89) 
 
47% (N=89) 
 
 
.4455 
 
2.9740 
 
.0611 
 
1.2715 
 
 
.504 
 
 .085* 
 
.805 
 
.259 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed 
in public 
administration 
 
 
40% (N=15) 
 
 
48% (N=90) 
 
 
.3125 
 
 
.576 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
83% (N=12) 
 
64% (N=11) 
 
33% (N=12) 
 
67% (N=12) 
 
 
45% (N=93) 
 
48% (N=91) 
 
52% (N=93) 
 
47% (N=93) 
 
 
6.1953 
 
.9171 
 
1.4207 
 
1.5928 
 
 
.013* 
 
.338 
 
.233 
 
.207 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
50% (N=16) 
 
 
43% (N=89) 
 
 
.2939 
 
 
.588 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed 
in local government 
 
 
 
 
43% (N=17) 
 
 
 
 
41% (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.0242 
 
 
 
 
 
.876 
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(table continued) 
 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or 
older 
 
 
36% (N=11) 
 
 
41% (N=94) 
 
 
.1070 
 
 
.744 
Transportation  
 
% employed in 
transportation and 
warehousing 
 
 
44% (N=18) 
 
 
34% (N=87) 
 
 
.6409 
 
 
.423 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A.47: Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2004 
Louisiana standing 
committees 
% Committee members 
above median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for Median 
Difference 
Prob- 
values 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
64% (N=11) 
 
27% (N=11) 
 
50% (N=10) 
 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
 
48% (N=94) 
 
52% (N=94) 
 
50% (N=92) 
 
 
 
49% (N=94) 
 
 
.9790 
 
2.4336 
 
.0000 
 
 
  
.1239 
 
 
.322 
 
.119 
 
1.000 
 
 
 
.725 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
82% (N=17) 
 
 
88% (N=17) 
 
 
 
26% (N=88) 
 
 
29% (N=85) 
 
 
19.7305 
 
 
20.5645 
 
 
.000*** 
 
 
.000*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
50% (N=8) 
 
38% (N=8) 
 
 
50% (N=94) 
 
51% (N=97) 
 
 
.0000 
 
.5008 
 
 
1.000 
 
.479 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or 
retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate 
 
 
37% (N=19) 
 
 
21% (N=19) 
 
 
27% (N=86) 
 
 
30% (N=86) 
 
 
.7775 
 
 
.6426 
 
 
.378 
 
 
.423 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary 
and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
38% (N=16) 
63% (N=16) 
 
 
 
44% (N=89) 
 
 
47% (N=89) 
 
 
 
 
.2212 
 
 
1.2715 
 
 
 
 
.638 
 
 
.259 
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(table continued) 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
56% (N=18) 
 
67% (N=18) 
 
50% (N=18) 
 
61% (N=18) 
 
 
47% (N=87) 
 
38% (N=87) 
 
39% (N=87) 
 
47% (N=87) 
 
 
.4242 
 
5.0287 
 
.7354 
 
1.1668 
 
 
.515 
 
    .025** 
 
.391 
 
.280 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public 
administration 
 
 
30% (N=10) 
 
 
48% (N=95) 
 
 
1.2336 
 
 
.267 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
71% (N=14) 
 
46% (N=13) 
 
36% (N=14) 
 
64% (N=14) 
 
 
 
 
46% (N=91) 
 
51% (N=89) 
 
52% (N=91) 
 
47% (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
3.1006 
 
.0882 
 
1.2323 
 
1.4082 
 
 
 
 
.078* 
 
.767 
 
.267 
 
.235 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
60% (N=10) 
 
 
42% (N=95) 
 
 
1.1769 
 
 
.278 
Municipal 
 
 
 
% of district employed in local 
government 
 
 
 
 
33% (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
42% (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
.3252 
 
 
 
 
 
.568 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
22% (N=9) 
 
 
43% (N=96) 
 
 
1.4281 
 
 
.232 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and 
warehousing 
 
 
28% (N=18) 
 
 
38% (N=87) 
 
 
.6658 
 
 
.415 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10, **p=<.05, ***p=<.01 
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Table A.48: Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees  
2005 
Louisiana standing 
committees 
% Committee members 
above median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for Median 
Difference 
Prob- 
values 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
57% (N=14) 
 
43% (N=14) 
 
42% (N=12) 
 
 
 
50% (N=14) 
 
 
48% (N=91) 
 
51% (N=91) 
 
51% (N=90) 
 
 
 
49% (N=91) 
 
 
.3751 
 
.2872 
 
.3778 
 
 
 
.0015 
 
 
.540 
 
.592 
 
.539 
 
 
 
.969 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
1% (N=14) 
 
 
86% (N=14) 
 
 
 
25% (N=91) 
 
 
32% (N=88) 
 
 
29.6881 
 
 
14.7189 
 
 
.000*** 
 
 
.000*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
50% (N=10) 
 
40% (N=10) 
 
 
50% (N=92) 
 
51% (N=95) 
 
 
.0000 
 
.4010 
 
 
1.000 
 
.527 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or 
retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate 
 
 
37% (N=19) 
 
 
21% (N=19) 
 
 
27% (N=86) 
 
 
30% (N=86) 
 
 
.7775 
 
 
.6426 
 
 
.378 
 
 
.423 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary 
and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
36% (N=14) 
64% (N=14) 
 
 
 
44% (N=91) 
 
 
47% (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.3365 
 
 
1.4082 
 
 
 
 
.562 
 
 
.235 
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(table continued) 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
56% (N=18) 
 
67% (N=18) 
 
50% (N=18) 
 
61% (N=18) 
 
 
47% (N=87) 
 
38% (N=87) 
 
39% (N=87) 
 
47% (N=87) 
 
 
.4242 
 
5.0287 
 
.7354 
 
1.1668 
 
 
.515 
 
    .025** 
 
.391 
 
.280 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public 
administration 
 
 
33% (N=9) 
 
 
48% (N=96) 
 
 
.7031 
 
 
.402 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
63% (N=16) 
 
47% (N=15) 
 
38% (N=16) 
 
63% (N=16) 
 
 
47% (N=89) 
 
51% (N=87) 
 
52% (N=89) 
 
47% (N=89) 
 
 
1.2715 
 
.0782 
 
1.0917 
 
1.2715 
 
 
.259 
 
.780 
 
.296 
 
.259 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
 
43% (N=94) 
 
 
.5753 
 
 
.448 
Municipal 
 
% of district employed in local 
government 
 
 
33% (N=12) 
 
 
42% (N=93) 
 
 
.3252 
 
 
 
.568 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
18% (N=11) 
 
 
44% (N=94) 
 
 
2.6346 
 
 
.105 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and 
warehousing 
 
 
33% (N=18) 
 
 
37% (N=87) 
 
 
.0768 
 
 
.782 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05  
***p=<.01 
 212 
 
Table A.49: Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2006 
Louisiana standing 
committees 
% Committee members 
above median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for Median 
Difference 
Prob- 
values 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
53% (N=15) 
 
47% (N=15) 
 
46% (N=13) 
 
 
 
47% (N=15) 
 
 
49% (N=90) 
 
50% (N=90) 
 
51% (N=89) 
 
 
 
50% (N=90) 
 
 
.3751 
 
.2872 
 
.3778 
 
 
 
.0015 
 
 
.540 
 
.592 
 
.539 
 
 
 
.969 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
1% (N=14) 
 
 
86% (N=14) 
 
 
 
25% (N=91) 
 
 
32% (N=88) 
 
 
29.6881 
 
 
14.7189 
 
 
.000*** 
 
 
.000*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
56% (N=9) 
 
33% (N=9) 
 
 
49% (N=93) 
 
51% (N=96) 
 
 
.1219 
 
1.322 
 
 
.727 
 
.310 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or 
retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate 
 
 
37% (N=19) 
 
 
21% (N=19) 
 
 
27% (N=86) 
 
 
30% (N=86) 
 
 
.7775 
 
 
.6426 
 
 
.378 
 
 
.423 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary 
and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
36% (N=14) 
50% (N=14) 
 
 
 
44% (N=91) 
 
 
49% (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.3365 
 
 
.0015 
 
 
 
 
.562 
 
 
.969 
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(table continued) 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
58% (N=19) 
 
63% (N=19) 
 
47% (N=19) 
 
58% (N=19) 
 
 
47% (N=86) 
 
38% (N=86) 
 
40% (N=86) 
 
48% (N=86) 
 
 
.8072 
 
3.9038 
 
.3949 
 
.6503 
 
 
.369 
 
    .048** 
 
.530 
 
.420 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public 
administration 
 
 
33% (N=9) 
 
 
48% (N=96) 
 
 
.7031 
 
 
.402 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
56% (N=16) 
 
53% (N=15) 
 
38% (N=16) 
 
50% (N=16) 
 
 
 
 
48% (N=89) 
 
49% (N=87) 
 
52% (N=89) 
 
49% (N=89) 
 
 
 
 
.3416 
 
.0782 
 
1.917 
 
.0017 
 
 
 
 
.559 
 
.780 
 
.296 
 
.967 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
 
43% (N=94) 
 
 
.5753 
 
 
.448 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local 
government 
 
 
 
 
42% (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
41% (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
.0029 
 
 
 
 
 
.957 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
17% (N=12) 
 
 
44% (N=93) 
 
 
3.3045 
 
 
 .069* 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and 
warehousing 
 
 
32% (N=19) 
 
 
37% (N=86) 
 
 
.2136 
 
 
.644 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 **p=<.05 ***p=<.01 
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Table A.50: Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees  
 
2007 
Louisiana standing 
committees 
% Committee members 
above median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for Median 
Difference 
Prob- 
values 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
46% (N=13) 
 
46% (N=13) 
 
45% (N=11) 
 
 
 
38% (N=13) 
 
 
50% (N=92) 
 
50% (N=92) 
 
51% (N=91) 
 
 
 
51% (N=92) 
 
 
.0674 
 
.0674 
 
.1019 
 
 
 
.7263 
 
 
.795 
 
.795 
 
.750 
 
 
 
.394 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
1% (N=14) 
 
 
86% (N=14) 
 
 
 
25% (N=91) 
 
 
32% (N=88) 
 
 
29.6881 
 
 
14.7189 
 
 
.000*** 
 
 
.000*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
56% (N=9) 
 
67% (N=12) 
 
 
49% (N=93) 
 
47% (N=93) 
 
 
.1219 
 
1.5928 
 
 
.727 
 
.207 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or 
retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate 
 
 
41% (N=17) 
 
 
24% (N=17) 
 
 
26% (N=88) 
 
 
30% (N=88) 
 
 
1.5792 
 
 
.2527 
 
 
.209 
 
 
.615 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary 
and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
35% (N=17) 
41% (N=17) 
 
 
 
44% (N=88) 
 
 
51% (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
.4738 
 
 
.5654 
 
 
 
 
.491 
 
 
.452 
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(table continued) 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
53% (N=17) 
 
59% (N=17) 
 
47% (N=17) 
 
47% (N=17) 
 
 
48% (N=88) 
 
40% (N=88) 
 
40% (N=88) 
 
50% (N=88) 
 
 
.1551 
 
2.1115 
 
.3128 
 
.0493 
 
 
.694 
 
 .146 
 
.576 
 
.824 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public 
administration 
 
 
40% (N=10) 
 
 
47% (N=95) 
 
 
.1974 
 
 
.657 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
59% (N=17) 
 
50% (N=16) 
 
41% (N=17) 
 
47% (N=17) 
 
 
 
 
48% (N=88) 
 
50% (N=86) 
 
51% (N=88) 
 
50% (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
.7018 
 
.0000 
 
.5654 
 
.0493 
 
 
 
 
.402 
 
1.000 
 
.452 
 
.824 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
 
43% (N=94) 
 
 
.5753 
 
 
.448 
Municipal 
 
Orleans delegation  
 
% of district employed in local 
government 
 
 
 
 
42% (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
41% (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
.0029 
 
 
 
 
 
.957 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
18% (N=11) 
 
 
44% (N=94) 
 
 
2.6346 
 
 
 .105 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and 
warehousing 
 
 
32% (N=19) 
 
 
37% (N=86) 
 
 
.2136 
 
 
.644 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 **p=<.05 ***p=<.01 
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Table A.51: Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from constituency characteristic 
measures and membership on the Louisiana House standing committees  
2008 
Louisiana standing 
committees 
% Committee members 
above median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for Median 
Difference 
Prob- 
values 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
40% (N=15) 
 
47% (N=15) 
 
43% (N=14) 
 
 
 
40% (N=15) 
 
 
52% (N=89) 
 
51% (N=89) 
 
51% (N=87) 
 
 
 
52% (N=89) 
 
 
.7011 
 
.0779 
 
.2873 
 
 
 
.7011 
 
 
.402 
 
.780 
 
.592 
 
 
 
.402 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, and hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
89% (N=19) 
 
 
89% (N=19) 
 
 
 
24% (N=85) 
 
 
28% (N=82) 
 
 
29.4634 
 
 
24.3326 
 
 
.000*** 
 
 
.000*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
50% (N=14) 
 
36% (N=14) 
 
 
49% (N=87) 
 
52% (N=90) 
 
 
.0016 
 
1.3206 
 
 
.968 
 
.250 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or 
retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate 
 
 
32% (N=19) 
 
 
26% (N=19) 
 
 
28% (N=85) 
 
 
28% (N=85) 
 
 
.0846 
 
 
.0285 
 
 
.771 
 
 
.866 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary 
and high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
50% (N=16) 
44% (N=16) 
 
 
 
42% (N=88) 
 
 
51% (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
.3490 
 
 
.2955 
 
 
 
 
.555 
 
 
.587 
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(table continued) 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
53% (N=17) 
 
53% (N=17) 
 
41% (N=17) 
 
59% (N=17) 
 
 
48% (N=87) 
 
40% (N=87) 
 
40% (N=87) 
 
48% (N=87) 
 
 
.1239 
 
.9414 
 
.0053 
 
.6329 
 
 
.725 
 
 .332 
 
.942 
 
.426 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public 
administration 
 
 
42% (N=19) 
 
 
48% (N=85) 
 
 
.2342 
 
 
.628 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
63% (N=?) 
 
67% (N=15) 
 
44% (N=16) 
 
56% (N=16) 
 
 
 
 
48% (N=88) 
 
47% (N=86) 
 
51% (N=88) 
 
49% (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
1.1818 
 
2.756 
 
.2955 
 
.2955 
 
 
 
 
.277 
 
.150 
 
.587 
 
.587 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
25% (N=8) 
 
 
46% (N=96) 
 
 
1.2994 
 
 
.254 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local 
government 
 
 
 
 
47% (N=19) 
 
 
 
 
39% (N=85) 
 
 
 
 
.4710 
 
 
 
 
 
.493 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
55% (N=11) 
 
 
39% (N=93) 
 
 
1.0246 
 
 
 .311 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and 
warehousing 
 
 
42% (N=19) 
 
 
35% (N=85) 
 
 
.3107 
 
 
.577 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10, **p=<.05, ***p=<.01 
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Table A.52 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing 
committees 
1999 
Louisiana Standing Committees Committee 
Member 
Non-
Committee  
Member 
Mean  
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
 
33.4167 (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
31.8172 (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
-1.5995 
 
 
 
 
-.2179 
 
 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
 
11.0625 (N=16) 
 
 
5.1685 (N=89) 
 
 
-4.9790 
 
 
.000***  
Education 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
 
28637.76 (N=17) 
 
 
 
 
29305.13 (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
667.3603 
 
 
 
 
.3168 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
 
21.3125 (N=16) 
 
 
18.8539 (N=89) 
 
 
      -2.4586 
 
 
-2.1607* 
Judiciary 
 
% African Americas 
 
 
31.25 (N=12) 
 
 
32.0968 (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
.8468 
 
 
 
 
.1153 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
17.5333 (N=15) 
 
 
20.5444 (N=90) 
 
 
3.0111 
 
 
1.6011 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
% on social security 
 
 
20.2727 (N=11) 
 
25.8182 (N=11) 
 
19.1064 (N=94) 
 
25.4362 (N=94) 
 
-1.1663 
 
-.3820 
 
-.8574 
 
-.2116 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01
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Table A.53 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing 
committees 
2000 
Louisiana Standing Committees Committee 
Member 
Non-
Committee  
Member 
Mean  
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
 
 
 
 
31.7692 (N=13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31.0544 (N=92) 
 
 
 
 
-.7149 
 
 
 
 
-.1027 
 
 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
 
11.0588 (N=17) 
 
 
5.1023 (N=88) 
 
 
    -5.9566 
 
 
-5.2035***  
Education 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
 
31759.06 (N=16) 
 
 
 
 
 28737.09 (N=89) 
 
 
 
 
-3021.973 
 
 
 
 
-1.4123 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
 
21.64796 (N=17) 
 
 
18.76136 (N=88) 
 
 
      -2.8857 
 
 
-2.6262** 
Judiciary 
 
% African Americas 
 
43.0714 (N=14) 
 
 
 
29.3077 (N=91) 
 
 
 
-13.7637 
 
 
 
-2.0838** 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
19.4375 (N=16) 
 
 
20.2360 (N=89) 
 
 
.7985 
 
 
.4311 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
% on social security 
 
 
20.9 (N=10) 
 
26.4 (N=10) 
 
19.0526 (N=95) 
 
25.3790 (N=95) 
 
-1.8474 
 
-1.0211 
 
-1.3078 
 
-.5429 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01
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Table A.54 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on Louisiana House standing 
committees 
2001 
Louisiana Standing Committees Committee 
Member 
Non-
Committee  
Member 
Mean  
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
 
 
 
 
33.2727 (N=11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30.8936 (N=94) 
 
 
 
 
-2.3791 
 
 
 
 
-.3180 
 
 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
 
11.0588 (N=17) 
 
 
5.1023 (N=88) 
 
 
    -5.9566 
 
 
-5.2035***  
Education 
 
Median family income 
 
 
 
 
31341.82 (N=17) 
 
 
 
 
 28783.35 (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
-2558.471 
 
 
 
 
-1.2226 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
 
21.2353 (N=17) 
 
 
18.8409 (N=88) 
 
 
      -2.3944 
 
 
-2.1567** 
Judiciary 
 
% African Americas 
 
45.4167 (N=12) 
 
 
 
29.3011 (N=93) 
 
 
 
-16.1156 
 
 
 
-2.2934** 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
19.1177 (N=17) 
 
 
20.3068 (N=88) 
 
 
1.1892 
 
 
.6589 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
% on social security 
 
 
20.1818 (N=11) 
 
25.9091 (N=11) 
 
19.1170 (N=94) 
 
25.4255 (N=94) 
 
-1.0648 
 
-.4836 
 
-.7823 
 
-.2679 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A.55: Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House 
standing committees  
 
2002 
Louisiana standing committees Commmitte 
Member 
Non-
Committee 
Member 
Mean 
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
31.7273 (N=11) 
 
42359.55 (N=11) 
 
66.7 (N=10) 
 
 
 
24.2091 (N=11) 
 
 
32.7021 (N=94) 
 
42584.16 (N=94) 
 
73.2826 (N=92) 
 
 
 
23.2606 (N=94) 
 
 
.9749 
 
214.6141 
 
6.5826 
 
 
 
-.9485 
 
 
.1230 
 
.4721 
 
.6997 
 
 
 
-.3584 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
3.5294 (N=17) 
 
 
1.7058 (N=17) 
 
 
 
1.1705 (N=88) 
 
 
.4235 (N=85) 
 
 
-2.3590 
 
 
-1.2824 
 
 
.-4.9845*** 
 
 
-6.2165*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
66.125 (N=8) 
 
43437.5 (N=8) 
 
 
73.1915 (N=94) 
 
42489.44 (N=97) 
 
 
7.0665 
 
-948.0567 
      
 
 
.6790 
 
-1.8338* 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
 
 
15.3125 (N=16) 
 
 
3.875 (N=16) 
 
 
15.3034 (N=89) 
 
 
3.9551 (N=89) 
 
 
-.0091 
 
 
.0801 
 
 
-.0176 
 
 
.2087 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and 
high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
17.8824 (N=17) 
42232.35 (N=17) 
 
 
 
17.9432 (N=88) 
 
 
       39681.56 (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
.0608 
 
 
-2550.796 
 
 
 
 
.0544 
 
 
-.8388 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
36.6471 (N=17) 
 
12.9412 (N=17) 
 
20.5882 (N=17) 
 
25.6471 (N=17) 
 
 
36.0455 (N=88) 
 
12.1136 (N=88) 
 
19.9318 (N=88) 
 
22.9182 (N=88) 
 
 
-.6016 
 
-.8275 
 
-.6564 
 
-2.7289 
 
 
-.3243 
 
    -1.1950 
 
-.7769 
 
-1.2490 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration 
 
 
5.6 (N=15) 
 
 
5.8111 (N=90) 
 
 
.2111 
 
 
.3955 
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(table continued) 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
42.1667 (N=12) 
 
75.0909 (N=12) 
 
42796.92 (N=12) 
 
26.4583 (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
31.3656 (N=93) 
 
72.3407 (N=91) 
 
42531.32 (N=93) 
 
22.9602 (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
-10.8011 
 
-2.7503 
 
-265.5941 
 
-3.4981 
 
 
 
 
-1.4299 
 
-.3043 
 
-.6074 
 
-1.3852 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
9.8125 (N=16) 
 
 
10.2584 (N=89) 
 
 
.4459 
 
 
.4159 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
 
 
6.9286 (N=14) 
 
 
 
 
7.2418 (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.3132 
 
 
 
 
 
.7371 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
20.4 (N=10) 
 
 
20 (N=95) 
 
 
-.4 
 
 
 -.3764 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
4.8235 (N=17) 
 
 
4.1932 (N=88) 
 
 
-.6303 
 
 
-1.8192* 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01
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Table A56: Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House 
standing committees  
 
                                                                               2003 
Louisiana standing committees Commmitte 
Member 
Non-
Committee 
Member 
Mean 
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
31.7273 (N=11) 
 
42369.55 (N=11) 
 
66.7 (N=10) 
 
 
 
24.2091 (N=11) 
 
 
32.7021 (N=94) 
 
42584.16 (N=94) 
 
73.2826 (N=92) 
 
 
 
23.2606 (N=94) 
 
 
.9749 
 
214.6141 
 
6.5826 
 
 
 
-.9485 
 
 
.1230 
 
.4721 
 
.6997 
 
 
 
-.3584 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
3.7059 (N=17) 
 
 
1.7647 (N=17) 
 
 
 
1.1364 (N=88) 
 
 
.41176 (N=85) 
 
 
-2.5695 
 
 
-1.3529 
 
 
-5.5559*** 
 
 
-6.7069*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
59.9 (N=10) 
 
43342.4 (N=10) 
 
 
74.0217 (N=92) 
 
42479.49 (N=95) 
 
 
14.1217 
 
-862.9053 
      
 
 
1.5145 
 
-1.8472* 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
 
 
15.2143 (N=14) 
 
 
3.7143 (N=14) 
 
 
15.3187 (N=91) 
 
 
3.9780 (N=91) 
 
 
.1044 
 
 
.2637 
 
 
.1908 
 
 
.6515 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and 
high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
18.0588 (N=17) 
42023.53 (N=17) 
 
 
 
17.9091 (N=88) 
 
 
       39721.9 (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
-.1497 
 
 
-2301.632 
 
 
 
 
-.1339 
 
 
-.7564 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
37.125 (N=16) 
 
13.1875 (N=16) 
 
20.25 (N=16) 
 
26.0938 (N=16) 
 
 
35.9663 (N=89) 
 
12.0787 (N=89) 
 
20 (N=89) 
 
22.8685 (N=89) 
 
 
-1.1587 
 
-1.1088 
 
-.25 
 
-3.2252 
 
 
-.6102 
 
    -1.5699 
 
-.2879 
 
-1.4438 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration 
 
 
5.6 (N=15) 
 
 
5.8111 (N=90) 
 
 
.2111 
 
 
.3955 
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(table continued) 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
45.6667 (N=12) 
 
81.2727 (N=12) 
 
42212.5 (N=12) 
 
28.15 (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
30.9140 (N=93) 
 
71.5934 (N=91) 
 
42606.73 (N=93) 
 
22.7419 (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
-14.7527 
 
-9.6793 
 
394.2312 
 
-5.4081 
 
 
 
 
-1.9701* 
 
-1.0768 
 
.9035 
 
-2.1698** 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
9.8125 (N=16) 
 
 
10.2584 (N=89) 
 
 
.4459 
 
 
.4159 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
 
 
6.9286 (N=14) 
 
 
 
 
7.2418 (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.3132 
 
 
 
 
 
.7371 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
20.5455 (N=11) 
 
 
19.9787 (N=94) 
 
 
-.5667 
 
 
 -.5568 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
4.6667 (N=18) 
 
 
4.2184 (N=87) 
 
 
-.4483 
 
 
-1.3138 
Statistical significance  *p=<.10  **p=<.05 ***p=<.01
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Table A57: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House 
standing committees  
 
                                                                                2004 
Louisiana standing committees Commmitte 
Member 
Non-
Committee 
Member 
Mean 
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
35.5455 (N=11) 
 
41841.82 (N=11) 
 
70.4 (N=10) 
 
 
 
25.1546 (N=11) 
 
 
32.2553 (N=94) 
 
42645.91 (N=94) 
 
72.8804 (N=92) 
 
 
 
23.15 (N=94) 
 
 
-3.2901 
 
804.0967 
 
2.4804 
 
 
 
-2.0045 
 
 
-.4155 
 
1.7942* 
 
.2631 
 
 
 
-.7591 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
3.7059 (N=17) 
 
 
1.7647 (N=17) 
 
 
 
1.1364 (N=88) 
 
 
.41176 (N=85) 
 
 
-2.5695 
 
 
-1.3529 
 
 
-5.5559*** 
 
 
-6.7069*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
72.125 (N=8) 
 
42378 (N=8) 
 
 
72.6809 (N=94) 
 
42576.82 (N=97) 
 
 
.5559 
 
198.8247 
 
 
 
.0533 
 
.3787 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
 
 
16 (N=19) 
 
 
3.7368 (N=19) 
 
 
15.1512 (N=86) 
 
 
3.9884 (N=86) 
 
 
-.8488 
 
 
.2515 
 
 
-1.7836* 
 
 
.7039 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and 
high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
17.5 (N=16) 
43824.69 (N=16) 
 
 
 
18.0112 (N=89) 
 
 
39423.96 (N=89) 
 
 
 
 
.5112 
 
 
-4400.732 
 
 
 
 
.4463 
 
 
-1.4208 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
37.5 (N=18) 
 
13.8889 (N=18) 
 
21.0556 (N=18) 
 
25.6833 (N=18) 
 
 
35.8621 (N=87) 
 
11.9081 (N=87) 
 
19.8276 (N=87) 
 
22.8793 (N=87) 
 
 
-1.6379 
 
-1.9808 
 
-1.2280 
 
-2.8040 
 
 
-.9065 
 
-3.0334** 
 
-1.4987 
 
-1.3141 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration 
 
 
5.1 (N=10) 
 
 
5.8526 (N=95) 
 
 
.7526 
 
 
1.1899 
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(table continued) 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
41.5714 (N=14) 
 
65.8462 (N=13) 
 
42206.93 (N=14) 
 
26.4357 (N=14) 
 
 
31.2198 (N=91) 
 
73.6292 (N=89) 
 
42616.25 (N=91) 
 
22.8868 (N=91) 
 
 
 
-10.3517 
 
7.7831 
 
409.3242 
 
-3.5489 
 
 
-1.4649 
 
.9295 
 
1.0032 
 
-1.5040 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
10.3 (N=10) 
 
 
10.1790 (N=95) 
 
 
-.1211 
 
 
-.0922 
Municipal 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
6.9167(N=12) 
 
 
7.2366 (N=93) 
 
 
.3199 
 
 
 
.7045 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
19.6667 (N=9) 
 
 
20.0729 (N=96) 
 
 
.4063 
 
 
.3646 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
4.0556 (N=18) 
 
 
4.3448 (N=87) 
 
 
.2893 
 
 
.8437 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A58: Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House 
standing committees  
 
                                                                                 2005 
Louisiana standing committees Commmitte 
Member 
Non-
Committee 
Member 
Mean 
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
35 (N=14) 
 
42206.79 (N=14) 
 
68.75 (N=12) 
 
 
 
25.5429 (N=14) 
 
 
32.23077 (N=91) 
 
42616.27 (N=91) 
 
73.1556 (N=90) 
 
 
 
23.0242 (N=91) 
 
 
-2.7692 
 
409.489 
 
4.4056 
 
 
 
-2.5187 
 
 
-.3882 
 
1.0036 
 
.5068 
 
 
 
-.1.0616 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
4.2857 (N=14) 
 
 
1.9286 (N=14) 
 
 
 
1.1319 (N=91) 
 
 
.4318 (N=88) 
 
 
-3.1538 
 
 
-1.4968 
 
 
-6.5781*** 
 
 
-6.9192*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
69.2 (N=10) 
 
42338.9 (N=10) 
 
 
73.0109 (N=92) 
 
42585.13 (N=95) 
 
 
3.8109 
 
246.2263 
 
 
 
.4044 
 
.5193 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
 
 
15.8947 (N=19) 
 
 
3.7895 (N=19) 
 
 
15.17442 (N=86) 
 
 
3.9767 (N=86) 
 
 
-.7203 
 
 
.1873 
 
 
-1.5071 
 
 
.5235 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and 
high school 
 
Median family income 
 
 
17.7143 (N=14) 
44471 (N=14) 
 
 
 
17.9670 (N=91) 
 
 
39421.24 (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.2527 
 
 
-5049.758 
 
 
 
 
.2085 
 
 
-1.5447 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
37.5 (N=18) 
 
13.8889 (N=18) 
 
21.0556 (N=18) 
 
25.6833 (N=18) 
 
 
35.8621 (N=87) 
 
11.9081 (N=87) 
 
19.8276 (N=87) 
 
22.8793 (N=87) 
 
 
-1.6379 
 
-1.9808 
 
-1.2280 
 
-2.8040 
 
 
-.9065 
 
-3.0334** 
 
-1.4987 
 
-1.3141 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration 
 
 
5.2222 (N=9) 
 
 
5.8333 (N=96) 
 
 
.6111 
 
 
.9189 
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(table continued) 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
38.5  (N=16) 
 
66.3333 (N=15) 
 
42262.06 (N=16) 
 
25.45 (N=16) 
 
 
 
 
31.5393 (N=89) 
 
73.7241 (N=89) 
 
42615.54 (N=89) 
 
22.9843 (N=89) 
 
 
 
 
-6.9607 
 
7.3908 
 
353.4768 
 
-2.4657 
 
 
 
 
-1.0361 
 
.9375 
 
.9151 
 
-1.0992 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
10.0909 (N=11) 
 
 
10.2021(N=94) 
 
 
.1112 
 
 
.0883 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
 
 
7.0833 (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
7.2151 (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
.1317 
 
 
 
 
 
.2895 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
19.6364 (N=11) 
 
 
20.0851 (N=94) 
 
 
.4487 
 
 
.4407 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
4.1667 (N=18) 
 
 
4.3218 (N=87) 
 
 
.1552 
 
 
.4515 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A59: Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House 
standing committees  
 
                                                                                 2006 
Louisiana standing committees Commmitte 
Member 
Non-
Committee 
Member 
Mean 
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
37.0533 (N=15) 
 
42268.67 (N=15) 
 
70.6154 (N=13) 
 
 
 
24.9533 (N=15) 
 
 
34.2233 (N=90) 
 
42610.51 (N=90) 
 
72.9326 (N=89) 
 
 
 
23.0944 (N=90) 
 
 
-2.83 
 
341.8444 
 
2.3172 
 
 
 
-1.8589 
 
 
-.4176 
 
       .8613 
 
.2756 
 
 
 
-.8047 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
4.2857 (N=14) 
 
 
1.9286 (N=14) 
 
 
 
1.1319 (N=91) 
 
 
.4318 (N=88) 
 
 
-3.1538 
 
 
-1.4968 
 
 
-6.5781*** 
 
 
-6.9192*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
74.3333 (N=9) 
 
42286.67 (N=9) 
 
 
72.4731 (N=93) 
 
42587.46 (N=96) 
 
 
-1.8602 
 
300.7917 
 
 
 
-.1882 
 
.6052 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
 
 
15.7368 (N=19) 
 
 
3.7895 (N=19) 
 
 
15.2093 (N=86) 
 
 
3.9767 (N=86) 
 
 
-.5275 
 
 
.1873 
 
 
-1.0981 
 
 
.5235 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and 
high school 
 
Average family income 
 
 
17.4286 (N=14) 
50424.79 (N=14) 
 
 
 
18.0110 (N=91) 
 
 
48460.19 (N=91) 
 
 
 
 
.5824 
 
 
-1964.599 
 
 
 
 
.4810 
 
 
-.5283 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
37.8421 (N=19) 
 
13.7895 (N=19) 
 
21.2105 (N=19) 
 
24.8158 (N=19) 
 
 
35.7674 (N=86) 
 
11.9070 (N=86) 
 
19.7791 (N=86) 
 
23.0384 (N=86) 
 
 
-2.0747 
 
-1.8825 
 
-1.4315 
 
-1.7774 
 
 
-1.1761 
 
-2.9372** 
 
-1.7927* 
 
-.8468 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration 
 
 
5.2222 (N=9) 
 
 
5.8333 (N=96) 
 
 
.6111 
 
 
.9189 
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(table continued) 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
37.4  (N=16) 
 
71.4667 (N=15) 
 
42312.75 (N=16) 
 
23.9875 (N=16) 
 
 
 
 
34.1292 (N=89) 
 
72.8391 (N=87) 
 
42606.43 (N=89) 
 
23.2472 (N=89) 
 
 
 
 
-3.2708 
 
1.3724 
 
293.677 
 
-.7403 
 
 
 
 
-.4959 
 
.1733 
 
.7594 
 
-.3283 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
10.0909 (N=11) 
 
 
10.2021(N=94) 
 
 
.1112 
 
 
.0883 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
 
 
7.1667 (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
7.2043 (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
.0376 
 
 
 
 
 
.0827 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
19.0833 (N=12) 
 
 
20.1613 (N=93) 
 
 
1.0780 
 
 
1.1052 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
4.1053 (N=19) 
 
 
4.3372 (N=86) 
 
 
.2319 
 
 
.6902 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01
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Table A60: Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House 
standing committees  
 
                                                                                  2007 
Louisiana standing committees Commmitte 
Member 
Non-
Committee 
Member 
Mean 
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
31.7308 (N=13) 
 
42305.69 (N=13) 
 
68 (N=11) 
 
 
 
23.5 (N=13) 
 
 
35.0370 (N=92) 
 
42597.85 (N=92) 
 
73.1978 (N=91) 
 
 
 
23.3402 (N=92) 
 
 
3.3062 
 
292.1555 
 
5.1978 
 
 
 
-.1598 
 
 
.4593 
 
       .6920 
 
.5759 
 
 
 
-.0649 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
4.2857 (N=14) 
 
 
1.9286 (N=14) 
 
 
 
1.1319 (N=91) 
 
 
.4318 (N=88) 
 
 
-3.1538 
 
 
-1.4968 
 
 
-6.5781*** 
 
 
-6.9192*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
74.3333 (N=9) 
 
42306 (N=9) 
 
 
72.4731 (N=93) 
 
42585.65 (N=96) 
 
 
-1.8602 
 
279.6458 
 
 
 
-.1882 
 
.5625 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
 
 
15.8824 (N=17) 
 
 
4.0588 (N=17) 
 
 
15.1932 (N=88) 
 
 
3.9205 (N=88) 
 
 
-.6892 
 
 
-.1384 
 
 
-1.3772 
 
 
-.3699 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and 
high school 
 
Average family income 
 
 
17.6471 (N=17) 
48222.59 (N=17) 
 
 
 
17.9886 (N=88) 
 
 
48818.64 (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
.3416 
 
 
596.0481 
 
 
 
 
.3055 
 
 
.1735 
 
 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
36.6471 (N=17) 
 
13.5294 (N=17) 
 
21 (N=17) 
 
23.9059 (N=17) 
 
 
36.0455 (N=88) 
 
12 (N=88) 
 
19.8523 (N=88) 
 
23.2546 (N=88) 
 
 
-.6016 
 
-1.5294 
 
-1.1477 
 
-.6513 
 
 
-.3243 
 
-2.2464** 
 
-1.3666 
 
-.2960 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration 
 
 
5.5 (N=10) 
 
 
5.8105 (N=95) 
 
 
.3105 
 
 
.4882 
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(table continued) 
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
36.8177  (N=17) 
 
72.125 (N=16) 
 
42350.18 (N=17) 
 
23.7412 (N=17) 
 
 
 
 
34.2046 (N=88) 
 
72.7326 (N=86) 
 
42602.53 (N=88) 
 
23.2864 (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
-2.6131 
 
.6076 
 
252.3576 
 
-.4548 
 
 
 
 
-.4059 
 
.0788 
 
.6684 
 
-.2066 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
9.9091 (N=11) 
 
 
10.2234 (N=94) 
 
 
.3143 
 
 
.2497 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
 
 
7.3333 (N=12) 
 
 
 
 
7.1828 (N=93) 
 
 
 
 
-.1505 
 
 
 
 
 
-.3309 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
19.0909 (N=11) 
 
 
20.1489 (N=94) 
 
 
1.0580 
 
 
1.0435 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
4.1053 (N=19) 
 
 
4.3372 (N=86) 
 
 
.2319 
 
 
.6902 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01
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Table A61: Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created 
from constituency characteristic measures and membership on the Louisiana House 
standing committees  
 
                                                                                 2008 
Louisiana standing committees Commmitte 
Member 
Non-
Committee 
Member 
Mean 
Difference 
t 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
 
% African American 
 
Pop. density 
 
% pop. living in urban area 
 
 
% pop. below poverty line 
 
 
32.1933 (N=15) 
 
42526.33 (N=15) 
 
67.4256 (N=14) 
 
 
23.6733 (N=15) 
 
 
35.2236 (N=89) 
 
42574.79 (N=89) 
 
73.1609 (N=87) 
 
 
23.4214 (N=89) 
 
 
3.0303 
 
48.4532 
 
5.7323 
 
 
-.2520 
 
 
.4457 
 
.1211 
 
.7044 
 
 
-.1089 
Agriculture 
 
% employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting 
 
% of district living in rural farming areas 
 
 
3.7368 (N=19) 
 
 
1.6316 (N=19) 
 
 
 
1.0824 (N=85) 
 
 
.4146 (N=82) 
 
 
-2.6545 
 
 
-1.2169 
 
 
-6.1394*** 
 
 
-6.1231*** 
Civil Law 
 
% of pop. living in urban area 
  
Pop. density 
 
 
72.3571 (N=14) 
 
42185.79 (N=14) 
 
 
72.3678 (N=87) 
 
42627.22 (N=90) 
 
 
.0107 
 
441.4365 
 
 
 
.0013 
 
1.0777 
Commerce 
 
% of district employed in wholesale or retail trade 
 
% of district employed in finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
 
 
15.8947(N=19) 
 
 
3.9474 (N=19) 
 
 
15.1647 (N=85) 
 
 
3.9294 (N=85) 
 
 
-.7300 
 
 
-.0180 
 
 
-1.5198 
 
 
-.0500 
 
Education 
 
% of district attending public elementary and 
high school 
 
Average household income 
 
18.5 (N=16) 
45720.81 (N=16) 
 
 
17.8636 (N=88) 
 
 
49094.18 (N=88) 
 
 
-.5540 
 
 
3373.369 
 
 
.5808 
 
 
.9632 
Health and Welfare 
 
% of district with disabilities 
 
% of district employed in healthcare 
 
% of district age 55 or over 
 
% of pop. below poverty 
 
 
38 (N=17) 
 
12.1177 (N=17) 
 
20.6471 (N=17) 
 
24.6412 (N=17) 
 
 
35.8966 (N=87) 
 
12.2184 (N=87) 
 
19.8621 (N=87) 
 
23.2264 (N=87) 
 
 
-2.1034 
 
.1007 
 
-.7850 
 
-1.4147 
 
 
-1.1459 
 
.1460 
 
-.9360 
 
-.6450 
Governmental Affairs 
 
% of district employed in public administration 
 
 
5.3158 (N=19) 
 
 
5.8941 (N=85) 
 
 
.5783 
 
 
1.1931 
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(table continued)  
Judiciary 
 
% African American 
 
% Urban 
 
Pop. density 
 
% poverty 
 
 
 
 
49.0313  (N=16) 
 
80.5333(N=15) 
 
42198.81 (N=16) 
 
25.0313 (N=16) 
 
 
 
 
32.1966 (N=88) 
 
70.9419 (N=86) 
 
42634.89 (N=88) 
 
23.1716 (N=88) 
 
 
 
 
-16.8347 
 
-9.5915 
 
436.0739 
 
-1.8597 
 
 
 
 
-2.6250** 
 
-1.2190 
 
1.1260 
 
-.8283 
 
 
Labor 
 
% in manufacturing 
 
 
8.25 (N=8) 
 
 
10.3854(N=96) 
 
 
2.1354 
 
 
1.4818 
Municipal 
 
 
% of district employed in local government 
 
 
 
7.3158 (N=19) 
 
 
 
7.1647 (N=85) 
 
 
 
-.1511 
 
 
 
 
-.4002 
Retirement 
 
% of district age 55 or older 
 
 
20.4546 (N=11) 
 
 
19.9355 (N=93) 
 
 
-.5191 
 
 
-.5132 
Transportation  
 
% employed in transportation and warehousing 
 
 
4.6316 (N=19) 
 
 
4.2353 (N=85) 
 
 
-.3963 
 
 
-1.1831 
Statistical significance 
    *p=<.10 
  **p=<.05 
***p=<.01 
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Table A.62:  Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
1999 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.5833 (N=12) 
 
.3333 (N=93) 
 
-.25 
 
.3995 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1875 (N=16) 
 
.1124 (N=89) 
 
-.0751 
 
.7589 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.4167 (N=12) 
 
.3548 (N=93) 
 
-.0618 
 
.8352 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.5882 (N=17) 
 
.3864 (N=88) 
 
-.2019 
 
.4341 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.5882 (N=17) 
 
.2759 (N=87) 
 
-.3124 
 
.2214 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.625 (N=16) 
 
.0112 (N=89) 
 
-.6138 
 
  .0102** 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.0833 (N=12) 
 
.1505 (N=93) 
 
.0672 
 
.8097 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
.4167 (N=12) 
 
.3548 (N=93) 
 
-.0618 
 
.8352 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.63: Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.6154 (N=13) 
 
.25 (N=92) 
 
-.3654 
 
   .007*** 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1176 (N=17) 
 
.0227 (N=88) 
 
-.0949 
 
 .0622* 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.4167 (N=12) 
 
.2796 (N=93) 
 
-.1371 
 
.3319 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.2941 (N=17) 
 
.375 (N=88) 
 
.0809 
 
.5298 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.5625 (N=16) 
 
.3034 (N=89) 
 
-.2591 
 
.3221 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
0 (N=17) 
 
.1477 (N=88) 
 
.1477 
 
.5361 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.1069 (N=15) 
 
.0318 (N=90) 
 
.0890 
 
.2640 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
.3571 (N=14) 
 
.2857 (N=91) 
 
-.0714 
 
.5897 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.64: Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.6364 (N=11) 
 
.2447 (N=94) 
 
-.3917 
 
.0062*** 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.0588 (N=17) 
 
.0455 (N=88) 
 
-.0134 
 
           .8149 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.3333 (N=9)  
 
.2813 (N=96) 
 
-.0521 
 
           .7438 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.3529 (N=17) 
 
.4545 (N=88)  
 
.1016 
 
           .6946 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.5294 (N=17)  
 
.3068 (N=88) 
 
-.2225 
 
           .3836 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.0588 (N=17)  
 
.1364 (N=88)  
 
.0775 
 
           .7455 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.125 (N=16)  
 
.1124 (N=89) 
 
-.1449 
 
.8851 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
.4167 (N=12) 
 
.2688 (N=93) 
 
-1.0625 
 
.2905 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.65: Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.6364 (N=11) 
 
.3085 (N=94) 
 
-.327853 
 
.2855 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1176 (N=17) 
 
.1364 (N=88) 
 
.0187 
 
.9378 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.375 (N=8) 
 
.3402 (N=97) 
 
-.0348 
 
.9220 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.4 (N=15) 
 
.3371 (N=89) 
 
-.0629 
 
.6395 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.4706 (N=17) 
 
.4205 (N=88) 
 
-.0501 
 
.8831 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.0588 (N=17) 
 
.2386 (N=88) 
 
.1798 
 
.5883 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.6471 (N=17) 
 
.1136 (N=88) 
 
-.5334 
 
  .0286** 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
1.1667 (N=12) 
 
.2366 (N=93) 
 
-.9301 
 
   .0013*** 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.66: Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.6364 (N=11) 
 
.2872 (N=94) 
 
-.3491 
 
.2536 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1176 (N=17) 
 
.1364 (N=88) 
 
.0187 
 
.9378 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.3 (N=10) 
 
.3263 (N=95) 
 
.0263 
 
.9345 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
0 (N=14) 
 
.2198 (N=91) 
 
.2198 
 
.4084 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.5294 (N=17) 
 
.4091 (N=88) 
 
-.1203 
 
.7240 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.0625 (N=16) 
 
.2247 (N=89) 
 
.1622 
 
.6332 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.6471 (N=17) 
 
.1022 (N=88) 
 
-.5448 
 
  .0248** 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
1.083 (N=12) 
 
.2258 (N=93) 
 
-.8575 
 
    .0030*** 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.67: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2004 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.4545 (N=11) 
 
1.108 (N=93) 
 
.6530  
 
.4154 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1176 (N=17)  
 
.0114 (N=88) 
 
-.1063 
 
  .0158** 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.375 (N=8) 
 
1.0938 (N=96) 
 
.7188 
 
.4374 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.5263 (N=19) 
 
.25 (N=84)  
 
-.2763 
 
  .0175** 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.375 (N=16) 
 
.2841 (N=88) 
 
-.0909 
 
.7277 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.0556 (N=18) 
 
.1279 (N=86) 
 
.0724 
 
.7570 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.1667 (N=18) 
 
.0345 (N=87) 
 
-.1322 
 
  .0279** 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
1 (N=14) 
 
1.0444 (N=90) 
 
.04444 
 
.9510 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.68: Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2005 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.4286 (N=14) 
 
1.1429 (N=91) 
 
.7143 
 
.3193 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1429 (N=14) 
 
.2088 (N=91) 
 
.0659 
 
.8545 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
1.2 (N=10) 
 
1.0316 (N=95) 
 
-.1684 
 
.8397 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.5263 (N=19) 
 
.4767 (N=86) 
 
-.0496 
 
.8794 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.3571 (N=14) 
 
.4725 (N=91) 
 
.1154 
 
.7936 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.5556 (N=18)  
 
.2299 (N=87) 
 
-.3257  
 
.4078 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.1579 (N=19) 
 
.2442 (N= 86) 
 
.0863 
 
.7869 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
1.5 (N=16) 
 
.9663 (N=89) 
 
-.5337 
 
.4318 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.69: Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2006 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.4 (N=15) 
 
1.1556 (N=90) 
 
.7556  
 
.2779 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1429 (N=14) 
 
.0110 (N=91) 
 
-.1319 
 
    .0055*** 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
1.3333 (N=9) 
 
1.0201 (N=96) 
 
-.3125 
 
.7203 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.6316 (N=19) 
 
.2381 (N=84) 
 
-.3935 
 
    .0007*** 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.2857 (N=14) 
 
.2857 (N=91) 
 
0 
 
1.0000 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.0526 (N=19) 
 
.1279 (N=86) 
 
.0753 
 
.7408 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.1667 (N=18) 
 
.0345 (N=87) 
 
-.1322 
 
   .0279** 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
.9375 (N=16) 
 
1.0674 (N=89) 
 
.1299 
 
.8485 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.70: Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2007 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.3077 (N=13) 
 
1.4240 (N=92) 
 
1.1162 
 
.1824 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.1429 (N=14) 
 
.3077 (N=91) 
 
.1648 
 
.7059 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
1.4444 (N=9) 
 
1.2708 (N=96) 
 
-.1736 
 
.8607 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
1.1176 (N=17) 
 
.4651 (N=86) 
 
-.6525 
 
.1103 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.7647 (N=17) 
 
.5 (N=88) 
 
-.2647  
 
.5678 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.5882 (N=17) 
 
.3295 (N=88) 
 
-.2587 
 
.5757 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
.1765 (N=17) 
 
.3409 (N=88) 
 
.1644 
 
.6840 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
.9412 (N=17) 
 
1.3523 (N=88) 
 
.4111 
 
.5842 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.71: Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from occupation and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees by occupation  
                      
2008 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.6 (N=15) 
 
.2360 (N=89) 
 
-.3640 
 
   .0037*** 
Agriculture 
Cattleman/Farmer occupation  
 
.2105 (N=19) 
 
.0235 (N=85) 
 
-.1870 
 
   .0014*** 
Civil Law 
Lawyer/Law Enforcement occupation 
 
.5714 (N=14) 
 
.2444 (N=90) 
 
-.3270 
 
  .0117** 
Commerce 
Commerce occupation  
 
.5789 (N=19) 
 
.4235 (N=85) 
 
-.1554 
 
.2224 
Education 
Education occupation  
 
.0625 (N=16) 
 
.0795 (N=88) 
 
.0170 
 
.8161 
Health and Welfare 
Health and Welfare occupation  
 
.0588 (N=17) 
 
0 (N=87) 
 
-.0588 
 
  .0229** 
Insurance 
Insurance occupation  
 
0 (N=10) 
 
.0106 (N=94) 
 
.0106 
 
.7460 
Judiciary 
Lawyer/Law enforcement occupation  
 
.5625 (N=16) 
 
.2386 (N=88) 
 
-.3239 
 
     .0082 *** 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.72: Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and 
Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee 
                      
1999  
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.25 (N=12) 
.1667 (N=12) 
0 (N=12) 
.3333 (N=12) 
.6667 (N=12) 
 
.2581 (N=93) 
.1183 (N=93) 
.2043  (N=93) 
.1828  (N=93) 
.6452 (N=93) 
 
.0081 
-.0484 
.2043 
-.1505 
-.0215 
 
.9526 
.6359 
.0851* 
.2237 
.8847 
Agriculture 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.5625 (N=16) 
0  (N=16) 
.0625 (N=16) 
.0625 (N=16) 
.875   (N=16) 
 
.2022 (N=89) 
.1461 (N=89) 
.2022 (N=89) 
.2247 (N=89) 
.6067 (N=89) 
 
-.3603 
.1461 
.1397 
.1622 
-.2683 
 
.0022*** 
.1044 
.1847 
. 1379 
.0390** 
Appropriations 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.3158 (N=19) 
. 0526 (N=19) 
.1053 (N=19) 
.1579 (N=19) 
.7368 (N=19) 
 
.2442 (N=86) 
.1395 (N=86) 
.1977 (N=86) 
.2093 (N=86) 
.6279 (N=86) 
 
-.0716 
.0869 
.0924 
.0514 
-.1089 
 
.5227 
.3025 
.3484 
.6162 
.3732 
Civil Law 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
.1667 (N=12) 
.25     (N=12) 
.1667 (N=12) 
.0833 (N=12) 
.6667 (N=12) 
 
.2688 (N=93) 
.1075 (N=93) 
.1828 (N=93) 
.2151 (N=93) 
.6452 (N=93) 
 
.1022 
-.1425 
.0161 
.1317 
-.0215 
 
.4509 
.1615 
.8926 
.2875 
.8847 
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(table continued) 
Commerce 
 Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.2941 (N=17) 
.0588 (N=17) 
.4118 (N=17) 
.2353 (N=17) 
.6471 (N=17) 
 
.25 (N=88) 
.1364 (N=88) 
.3864 (N=88) 
.1932 (N=88) 
.6477 (N=88) 
 
-.0441 
.0775 
-.0254 
-.0421 
.0007 
 
.7065 
.3790 
.8460 
.6945 
.9958 
Education 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
.0588 (N=17) 
.0588 (N=17) 
.1765 (N=17) 
.1765 (N=17) 
.7059 (N=17) 
 
.2955 (N=88) 
.1364 (N=88) 
.1818 (N=88) 
.2045 (N=88) 
.6364 (N=88) 
 
.2366 
.0775 
.0053 
.0281 
-.0695 
 
.0414** 
.3790 
.9587 
.7935 
.5871 
Environment 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
.4167 (N=12) 
.25    (N=12) 
.25 (N=12) 
.0833 (N=12) 
.75 (N=12) 
 
.2366 (N=93) 
.1075 (N=93) 
.1720 (N=93) 
.2151 (N=93) 
.6344 (N=93) 
 
-.1801 
-.1425 
-.0780 
.1317 
-.1156 
 
.1825 
.1615 
.5138 
.2875 
.4351 
Health and Welfare 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
.3125 (N=16) 
0 (N=16) 
.3125 (N=16) 
.25 (N=16) 
.75  (N=16) 
 
.2472 (N=89) 
.1461 (N =89) 
.1573 (N=89) 
.1910 (N=89) 
.6292 (N=89) 
 
-.0653 
.1461 
-.1552 
-.0590 
-.1208 
 
.5864 
.1044 
.1403 
.5913 
.3566 
Governmental Affairs 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
0 (N=13) 
.3077 (N=13) 
.3077 (N=13) 
.3846 (N=13) 
.3846 (N=13) 
 
.2935 (N=92) 
.0978 (N=92) 
.1630 (N=92) 
.1739 (N=92) 
.6848 (N=92) 
 
.2935 
-.2099 
-.1446 
-.2107 
.3002 
 
.0234** 
.0317** 
.2085 
.0767* 
.0342** 
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(table continued) 
Insurance 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.4167 (N=12) 
. 3333 (N=12) 
.1667 (N=12) 
.1667(N=12) 
.5833 (N=12) 
 
.2366 (N=93) 
. 0968 (N=90) 
.1828 (N=93) 
.2043 (N=93) 
.6559 (N=93) 
 
-.1801 
-.2366 
.0161 
.0376 
.0726 
 
.1825 
.0190** 
.8926 
.7618 
.6244 
Judiciary 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
.25 (N=12) 
.1667 (N=12) 
.0833 (N=12) 
.1667 (N=12) 
.6667 (N=12) 
 
.2581 (N=93) 
. 1183 (N=91) 
.1935 (N=93) 
.2043 (N=93) 
.6452 (N=93) 
 
.0081 
-.0484 
.1102 
.0376 
-.0215 
 
.9526 
.6359 
.3554 
.7618 
.8847 
Labor 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
.2 (N=.15) 
.1333 (N=15) 
.2667 (N=15) 
.2667 (N=15) 
.6       (N=15) 
 
.2667 (N=90) 
.1222 (N=90) 
.1667 (N=90) 
.1889 (N=90) 
.6556 (N=90) 
 
.0667 
-.0111 
-.1 
-.0778 
.0556 
 
.5887 
.9049 
.3564 
.4904 
.6802 
Municipal 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.3077 (N=13) 
.0769 (N=13) 
.3846 (N=13) 
.3077 (N=13) 
.5385 (N=13) 
 
.25 (N=92) 
.1304 (N=92) 
.1522 (N=92) 
.1848 (N=92) 
.6630 (N=92) 
 
-.0577 
.0536 
-.2324 
-.1230 
.1246 
 
.6597 
.5877 
0420** 
.3043 
.3836 
Natural Resources 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.5556 (N=18) 
0 (N=18) 
.0556 (N=18) 
.1111 (N=18) 
.8333 (N=18) 
 
.1954 (N=87) 
.1494 (N=87) 
.2069 (N=87) 
.2184 (N=87) 
.6092 (N=87) 
 
-.3601 
.1494 
.1513 
.1073 
-.2241 
 
.0013*** 
.0812* 
.1315 
.3049 
.0711* 
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(table continued) 
Retirement 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.3636 (N=11) 
0  (N=11) 
.1818 (N=11) 
.0909 (N=11) 
.8182 (N=11) 
 
.2447 (N=94) 
.1383 (N=94) 
.1809 (N=94) 
.2128 (N=94) 
.6277 (N=94) 
 
-.1190 
.1383 
-.0010 
.1219 
-.1905 
 
.3979 
.1911 
.9938 
.3438 
.2145 
Transportation 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.3846 (N=13) 
.0769 (N=13) 
.2308 (N=13) 
.2308 (N=13) 
.6923 (N=13) 
 
.2391 (N=92) 
. 1304 (N=92) 
.1739 (N=92) 
.1957 (N=92) 
.6413 (N=92) 
 
-.1455 
.0535 
-.0569 
-.0351 
-.0510 
 
.2656 
.5877 
.6222 
.7697 
.7217 
Ways and Means 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.1579 (N=19) 
.0526 (N=19) 
.2632 (N=19) 
.3158 (N=19) 
.5263 (N=19) 
 
.2791 (N=86) 
.1395 (N=86) 
.1628 (N=86) 
.1744 (N=86) 
.6744 (N=86) 
 
.1212 
.0869 
-.1004 
-.1414 
.1481 
 
.2785 
.3025 
.3083 
.1664 
.2252 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.73: Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and 
Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee 
                      
2000  
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
        .4615 (N=13) 
        .2308 (N=13) 
         0 (N=13) 
        .3077 (N=13) 
        .6923 (N=13) 
 
.2717 (N=92) 
.1087 (N=92) 
.2174 (N=92) 
            .1848 (N=92) 
            .6413 (N=92) 
 
            -.1898 
            -.1221 
             .2174 
             -.1230 
             -.0510 
 
  .1633   
   .2148 
               .0626* 
               .3043 
               .7217 
Agriculture 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.4706 (N=17) 
       0 (N=17) 
.0588 (N=17) 
.0588 (N=17) 
.8824 (N=17) 
 
.2614 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
.2159 (N=88) 
.2273 (N=88) 
.6023 (N=88) 
 
-.2092 
.1477 
.1571 
.1684 
-.2801 
 
    .0839*   
              .0921* 
              .1336 
              .1141 
              .0269** 
Appropriations 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
           
          .3158 (N=19) 
          .1053 (N=19) 
          .1579 (N=19) 
          .2632 (N=19) 
          .6842 (N=19) 
 
,2907 (N=86) 
.1280 (N=86) 
.1977 (N=86) 
.1860 (N=86) 
.6395 (N=86) 
 
-.0251 
.0226 
.0398 
            -.0771 
            -.0447 
 
.8302 
.7887 
.6928 
.4518 
.7154 
Civil Law 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.25 (N=12) 
            .25 (N=12) 
.1667 (N=12) 
.0833 (N=12) 
.6667 (N=12) 
 
.3011 (N=93) 
          .1075  (N=93) 
.1935 (N=93) 
.2151 (N=93) 
.6452 (N=93) 
 
.0511 
            -.1425 
.0269 
.1317 
-.0215 
 
.7183   
             .1615 
.8255 
             .2875 
             .8847 
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(table continued) 
Commerce 
 Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus  
 
.4706 (N=17) 
.0588 (N=17) 
.1176 (N=17) 
.1765 (N=17) 
.7059 (N=17) 
 
.2614 (N=88) 
.1364 (N=88) 
.2045 (N=88) 
.2045 (N=88) 
.6364 (N=88) 
 
-.2092 
.0775 
.0869 
.0281 
-.0695 
 
 .0849* 
.3790 
.4084 
.7935 
.5871 
Education 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
               .25 (N=16) 
       0 (N=16) 
   . (N=16) 
         .0625 (N=16) 
         .8125 (N=16) 
 
.3034 (N=89) 
.1461 (N=89) 
.2022 (N=89) 
.2247 (N=89) 
.6180 (N=89) 
 
.0534 
.1461 
.0772 
.1622 
-.1945 
 
.6702   
.1044 
.4736 
.1379 
.1363 
Environment 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.3077 (N=13) 
.1538 (N=13) 
.0769 (N=13) 
.1538 (N=13) 
.7692 (N=13) 
 
.2935 (N=92) 
           .1196 (N=92) 
          .2065 (N=92) 
          .2065 (N=92) 
          .6304 (N=92) 
 
-.0142 
-.0343 
.1296 
.0526 
-.1388 
 
.9172 
.7285 
.2697 
.6604 
.3315 
Health and Welfare 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.1176 (N=17) 
                 0  (N=17) 
.2941 (N=17) 
          .2353 (N=17) 
          .7647 (N=17) 
 
.3296 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
.1705 (N=88) 
          .1932 (N=88) 
          .625    (N=88) 
 
.2119 
             .1477 
            -.1237 
            -.0421 
            -.1397 
 
.0809* 
.0921* 
             .2386 
             .6945 
             .2740 
Governmental Affairs 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.0667 (N=15) 
          .3333 (N=15) 
.3333 (N=15) 
.3333 (N=15) 
.4 (N=15) 
 
.3333 (N=90) 
.0889 (N=90) 
.1667 (N=90) 
.1778 (N=90) 
.6889 (N=90) 
 
.2667 
-.2444 
-.1667 
 -.1556 
.2889 
 
.0363**     
.0075*** 
           .1305 
           .1663 
           .0302** 
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(table continued) 
Insurance 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.5333 (N=15) 
     .2 (N=15) 
.1333 (N=15) 
.2 (N=15) 
.6667 (N=15) 
 
.2556 (N=90) 
 .1111 (N=90) 
     .2 (N=90) 
    .2 (N =90) 
.6445 (N=90) 
 
           -.2778 
             -.0889 
               .0667 
             0 
              -.0222 
 
  .0291** 
.3379 
.5472 
 1.000 
.8691 
Judiciary 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
        . 2857 (N=14) 
        .1429 (N=14) 
        .2857 (N=14) 
        .3571 (N=14) 
        .5714 (N=14) 
 
.2967 (N=91) 
.1209 (N=91) 
.1758 (N=91) 
.1758 (N=91) 
.6593 (N=91) 
 
.0110 
            -.0220 
            -.1099 
            -.1813 
              .0879 
 
.9339 
.8183 
.3344 
.1165 
.5261 
Labor 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
         .3125 (N=16) 
        .1875 (N=16) 
        .25 (N=16) 
        .3125 (N=16) 
        .6875 (N=16) 
 
.2921 (N=89) 
.1124 (N=89) 
.1798 (N=89) 
.1798 (N=89) 
.6404 (N=89) 
 
-.0204 
            -.0751 
            -.0702 
            -.1327 
            -.0471 
 
.8709 
.4057 
.5148 
             .2256 
             .7200 
Municipal 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
        .2857 (N=14) 
        .0714 (N=14) 
        .4286 (N=14) 
        .2857 (N=14) 
        .5       (N=14) 
 
.2967 (N=91)     
 .1319 (N=91) 
.1538 (N=91) 
.1868 (N=91) 
.6703 (N=91) 
 
.0110  
.0604 
-.2748 
-.0989 
.1703 
 
.9339 
.5273 
     .0146*** 
.3940 
.2181 
Natural Resources 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
          .4 (N=15) 
           0 (N=15) 
          .2 (N=15) 
          .2667 (N=15) 
          .6667 (N=15) 
 
.2778 (N=90) 
.1444 (N=90) 
.1889 (N=90) 
.1889 (N=90) 
.6444 (N=90) 
 
-.1222 
.1444 
-.0111 
-.0778 
-.0222 
 
    .3414   . 
             .1181 
             .9201 
             .4904 
             .8691 
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(table continued) 
Retirement 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
            .3 (N=10) 
             0 (N=10) 
            .1 (N=10) 
            .1 (N=10) 
            .8 (N=10) 
 
.2947 (N=95) 
          .1368 (N=95) 
.2      (N=95) 
.2105 (N=95) 
           .6316 (N=95) 
 
-.0053 
.1368 
.1 
.1105 
-.1684 
 
.9726 
.2152 
.4485 
.4108 
.2934 
Transportation 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.3571 (N=14) 
.0714 (N=14) 
.2857 (N=14) 
.1429 (N=14) 
.6429 (N=14) 
 
.2857 (N=91) 
.1319 (N=91) 
.1758 (N=91) 
           .2088 (N=91) 
           .6484 (N=91) 
 
-.0714 
.0604 
-.1099 
.0659 
.0055 
 
.5897 
.5273 
.3344 
.5702 
.9684 
Ways and Means 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.1053 (N=19) 
.0526 (N=19) 
.3158 (N=19) 
.3684 (N=19) 
.5789 (N=19) 
 
.3372 (N=86) 
.1395 (N=86) 
.1628 (N=86) 
.1628 (N=86) 
.6628 (N=86) 
 
.2319 
.0869 
            -.1530 
            -.2056 
             .0838 
 
   .0454** 
.3025 
.1267  
             .0430** 
             .4934 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.74: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and 
Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee 
                      
2004  
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non 
Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.3636 (N=11) 
.1818 (N=11) 
.1818 (N=11) 
.3636 (N=11) 
.7273 (N=11) 
 
.2872 (N=94) 
.1170 (N=94) 
.1489 (N=94) 
.1809 (N=94) 
.6383 (N=94) 
 
-.0764 
-.0648 
-.0329 
-.1828 
             -.0890 
 
.6033 
.5415 
.7766 
.1545 
.5633 
Agriculture 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.4706 (N=17) 
0 (N=17) 
.1176 (N=17) 
.0588 (N=17) 
.9412 (N=17) 
 
.2614 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
.1591 (N=88) 
.2273 (N=88) 
.5909 (N=88) 
 
-.2092 
.1477 
.0414 
.1684 
-.3503 
 
.0849* 
.0921* 
.6670 
.1141 
     .0053*** 
Appropriations 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
           
          .2105 (N=19) 
          .1053 (N-19) 
.1053 (N=19) 
           .2632 (N=19) 
           .6842 (N=19) 
 
.3140 (N=86) 
.1279 (N=86) 
.1628 (N=86) 
.1860 (N=86) 
.6395 (N=86) 
 
.1034 
.0226 
.0575 
-.0771 
-.0447 
 
.3759 
.7887 
.5323 
.4518 
.7154 
Civil Law 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.375 (N=8) 
.25 (N=8) 
.125 (N=8) 
.125 (N=8) 
.625 (N=8) 
 
.2887 (N=97) 
.1134 (N=97) 
.1546 (N=97) 
.2062 (N=97) 
.6495 (N=97) 
 
-.0863 
-.1366 
.0296  
.0812 
.0245 
 
.6109  
.2638 
.8247 
.5854 
.8905 
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(table continued) 
Commerce 
 Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.2632 (N=19) 
.0526 (N=19) 
.1579 (N=19) 
.1579 (N=19) 
.7895 (N=19) 
 
.3023 (N=86) 
.1395 (N=86) 
.1512 (N=86) 
.2093 (N=86) 
.6163 (N=86) 
 
.0392 
.0869 
-.0067 
.0514 
-.1732 
 
.7378 
.3025 
.9418 
.6162 
.1556 
Education 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.0625 (N=16) 
0 (N=16) 
.0625 (N=16) 
.125 (N=16) 
.5625 (N=16) 
 
.3371 (N=89) 
.1461 (N=89) 
.1685 (N=89) 
.2135 (N=89) 
.6629 (N=89) 
 
.2746 
.1461 
.1060 
.0885 
.1004 
 
  .0267** 
.1044 
.2817 
 .4202 
.4437 
Environment 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.5 (N=10) 
.3 (N=10) 
.2 (N=10) 
.1 (N=10) 
.7 (N =10) 
 
.2737 (N=95) 
.1053 (N=95) 
.1474 (N=95) 
.2105 (N=95) 
.6421 (N=95) 
 
-.2263 
-.1947 
-.0526 
.1105 
-.0579 
 
.1382 
  .0766* 
.6633 
.4108 
.7186 
Health and Welfare 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.2222 (N=18) 
.0556 (N=18) 
.3333 (N=18) 
.2222 (N=18) 
.7222 (N=18) 
 
.3103 (N=87) 
.1379 (N=87) 
.1149 (N=87) 
.1954 (N=87) 
.6322 (N=87) 
 
.0881 
.0824 
-.2184 
-.0268 
-.0900 
 
.4604 
.3388 
   .0188** 
.7980 
.4715 
Governmental Affairs 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.2 (N=10) 
.2 (N=10) 
.2 (N=10) 
.5 (N=10) 
.5 (N=10) 
 
.3053 (N=95) 
.11579 (N=95) 
.1474 (N=95) 
.1684 (N=95) 
.6632 (N=95) 
 
.1053 
-.0842 
-.0526 
-.3316 
.1632 
 
.4923 
.4467 
.6633 
  .0124** 
             .3089 
 
 
 
 255 
 
(table continued) 
Insurance 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.3333 (N=18) 
.2778 (N=18) 
0 (N=18) 
.1667 (N=18) 
.6111 (N=18) 
 
.2874 (N=87) 
.0920 (N=87) 
.1839 (N=87) 
.2069 (N=87) 
.6552 (N=87) 
 
-.0460 
-.1858 
.1839 
.0402 
.0441 
 
.7004 
   .0294** 
   .0487** 
.7011 
.7248 
Judiciary 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.2857 (N=14) 
.1429 (N=14) 
.2143 (N=14) 
.1429 (N=14) 
.7143 (N=14) 
 
.2967 (N=91) 
.1209 (N=91) 
.1429 (N=91) 
.2088 (N=91) 
          .6374 (N=91) 
 
.0110 
-.0219 
            -.0714 
             .0659 
-.0769 
 
.9339 
.8183 
.4935 
.5702 
.5792 
Labor 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.4 (N=10) 
.3 (N=10) 
.1 (N=10) 
.3 (N=10) 
             .6 (N=10) 
 
.2842 (N=95) 
.1053 (N=95) 
.1579 (N=95) 
.1895 (N=95) 
.6526 (N=95) 
 
-.1158 
-.1947 
.0579 
-.1105 
.0526 
 
.4500 
 .0766* 
.6319 
.4108 
.7433 
Municipal 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus  
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
   .1667 (N=12) 
0 (N=12) 
.5 (N=12) 
.5 (N=12) 
             .5 (N=12) 
 
.3118 (N=93) 
.1398 (N=93) 
.1075 (N=93) 
.1613 (N=93) 
           .6667 (N=93) 
 
.1452 
.1398 
-.3925 
-.3387 
.1667 
 
.3041 
.1696 
   .0003*** 
   .0055*** 
.2596 
Natural Resources 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
            .5882 (N=17) 
            .0 (N=17) 
.1765 (N=17) 
.1176 (N=17) 
.7647 (N=17) 
 
.2386 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
.2159 (N=88) 
.625  (N=88) 
 
 
-.3496 
.1477 
-.0287 
.0983 
-.1397 
 
 
              .0035*** 
              .0921* 
.7654 
.3586 
.2740 
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(table continued) 
Retirement 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
 
.1111 (N=9) 
.1111 (N=9) 
.1111 (N=9) 
.2222 (N=9) 
             .5556 (N=9) 
 
.3125 (N=96) 
.125 (N=96) 
.1563 (N=96) 
.1979 (N=96) 
.6563 (N=96) 
 
.2014 
.0139 
.0451 
            -.0243 
.1007 
 
.2091 
.9049 
.7218 
             .8633 
.5499 
Transportation 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.3333 (N=18) 
.1111 (N=18) 
.1111 (N=18) 
.1111 (N=18) 
.6111 (N=18) 
 
.2874 (N=87) 
.1264 (N=87) 
.1609 (N=87) 
.2184 (N=87) 
.6552 (N=87) 
 
-.0460 
.0153 
.0498 
.1073 
.0441 
 
.7004 
.8591 
.5967 
.3049 
.7248 
Ways and Means 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
 Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
 
.1579 (N=19) 
0 (N=19) 
.2632 (N=19) 
.4211 (N=19) 
.6316 (N=19) 
 
.3256 (N=86) 
.1512 (N=86) 
.1279 (N=86) 
.1512 (N=86) 
.6512 (N=86) 
 
.1677 
.1512 
-.1353 
-.2699 
.0196 
 
.1498 
 .0714* 
.1403 
    .0075*** 
.8730 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.75: Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives Created from Caucus Membership and 
Membership on Louisiana House Standing Committees by Committee 
2008 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee 
member 
Non Committee 
member 
Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation  
 
.2667 (N=15) 
.2 (N=15) 
.1333 (N=15) 
.2 (N=15) 
.6667 (N=15) 
.1333 (N=15) 
 
.3034 (N=89) 
.1124 (N=89) 
.1798 (N=89) 
.1910 (N=89) 
.6517 (N=89) 
.1798 (N=89) 
 
.0367 
-.0876 
.0464 
-.0090 
-.0150 
.0464 
 
.7764 
.3472 
.6638 
.9357 
.9112 
.6638 
Agriculture 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.4737 (N=19) 
.0526 (N=19) 
0 (N=19) 
.0526 (N=19) 
1 (N=19) 
.0526 (N=19) 
 
.2588 (N=85) 
.1412 (N=85) 
.2118 (N=85) 
.2235 (N=85) 
.5765 (N=85) 
.2 (N=85) 
 
-.2149 
.0885 
.2118 
.1709 
-.4235 
.1474 
 
.0652* 
.2960 
.0274** 
.0891* 
.0003*** 
           .1272 
Appropriations 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.32 (N=25) 
.12 (N=25) 
.08 (N=25) 
.2 (N=25) 
.68 (N=25) 
.2 (N=25) 
 
.2911 (N=79) 
.1266 (N=79) 
.2025 (N=79) 
.1899 (N=79) 
.6456 (N=79) 
.1646 (N=79) 
 
-.0289 
.0066 
.1225 
-.0101 
-.0344 
-.0354 
 
.7859 
.9317 
.1612 
.9119 
.7553 
.6866 
Civil Law 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.1429 (N=14) 
.0714 (N=14) 
.0714 (N=14) 
.2857 (N=14) 
.5714 (N=14) 
.2143 (N=14) 
 
.3222 (N=90) 
.1333 (N=90) 
.1889 (N=90) 
.1778 (N=90) 
.6667 (N=90) 
.1667 (N=90) 
 
.1794 
.0619 
.1175 
-.1079 
.0952 
-.0476 
 
.1756 
.5194 
.2843 
.3453 
.4907 
.6650 
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(table continued) 
Commerce 
 Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.2105 (N=19) 
.1579 (N=19) 
.3158 (N=19) 
.2632 (N=19) 
.4737 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
 
.3176 (N=85) 
.1176 (N=85) 
.1412 (N=85) 
.1765 (N=85) 
.6941 (N=85) 
.1647 (N=85) 
 
.1071 
-.0402 
-.1746 
-.0867 
.2204 
-.0458 
 
.3609 
.6355 
.0701* 
.3910 
.0690* 
.6371 
Education 
Acadiana Caucus  
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.125 (N=16) 
0 (N=16) 
.3125 (N=16) 
.125 (N=16) 
.5625 (N=16) 
.3125 (N=16) 
 
.3295 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
.2045 (N=88) 
.6705 (N=88) 
.1477 (N=88) 
 
.2045 
.1477 
-.1648 
.0795 
.1080 
-.1648 
 
.1018 
.1022 
.1111 
.4626 
.4087 
.1111 
Health and Welfare 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
,2353 (N=17) 
.1176 (N=17) 
.1765 (N=17) 
.2353 (N=17) 
.6471 (N=17) 
.1765 (N=17) 
 
.3103 (N=87) 
.1264 (N=87) 
.1724 (N=87) 
.1839 (N=87) 
.6552 (N=87) 
.1724 (N=87) 
 
.0751 
.0088 
-.0041 
-.0514 
.0081 
-.0041 
 
.5406 
.9211 
.9681 
.6269 
.9493 
.9681 
Governmental Affairs 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.2632 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
.6316 (N=19) 
.1053 (N=19) 
 
.3059 (N=85) 
.1059 (N=85) 
.1647 (N=85) 
.1882 (N=85) 
.6588 (N=85) 
.1882 (N=85) 
 
.0427 
-.1046 
-.0458 
-.0223 
.0272 
.0830 
 
.7160 
.2163 
.6371 
.8257 
.8236 
.3923 
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(table continued) 
Insurance 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation  
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.4 (N=10) 
.1 (N=10) 
.2 (N=10) 
.1 (N=10) 
.8 (N=10) 
.1 (N=10) 
 
.2872 (N=94) 
.1277 (N=94) 
.1702 (N=94) 
.2021 (N=94) 
.6383 (N=94) 
.1809 (N=94) 
 
-.1128 
.0277 
-.0298 
.1021 
-.1617 
.0809 
 
.4634 
.8038 
.8151 
.4408 
.3115 
.5252 
Judiciary 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.3125 (N=16) 
.0625 (N=16) 
.25 (N=16) 
.3125 (N=16) 
.4375 (N=16) 
.25 (N=16) 
 
.2955 (N=88) 
.1364 (N=88) 
.1591 (N=88) 
.1705 (N=88) 
.6932 (N=88) 
.1591 (N=88) 
 
-.0170 
.0739 
-.0909 
-.1420 
.2557 
-.0909 
 
.8922 
.4161 
.3815 
.1883 
.0486* 
.3815 
Labor 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
0 (N=9) 
.3333 (N=9) 
.4444 (N=9) 
.3333 (N=9) 
.2222 (N=9) 
.3333 (N=9) 
 
.3263 (N=95) 
.1053 (N=95) 
.1474 (N=95) 
.1789 (N=95) 
.6947 (N=95) 
.1579 (N=95) 
 
.3263 
-.2281 
-.2971 
-.1544 
.4725 
-.1754 
 
.0412** 
.0486** 
.0243** 
.2657 
.0041*** 
.1871 
Municipal 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus  
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.3684 (N=19) 
.1053 (N=19) 
.3158 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
.5789 (N=19) 
.3158 (N=19) 
 
.2824 (N=85) 
.1294 (N=85) 
.1412 (N=85) 
.1882 (N=85) 
.6706 (N=85) 
.1412 (N=85) 
 
-.0861 
.0241 
-.1746 
-.0223 
.0916 
-.1746 
 
.4633 
.7762 
.0701* 
.8257 
.4527 
.0701* 
Natural Resources and Environment 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
 
.6471 (N=17) 
.1176 (N=17) 
0 (N=17) 
.1176 (N=17) 
 
.2299 (N=87) 
.1264 (N=87) 
.2069 (N=87) 
.2069 (N=87) 
 
-.4172 
.0088 
.2069 
.0892 
 
.0005*** 
.9211 
.0395** 
.3980 
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(table continued) 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
.8235 (N=17) 
.1765 (N=17) 
.6207 (N=87) 
.1724 (N=87) 
-.2028 
-.0041 
.1099 
.9681 
Retirement 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation  
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.3636 (N=11) 
0 (N=11) 
.0909 (N=11) 
.1818 (N=11) 
.8181 (N=11) 
.0909 (N=11) 
 
.2903 (N=93) 
.1398 (N=93) 
.1828 (N=93) 
.1935 (N=93) 
.6344 (N=93) 
.1828 (N=93) 
 
-.0733 
.1398 
.0919 
.0117 
-.1838 
.0919 
 
.6192 
.1884 
.4511 
.9265 
.2297 
.4511 
Transportation 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.3684 (N=19) 
.1053 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
.0526 (N=19) 
.8421 (N=19) 
.1579 (N=19) 
 
.2824 (N=85) 
.1294 (N=85) 
.1647 (N=85) 
.2235 (N=85) 
.6118 (N=85) 
.1765 (N=85) 
 
-.0861 
.0241 
-.0458 
.1709 
-.2303 
.0186 
 
.4633 
.7762 
.6371 
.0891* 
.0572* 
.8484 
Ways and Means 
Acadiana Caucus 
Jefferson Delegation 
 Black Caucus 
Orleans Delegation 
Rural Caucus 
Capital Region Delegation 
 
.3684 (N=19) 
.1053 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
.2105 (N=19) 
.6316 (N=19) 
.1579 (N=19) 
 
.2824 (N=85) 
.1294 (N=85) 
.1647 (N=85) 
.1882 (N=85) 
.6588 (N=85) 
.1765 (N=85) 
 
-.0861 
.0241 
-.0458 
-.0223 
.0272 
.0186 
 
.4633 
.7762 
.6371 
.8257 
.8236 
.8484 
  *= p<.10, **=p<.05, ***=p<.01     
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Table A.76 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
1999 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                25% (N=8)                52% (N=65)             2.1252                .145 
Agriculture                43% (N=14)                51% (N=59)               .2890                .591 
Appropriations                73% (N=15)                43% (N=58)             4.3572                .037** 
Civil Law                50% (N=6)                49% (N=67)               .0012                .972 
Commerce                45% (N=11)                50% (N=62)               .0772                .781 
Education                55% (N=11)                48% (N=62)               .1418                .707 
Environment                50% (N=8)                49% (N=65)               .0017                .967 
Health and Welfare                38% (N=16)                53% (N=57)             1.1444                .285 
Government Affairs                20% (N=5)                51% (N=68)             1.8455                .174 
Insurance                57% (N=7)                48% (N=66)               .1898                .663 
Judiciary                43% (N=7)                50% (N=66)               .1292                .719 
Labor                50% (N=10)                49% (N=63)               .0022                .963 
Municipal                44% (N=9)                50% (N=64)               .0974                .755 
Natural Resources                73% (N=15)                43% (N=58)             4.3572                .037** 
Retirement                60% (N=5)                49% (N=68)               .2452                .620 
Transportation                30% (N=10)                52% (N=63)             1.7295                .188 
Ways and Means                24% (N=17)                57% (N=56)             5.8950                .015** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.77 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                82% (N=11)                44% (N=63)                5.2323                0.022** 
Agriculture                67% (N=15)                46% (N=59)                2.0904                0.148 
Appropriations                67% (N=15)                46% (N=59)                2.0904                0.148 
Civil Law                50% (N=6)                50% (N=68)                0.0000                1.000 
Commerce                71% (N=14)                45% (N=60)                3.1714                0.075* 
Education                44% (N=9)                51% (N=65)                0.1265                0.722 
Environment                50% (N=8)                50% (N=66)                0.0000                1.000 
Health and Welfare                62% (N=13)                48% (N=61)                0.8398                0.359 
Government Affairs                14% (N=7)                54% (N=67)                3.9446                0.047** 
Insurance                33% (N=9)                52% (N=65)                1.1385                0.286 
Judiciary                45% (N=11)                51% (N=63)                0.1068                0.744 
Labor                50% (N=8)                50% (N=66)                0.0000                1.000 
Municipal                22% (N=9)                54% (N=65)                3.1624                0.075* 
Natural Resources                62% (N=13)                48% (N=61)                0.8398                0.359 
Retirement                80% (N=5)                48% (N=69)                1.9304                0.165 
Transportation                38% (N=8)                52% (N=66)                0.5606                0.454 
Ways and Means                32% (N=19)                56% (N=55)                3.4699                0.062* 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
  
 263 
 
Table A.78 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=10)                50% (N=62)                0.0000                1.000 
Agriculture                80% (N=15)                42% (N=57)                6.8211                0.009*** 
Appropriations                69% (N=16)                45% (N=56)                2.8929                0.089* 
Civil Law                80% (N=5)                48% (N=67)                1.9343                0.164 
Commerce                46% (N=13)                51% (N=59)                0.0939                0.759 
Education                56% (N=9)                49% (N=63)                0.1270                0.722 
Environment                63% (N=8)                48% (N=64)                0.5625                0.453 
Health and Welfare                54% (N=13)                49% (N=59)                0.0939                0.759 
Government Affairs                14% (N=7)                54% (N=65)                3.9560                0.047** 
Insurance                75% (N=8)                47% (N=64)                2.2500                 .134 
Judiciary                36% (N=11)                52% (N=61)                0.9657                0.326 
Labor                50% (N=8)                50% (N=64)                0.0000                1.000 
Municipal                17% (N=6)                53% (N=66)                2.9091                0.088* 
Natural Resources                58% (N=12)                48% (N=60)                0.4000                0.527 
Retirement                50% (N=6)                50% (N=66)                0.0000                1.000 
Transportation                29% (N=7)                52% (N=65)                1.4242                0.233 
Ways and Means                33% (N=18)                56% (N=54)                2.6667                0.102 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.79 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                60% (N=10)                48% (N=62)                0.4645                   0.496 
Agriculture                53% (N=15)                49% (N=57)                0.0842                     0.772 
Appropriations                44% (N=16)                52% (N=56)                0.3214                   0.571 
Civil Law                0% (N=4)                53% (N=68)                4.2353                   0.040** 
Commerce                42% (N=12)                52% (N=60)                0.4000                      0.527 
Education                70% (N=10)                47% (N=62)                1.8581                   0.173 
Environment                67% (N=9)                48% (N=63)                1.1429                   0.285    
Health and Welfare                54% (N=13)                49% (N=59)                0.0939                   0.759   
Government Affairs                57% (N=7)                49% (N=65)                0.1582                    0.691   
Insurance                33% (N=9)                52% (N=63)                1.1429                   0.285 
Judiciary                33% (N=9)                52% (N=63)                1.1429                   0.285 
Labor                71% (N=7)                48% (N=65)                1.4242                   0.233 
Municipal                57% (N=7)                49% (N=65)                0.1582                   0.691  
Natural Resources                25% (N=12)                55% (N=60)                3.6000                   0.058* 
Retirement                29% (N=7)                52% (N=65)                1.4242                    0.233 
Transportation                50% (N=8)                50% (N=64)                0.0000                   1.000      
Ways and Means                61% (N=18)                46% (N=54)                1.1852                   0.276       
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.80 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=10)                  49% (N=61)                 0.0023                   0.962       
Agriculture                57% (N=14)                47% (N=57)                0.4296                   0.512  
Appropriations                63% (N=16)                45% (N=55)                1.4407                   0.230 
Civil Law                20% (N=5)                52% (N=66)                1.8469                   0.174     
Commerce                36% (N=11)                52% (N=60)                0.8709                        0.351 
Education                44% (N=9)                50% (N=62)                0.0970                     0.755 
Environment                78% (N=9)                45% (N=62)                3.3450                   0.067* 
Health and Welfare                58% (N=12)                47% (N=59)                0.4719                   0.492    
Government Affairs                43% (N=7)                50% (N=64)                0.1288                   0.720 
Insurance                44% (N=9)                50% (N=62)                0.0970                   0.755 
Judiciary                56% (N=9)                48% (N=62)                0.1616                       0.688      
Labor                43% (N=7)                50% (N=64)                0.1288                   0.720    
Municipal                14% (N=7)                53% (N=64)                3.8081                   0.051* 
Natural Resources                46% (N=13)                50% (N=58)                0.0629                   0.802 
Retirement                57% (N=7)                48% (N=64)                0.1913                      0.662     
Transportation                25% (N=8)                52% (N=63)                2.1292                   0.145  
Ways and Means                41% (N=17)                52% (N=54)                0.5895                   0.443  
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.81 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2004 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                33% (N=9)                52% (N=60)             1.0524                .305 
Agriculture                79% (N=14)                42% (N=55)             6.0309                .014** 
Appropriations                41% (N=17)                52% (N=52)               .5920                .442 
Civil Law                67% (N=6)                48% (N=63)               .7952                .373 
Commerce                78% (N=9)                45% (N=60)             3.3640                .067* 
Education                57% (N=7)                48% (N=62)               .1929                .660 
Environment                57% (N=7)                48% (N=62)               .1929                .660 
Health and Welfare                46% (N=13)                50% (N=56)               .0624                .803 
Government Affairs                  0% (N=6)                54% (N=63)             6.3837                .012** 
Insurance                70% (N=10)                46% (N=59)             2.0097                .156 
Judiciary                55% (N=11)                48% (N=58)               .1454                .703 
Labor                50% (N=6)                49% (N=63)               .0014                .970 
Municipal                13% (N=8)                54% (N=61)             4.8964                .027** 
Natural Resources                73% (N=11)                45% (N=58)             2.8795                .090* 
Retirement                60% (N=5)                48% (N=64)               .2481                .618 
Transportation                80% (N=5)                47% (N=64)             2.0359                .154 
Ways and Means                28% (N=18)                57% (N=51)             4.5028                .034** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.82 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2005 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                33% (N=12)                53% (N=57)             1.4770                .224 
Agriculture                67% (N=12)                46% (N=57)             1.7578                .185 
Appropriations                47% (N=17)                50% (N=52)               .0443                .833 
Civil Law                71% (N=7)                47% (N=62)             1.5296                .216 
Commerce                56% (N=9)                48% (N=60)               .1633                .686 
Education                71% (N=7)                47% (N=62)             1.5296                .216 
Environment                67% (N=6)                48% (N=63)               .7952                .373 
Health and Welfare                50% (N=12)                49% (N=57)               .0031                .956 
Government Affairs                20% (N=5)                52% (N=64)             1.8484                .174 
Insurance                67% (N=9)                47% (N=60)             1.2524                .263 
Judiciary                55% (N=11)                48% (N=58)               .1454                .703 
Labor                43% (N=7)                50% (N=62)               .1284                .720 
Municipal                38% (N=8)                51% (N=61)               .5020                .479 
Natural Resources                50% (N=10)                49% (N=59)               .0025                .960 
Retirement                50% (N=4)                49% (N=65)               .0009                .976 
Transportation                67% (N=6)                48% (N=63)               .7952                .373 
Ways and Means                28% (N=18)                57% (N=51)             4.5028                .034** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.83 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2006 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=10)                49% (N=59)             .0025                .960 
Agriculture                75% (N=12)                44% (N=57)           3.8460                .050* 
Appropriations                44% (N=16)                51% (N=53)             .2544                .614 
Civil Law                67% (N=6)                48% (N=63)             .7952                .373 
Commerce                38% (N=8)                51% (N=61)             .5020                .479 
Education                56% (N=9)                48% (N=60)             .1633                .686 
Environment                71% (N=7)                47% (N=62)           1.5296                .216 
Health and Welfare                60% (N=10)                47% (N=59)             .5382                .463 
Government Affairs                17% (N=6)                52% (N=63)           2.7956                .095* 
Insurance                56% (N=9)                48% (N=60)             .1633                .686 
Judiciary                40% (N=10)                51% (N=59)             .4025                .526 
Labor                29% (N=7)                52% (N=62)           1.3360                .248 
Municipal                25% (N=8)                52% (N=61)           2.1335                .144 
Natural Resources                44% (N=9)                50% (N=60)             .0966                .756 
Retirement                25% (N=4)                51% (N=65)           1.0011                .317 
Transportation                67% (N=6)                48% (N=63)             .7952                .373 
Ways and Means                41% (N=17)                52% (N=52)             .5920                .442 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.84 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2007 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=10)                50% (N=58)             .0000                1.000 
Agriculture                67% (N=12)                46% (N=56)           1.6190                  .203 
Appropriations                53% (N=17)                49% (N=51)             .0784                  .779 
Civil Law                67% (N=6)                48% (N=62)             .7312                  .393 
Commerce                43% (N=7)                51% (N=61)             .1593                  .690 
Education                56% (N=9)                49% (N=59)             .1281                  .720 
Environment                83% (N=6)                47% (N=62)           2.9247                  .087* 
Health and Welfare                50% (N=10)                50% (N=58)             .0000                1.000 
Government Affairs                33% (N=6)                52% (N=62)             .7312                  .393 
Insurance                56% (N=9)                49% (N=59)             .1281                  .720 
Judiciary                60% (N=10)                48% (N=58)             .4690                  .493 
Labor                29% (N=7)                52% (N=61)           1.4333                  .231 
Municipal                25% (N=8)                53% (N=60)           2.2667                  .132 
Natural Resources                67% (N=9)                47% (N=59)           1.1525                  .283 
Retirement                50% (N=4)                50% (N=64)             .0000                 1.000 
Transportation                50% (N=6)                50% (N=62)             .0000                 1.000 
Ways and Means                44% (N=18)                52% (N=50)             .3022                   .582 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.85 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2008 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                67% (N=6)                48% (N=46)             .7536                .385 
Agriculture                82% (N=11)                41% (N=41)           5.6497                .017** 
Appropriations                55% (N=11)                49% (N=41)             .1153                .734 
Civil Law                71% (N=7)                47% (N=45)           1.4857                .223 
Commerce                27% (N=11)                56% (N=41)           2.8825                .090* 
Education                36% (N=11)                54% (N=41)           1.0377                .308 
Environment                63% (N=8)                48% (N=44)             .5909                .442 
Health and Welfare                70% (N=10)                45% (N=42)           1.9810                .159 
Government Affairs                38% (N=8)                52% (N=44)             .5909                .442 
Insurance                25% (N=4)                52% (N=48)           1.0833                .298 
Judiciary                33% (N=9)                53% (N=43)           1.2093                .271 
Labor                25% (N=4)                52% (N=48)           1.0833                .298 
Municipal                38% (N=13)                54% (N=39)             .9231                .337 
Natural Resources                63% (N=8)                48% (N=44)             .5909                .442 
Retirement                50% (N=4)                50% (N=48)             .0000              1.000 
Transportation                42% (N=12)                 53% (N=40)             .4333                .510 
Ways and Means                67% (N=9)                47% (N=43)           1.2093                .271 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.86 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W 
nominate scores and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
1999 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.046 (N=8) .0135 (N=65) .0595 .3149 
Agriculture .1284 (N=14) -.0218 (N=59) -.1502 -1.0079 
Appropriations .1691 (N=15) -.0349 (N=58) -.2040 -1.414 
Civil Law -.0795 (N=6) .0148 (N=67) .0943 .4387 
Commerce -.0901 (N=11) .0242 (N=62) .1143 .6945 
Education .0681 (N=11) -.0038 (N=62) -.0719 -.4359 
Environment .0146 (N=8) .0061 (N=65) -.0085 -.0452 
Health and Welfare -.0966 (N=16) .0361 (N=57) .1327 .9348 
Government Affairs -.3424 (N=5) .0327 (N=68) .3751 1.6331 
Insurance -.0749 (N=7) .0157 (N=66) .0906 .4518 
Judiciary -.0146 (N=7) .0093 (N=66) .0239 .1190 
Labor -.1123 (N=10) .0260 (N=63) .1383 .8081 
Municipal -.1498 (N=9) .0291 (N=64) .1788 1.002 
Natural Resources .2553 (N=15) -.0572 (N=58) -.3125 -2.2091** 
Retirement -.0752 (N=5) .0131 (N=68) .0883 .3776 
Transportation -.069 (N=10) .0191 (N=63) .0881 .5134 
Ways and Means -.1781 (N=17) .0632 (N=56) .2413 1.7634* 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.87 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                -.1760909 (N=11)                -.470254 (N=63)                -.2941631                -1.8952* 
Agriculture                -.3569333 (N=15)                -.4442203 (N=59)                -.087287                -0.6219 
Appropriations                -.1812667 (N=15)                -.4888814 (N=59)                -.3076147                -2.2621** 
Civil Law                -.305 (N=6)                -.43725 (N=68)                -.13225                -0.6398 
Commerce                -.3957857 (N=14)                -.4337 (N=60)                -.0379143                -0.2626 
Education                -.45 (N=9)                -.4232769 (N=65)                 .0267231                 0.1544 
Environment                -.2685 (N=8)                -.4456818 (N=66)                -.1771818                -0.9789 
Health and Welfare                -.4801538 (N=13)                -.4150984 (N=61)                 .0650555                 0.4381 
Government Affairs                -.6808571 (N=7)                -.3999552 (N=67)                 .2809019                 1.4748 
Insurance                -.5105555 (N=9)                -.4148923 (N=65)                 .0956632                 0.5538 
Judiciary                -.3703636 (N=11)                -.4363333 (N=63)                -.0659697                -0.4153 
Labor                -.48375 (N=8)                -.4195909 (N=66)                 .0641591                 0.3524 
Municipal                -.5958889 (N=9)                -.4030769 (N=65)                 .192812                 1.1236 
Natural Resources                -.1683077 (N=13)                -.4815574 (N=61)                -.3132497                -2.1750** 
Retirement                -.0672 (N=5)                -.4525652 (N=69)                -.3853652                -1.7454 
Transportation -               . 51275 (N=8)                -.4160758 (N=66)                 .0966742                 0.5316 
Ways and Means                -.6271579 (N=19)                -.3572182 (N=55)                .2699397                 2.1501** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.88 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                -.1465 (N=10)                    -.1648387 (N=62)                      -.0183387                    -0.1269               
Agriculture                 .0632667 (N=15)                    -.2216491 (N=57)                    -.2849158                     -2.4082**               
Appropriations                -.0244375 (N=16)                    -.2016786 (N=56)                    -.1772411                      -1.4972               
Civil Law                -.0058 (N=5)                    -.1739701 (N=67)                       -.1681702                    -0.8595               
Commerce                -.1632308 (N=13)                    -.1620847 (N=59)                     .001146                     0.0088               
Education                -.1115556 (N=9)                    -.1695397 (N=63)                       -.0579841                    -0.3839               
Environment                -.01725 (N=8)                    -.1804219 (N=64)                    -.1631719                    -1.0334                
Health and Welfare                -.1947692 (N=13)                    -.1551356 (N=59)                     .0396336                 0.3051                 
Government Affairs                -.5582857 (N=7)                    -.1196462 (N=65)                     .4386396                     2.7344***                
Insurance                -.117875 (N=8)                    -.1678437 (N=64)                    -.0499688                    -0.3143               
Judiciary                -.3407273 (N=11)                    -.1301148 (N=61)                 .2106125                 1.5410               
Labor                -.199875 (N=8)                    -.1575937 (N=64)                     .0422812                       0.2659                 
Municipal                -.4231667 (N=6)                     -.1385758 (N=66)                 .2845909                 1.6017                 
Natural Resources                -.0021667 (N=12)                    -.1943167 (N=60)                    -.19215                        -1.4537               
Retirement                -.1171667 (N=6)                    -.1663939 (N=66)                     -.0492273                    -0.2723                    
Transportation                -.3705714 (N=7)                    -.1398615 (N=65)                     .2307099                     1.3857                   
Ways and Means                -.3093889 (N=18)                     -.1132593 (N=54)                     .1961296                     1.7347                        
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.89 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                -.085 (N=10)                      -.0714516 (N=62)                     .0135484                      0.1070               
Agriculture                -.1220667 (N=15)                     -.0605088 (N=57)                     .0615579                            0.5724                   
Appropriations                -.0321875 (N=16)                    -.0850893 (N=56)                    -.0529018                          -0.5033               
Civil Law                -.55825 (N=4)                   -.0448088 (N=68)                     .5134412                       2.8366***    
Commerce                -.0198333 (N=12)                    -.0840333 (N=60)                    -.0642                      -0.5477               
Education                -.0207 (N=10)                    -.0818226 (N=62)                     -.0611226                    -0.4836               
Environment                -.1134444 (N=9)                    -.0676032 (N=63)                     .0458413                     0.3466                    
Health and Welfare                -.0603846 (N=13)                    -.0761864 (N=59)                   -.0158018                    -0.1389                       
Government Affairs                 .1568571 (N=7)                    -.0981231 (N=65)                    -.2549802                 -1.7634                
Insurance                -.2245556 (N=9)                -.0517302 (N=63)                     .1728254                     1.3217                      
Judiciary                -.1426667 (N=9)                   -.0634286 (N=63)                     .0792381                 0.6001                     
Labor                 .1167143 (N=7)                    -.0938 (N=65)                -.2105143                    -1.4457                     
Municipal                 .0102857 (N=7)                    -.0823385 (N=65)                    -.0926242                    -0.6286                  
Natural Resources                -.2736667 (N=12)                    -.0332667 (N=60)                      .2404                     2.1105**                  
Retirement                -.1314286 (N=7)                -.0670769 (N=65)                     .0643517                      0.4361               
Transportation                -.027375 (N=8)                    -.0790781 (N=64)                    -.0517031                    -0.3715                   
Ways and Means                -.0185556 (N=18)                    -.0915926 (N=54)                    -.073037                    -0.7251                        
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.90 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal score and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                -.0372 (N=10)                    -.205 (N=61)                    -.1678                           -1.1880               
Agriculture                -.1683571 (N=14)                    -.1845614 (N=57)                    -.0162043                       -0.1299                     
Appropriations                -.0739375 (N=16)                   -.2126182 (N=55)                    -.1386807                       -1.1791                          
Civil Law                -.327 (N=5)                    -.1703333 (N=66)                     .1566667                     0.8114                     
Commerce                -.3156364 (N=11)                       -.15675 (N=60)                     .1588864                        1.1697          
Education                -.3227778 (N=9)                 -.1608387 (N=62)                     .1619391                        1.0948                     
Environment                 .0395556 (N=9)                -.2134355 (N=62)                    -.252991                    -1.7323                        
Health and Welfare                -.1835 (N=12)                    -.1809322 (N=59)                     .0025678                       0.0194                       
Government Affairs                -.0277143 (N=7)                     -.1981719 (N=64)                     -.1704576                     -1.0316               
Insurance                -.2362222 (N=9)                      -.1734032 (N=62)                      .062819                         0.4216                    
Judiciary                -.0772222 (N=9)                    -.1964839 (N=62)                      -.1192616                          -0.8031                      
Labor                -.0857143 (N=7)                    -.1918281 (N=64)                      -.1061138                      -0.6392                       
Municipal                -.4801429 (N=7)                    -.1486875 (N=64)                 .3314554                        2.0505**                    
Natural Resources                -.2293846 (N=13)                    -.1706034 (N=58)                     .0587812                          0.4587                    
Retirement                -.3371429 (N=7)                        -.1643281 (N=64)                     .1728147                           1.0461                    
Transportation                -.40225 (N=8)                     -.1533175 (N=63)                       .2489325                     1.6155                    
Ways and Means                -.2524706 (N=17)                       -.1589815 (N=54)                    .0934891                     0.8076                     
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.91 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2004 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.1304 (N=9) -.1266 (N=60) .0039 .0236 
Agriculture .1201 (N=14) -.1900 (N=55) -.3100 -2.3275** 
Appropriations -.1915 (N=17) -.106 (N=52) .0855 .6635 
Civil Law -.1032 (N=6) -.1293 (N=63) -.0262 -.1324 
Commerce .0306 (N=9) -.1507 (N=60) -.1813 -1.1060 
Education -.073 (N=7) -.1332 (N=62) -.0602 -.3264 
Environment -.073 (N=7) -.1332 (N=62) -.0602 -.3264 
Health and Welfare -.2899 (N=13) -.0893 (N=56) .2007 1.4303 
Government Affairs -.577 (N=6) -.0842 (N=63) .4928 2.6176** 
Insurance .0966 (N=10) -.1650 (N=59) -.2616 -1.6881* 
Judiciary -.1321 (N=11) -.1261 (N=58) .0060 .0394 
Labor -.1595 (N=6) -.1240 (N=63) .0355 .1798 
Municipal -.6141 (N=8) -.0632 (N=61) .5509 3.4347*** 
Natural Resources .0107 (N=11) -.1532 (N=58) -.1639 -1.0869 
Retirement -.0282 (N=5) -.1348 (N=64) -.1066 -.4971 
Transportation .0962 (N=5) -.1445 (N=64) -.2407 -1.1311 
Ways and Means -.2847 (N=18) -.0714 (N=51) .2133 1.7185* 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.92 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2005 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.4423 (N=12) -.3448 (N=57) .0974 .9393 
Agriculture -.1599 (N=12) -.4043 (N=57) -.2444 -2.4432** 
Appropriations -.3709 (N=17) -.3588 (N=52) .0121 .1315 
Civil Law -.2156 (N=7) -.3783 (N=62) -.1627 -1.2563 
Commerce -.3908 (N=9) -.3574 (N=60) .0333 .2840 
Education -.2249 (N=7) -.3772 (N=62) -.1524 -1.1748 
Environment -.1922 (N=6) -.3779 (N=63) -.1858 -1.3407 
Health and Welfare -.4148 (N=12) -.3506 (N=57) .0641 .6160 
Government Affairs -.6126 (N=5) -.3422 (N=64) .2704 1.8150* 
Insurance -.2457 (N=9) -.3792 (N=60) -.1335 -1.1478 
Judiciary -.3166 (N=11) -.3703 (N=58) -.0537 -.4979 
Labor -.3713 (N=7) -.3607 (N=62) .0106 .0807 
Municipal -.5688 (N=8) -.3346 (N=61) .2341 1.9474* 
Natural Resources -.281 (N=10) -.3755 (N=59) -.0945 -.8451 
Retirement -.3513 (N=4) -.3624 (N=65) -.0112 -.0660 
Transportation -.107 (N=6) -.3860 (N=63) -.2790 -2.0487* 
Ways and Means -.5054 (N=18) -.3111 (N=51) .1943 2.2354** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.93 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal W scores 
and membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2006 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.314 (N=10) -.3677 (N=59) -.0537 -.4987 
Agriculture -.1473 (N=12) -.4047 (N=57) -.2574 -2.7044** 
Appropriations -.3534 (N=16) -.3619 (N=53) -.0085 -.0948 
Civil Law -.3362 (N=6) -.3622 (N=63) -.0260 -.1931 
Commerce -.3903 (N=8) -.3560 (N=61) .0343 .2893 
Education -.3289 (N=9) -.3646 (N=60) -.0357 -.3167 
Environment -.1861 (N=7) -.3795 (N=62) -.1934 -1.5650 
Health and Welfare -.2877 (N=10) -.3722 (N=59) -.0845 -.7864 
Government Affairs -.6535 (N=6) -.3320 (N=63) .3215 2.4932** 
Insurance -.3453 (N=9) -.3621 (N=60) -.0168 -.1488 
Judiciary -.4656 (N=10) -.3420 (N=59) .1236 1.1566 
Labor -.4233 (N=7) -.3528 (N=62) .0705 .5617 
Municipal -.6193 (N=8) -.3259 (N=61) .2933 2.5933** 
Natural Resources -.2862 (N=9) -.3710 (N=60) -.0848 -.7547 
Retirement -.4558 (N=4) -.3540 (N=65) .1017 .6276 
Transportation -.1757 (N=6) -.3775 (N=63) -.2018 -1.5226 
Ways and Means -.4506 (N=17) -.3303 (N=52) .1204 1.3849 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.94 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal scores and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2007 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.4331 (N=10) -.4486 (N=58) -.0155 -.1447 
Agriculture -.3154 (N=12) -.4744 (N=56) -.1589 -1.6305 
Appropriations -.4227 (N=17) -.4542 (N=51) -.0315 -.3599 
Civil Law -.3477 (N=6) -.4559 (N=62) -.1082 -.8136 
Commerce -.4883 (N=7) -.4415 (N=61) .0468 .3756 
Education -.471 (N=9) -.4425 (N=59) .0285 .2546 
Environment -.3323 (N=6) -.4573 (N=62) -.1250 -.9417 
Health and Welfare -.4323 (N=10) -.4487 (N=58) -.0164 -.1535 
Government Affairs -.6302 (N=6) -.4285 (N=62) .2017 1.5357 
Insurance -.3018 (N=9) -.4684 (N=59) -.1666 -1.5150 
Judiciary -.5017 (N=10) -.4368 (N=58) .0649 .6085 
Labor -.5019 (N=7) -.4399 (N=61) .0619 .4974 
Municipal -.6959 (N=8) -.4130 (N=60) .2828 2.5170** 
Natural Resources -.4133 (N=9) -.4513 (N=59) -.0380 -.3401 
Retirement -.509 (N=4) -.4424 (N=64) .0666 .4140 
Transportation -.3242 (N=6) -.4581 (N=62) -.1340 -1.0102 
Ways and Means -.5052 (N=18) -.4251 (N=50) .0800 .9379 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.95 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from Poole and Rosenthal scores and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2008 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice -.3912 (N=6) -.2997 (N=46) .0914 .4950 
Agriculture -.1024 (N=11) -.3660 (N=41) -.2637 -1.8834* 
Appropriations -.2503 (N=11) -.3264 (N=41) -.0761 -.5266 
Civil Law -.1496 (N=7) -.3353 (N=45) -.1857 -1.0836 
Commerce -.4604 (N=11) -.27 (N=41) .1904 1.3372 
Education -.3655 (N=11) -.2955 (N=41) .0700 .4842 
Environment -.1559 (N=8) -.3383 (N=44) -.1825 -1.1266 
Health and Welfare -.1465 (N=10) -.3493 (N=42) -.2028 -1.3758 
Government Affairs -.3758 (N=8) -.2984 (N=44) .0774 .4729 
Insurance -.5383 (N=4) -.2913 (N=48) .2470 1.1263 
Judiciary -.5063 (N=9) -.2692 (N=43) .2371 1.5520 
Labor -.6715 (N=4) -.2802 (N=48) .3913 1.8197* 
Municipal -.3577 (N=13) -.2945 (N=39) .0632 .4637 
Natural Resources -.1559 (N=8) -.3383 (N=44) -.1825 -1.1266 
Retirement -.311 (N=4) -.3102 (N=48) .0008 .0036 
Transportation -.3058 (N=12) -.3116 (N=40) -.0059 -.0418 
Ways and Means -.3049 (N=9) -.3114 (N=43) -.0065 -.0416 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.96 Difference of Medians for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
  1999 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=8)                48% (N=64)             .0069                .934 
Agriculture                50% (N=14)                48% (N=58)             .0134                .908 
Appropriations                67% (N=15)                44% (N=57)           2.4727                .116 
Civil Law                33% (N=6)                50% (N=66)             .6116                .434 
Commerce                45% (N=11)                49% (N=61)             .0518                .820 
Education                55% (N=11)                48% (N=61)             .1830                .669 
Environment                63% (N=8)                47% (N=64)             .6950                .404 
Health and Welfare                38% (N=16)                52% (N=56)           1.0167                .313  
Government Affairs                40% (N=5)                49% (N=67)             .1595                .690 
Insurance                43% (N=7)                49% (N=65)             .1028                .749 
Judiciary                57% (N=7)                48% (N=65)             .2259                .635 
Labor                40% (N=10)                50% (N=62)             .3447                .557 
Municipal                44% (N=9)                49% (N=63)             .0715                .789 
Natural Resources                67% (N=15)                44% (N=57)           2.4727                .116 
Retirement                60% (N=5)                48% (N=67)             .2790                 .597 
Transportation                30% (N=10)                52% (N=62)           1.6102                .204 
Ways and Means                35% (N=17)                53% (N=55)           1.5799                .209 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.97 Difference of Medians for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                45% (N=11)                40% (N=63)                0.1294                   0.719 
Agriculture                7% (N=15)                49% (N=59)                8.9555                    0.003*** 
Appropriations                47% (N=15)                39% (N=59)                0.2929                   0.588    
Civil Law                50% (N=6)                40% (N=68)                0.2424                   0.622  
Commerce                50% (N=14)                38% (N=60)                0.6410                   0.423 
Education                44% (N=9)                40% (N=65)                0.0648                   0.799 
Environment                50% (N=8)                39% (N=66)                0.3330                   0.564   
Health and Welfare                38% (N=13)                41% (N=61)                0.0283                   0.866 
Government Affairs                57% (N=7)                39% (N=67)                0.8841                   0.347 
Insurance                56% (N=9)                38% (N=65)                0.9583                       0.328 
Judiciary                45% (N=11)                40% (N=63)                0.1294                   0.719       
Labor                38% (N=8)                41% (N=66)                0.0344                              0.853 
Municipal                33% (N=9)                42% (N=65)                0.2208                      0.638 
Natural Resources                 31% (N=13)                43% (N=61)                0.6247                                0.429          
Retirement                80% (N=5)                38% (N=69)                3.4637                   0.063*        
Transportation                13% (N=8)                44% (N=66)                2.9258                   0.087*     
Ways and Means                37% (N=19)                42% (N=55)                0.1451                   0.703         
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.98 Difference of Medians for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                70% (N=10)                47% (N=62)                1.8581                       0.173 
Agriculture                60% (N=15)                47% (N=57)                0.7579                     0.384     
Appropriations                69% (N=16)                45% (N=56)                2.8929                   0.089*   
Civil Law                60% (N=5)                49% (N=67)                0.2149                     0.643 
Commerce                46% (N=13)                51% (N=59)                0.0939                     0.759     
Education                44% (N=9)                51% (N=63)                0.1270                        0.722 
Environment                63% (N=8)                48% (N=64)                0.5625                   0.453   
Health and Welfare                38% (N=13)                53% (N=59)                0.8449                   0.358        
Government Affairs                0 % (N=7)                55% (N=65)                7.7538                           0.005***          
Insurance                75% (N=8)                47% (N=64)                2.2500                   0.134       
Judiciary                55% (N=11)                49% (N=61)                0.1073                           0.743        
Labor                25% (N=8)                53% (N=64)                2.2500                     0.134          
Municipal                17% (N=6)                53% (N=66)                2.9091                            0.088*    
Natural Resources                50% (N=12)                50% (N=60)                0.0000                   1.000     
Retirement                67% (N=6)                48% (N=66)                0.7273                   0.394      
Transportation                14% (N=7)                54% (N=65)                3.9560                        0.047**    
Ways and Means                39% (N=18)                54% (N=54)                1.1852                    0.276 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.99 Difference of Medians for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                70% (N=10)                46% (N=61)                1.9961                    0.158 
Agriculture                53% (N=15)                48% (N=56)                0.1240                   0.725    
Appropriations                69% (N=16)                44% (N=55)                3.1274                       0.077* 
Civil Law                50% (N=4)                49% (N=67)                0.0008                   0.977 
Commerce                42% (N=12)                51% (N=59)                0.3363                   0.562   
Education                44% (N=9)                50% (N=62)                0.0970                      0.755 
Environment                63% (N=8)                48% (N=63)                0.6289                   0.428  
Health and Welfare                38% (N=13)                52% (N=58)                0.7473                   0.387 
Government Affairs                0% (N=7)                55% (N=64)                7.5499                   0.006***     
Insurance                67% (N=9)                47% (N=62)                1.2442                   0.265 
Judiciary                56% (N=9)                48% (N=62)                0.1616                   0.688     
Labor                14% (N=7)                53% (N=64)                3.8081                   0.051* 
Municipal                17% (N=6)                52% (N=65)                2.7916                0.095* 
Natural Resources                58% (N=12)                47% (N=59)                0.4719                   0.492      
Retirement                57% (N=7)                48% (N=64)                0.1913                   0.662 
Transportation                25% (N=8)                52% (N=63)                2.1292                   0.145 
Ways and Means                44% (N=18)                51% (N=53)                0.2271                   0.634 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.100 Difference of Medians for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created LABI Scores and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=10)                41% (N=61)                0.2863                0.593 
Agriculture                36% (N=14)                44% (N=57)                0.3056                0.580 
Appropriations                44% (N=16)                42% (N=55)                0.0190                0.890 
Civil Law                60% (N=5)                41% (N=66)                0.6943                0.405 
Commerce                36% (N=11)                43% (N=60)                0.1851                0.667 
Education                33% (N=9)                44% (N=62)                0.3361                0.562 
Environment                33% (N=9)                44% (N=62)                0.3361                0.562 
Health and Welfare                42% (N=12)                42% (N=59)                0.0020                0.964 
Government Affairs                29% (N=7)                44% (N=64)                0.5958                0.440 
Insurance                56% (N=9)                40% (N=62)                 0.7474                0.387 
Judiciary                33% (N=9)                44% (N=62)                0.3361                0.562 
Labor                43% (N=7)                42% (N=64)                0.0012                0.973 
Municipal                43% (N=7)                42% (N=64)                0.0012                0.973 
Natural Resources                54% (N=13)                40% (N=58)                0.8765                0.349 
Retirement                57% (N=7)                41% (N=64)                0.7056                0.401 
Transportation                25% (N=8)                44% (N=63)                1.1000                0.294 
Ways and Means                47% (N=17)                41% (N=54)                0.2115                0.646 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.101 Difference of Medians for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2004 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                44% (N=9)                49% (N=59)             .0693                .792 
Agriculture                77% (N=13)                42% (N=55)           5.1876                .023** 
Appropriations                56% (N=16)                46% (N=52)             .4993                .480 
Civil Law                33% (N=6)                50% (N=62)             .6084                .435 
Commerce                56% (N=9)                47% (N=59)             .2050                .651 
Education                67% (N=6)                47% (N=62)             .8667                .352 
Environment                67% (N=6)                47% (N=62)             .8667                .352 
Health and Welfare                46% (N=13)                49% (N=55)             .0363                .849 
Government Affairs                17% (N=6)                52% (N=62)           2.6747                 .102 
Insurance                50% (N=10)                48% (N=58)             .0102                .920 
Judiciary                36% (N=11)                51% (N=57)             .7776                .378  
Labor                50% (N=6)                48% (N=62)             .0057                .940 
Municipal                25% (N=8)                52% (N=60)           2.0096                .156 
Natural Resources                64% (N=11)                46% (N=57)           1.1990                .274 
Retirement                80% (N=5)                46% (N=63)           2.1399                .144 
Transportation                80% (N=5)                46% (N=63)           2.1399                .144 
Ways and Means                39% (N=18)                52% (N=50)             .9109                .340 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.102 Difference of Medians for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2005 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=12)                47% (N=57)             .0275                .868 
Agriculture                75% (N=12)                42% (N=57)           4.2987                .038** 
Appropriations                47% (N=17)                48% (N=52)             .0053                .942 
Civil Law                57% (N=7)                47% (N=62)             .2710                .603  
Commerce                67% (N=9)                45% (N=60)           1.4723                .225 
Education                71% (N=7)                45% (N=62)           1.7392                .187 
Environment                50% (N=6)                48% (N=63)             .0124                .911 
Health and Welfare                33% (N=12)                51% (N=57)           1.2228                .269 
Government Affairs                20% (N=5)                50% (N=64)           1.6727                .196 
Insurance                44% (N=9)                48% (N=60)             .0474                .828 
Judiciary                27% (N=11)                52% (N=58)           2.2154                .137 
Labor                43% (N=7)                48% (N=62)             .0771                .781 
Municipal                25% (N=8)                51% (N=61)           1.8895                .169 
Natural Resources                70% (N=10)                44% (N=59)           2.3044                .129 
Retirement                50% (N=4)                48% (N=65)             .0080                .929 
Transportation                67% (N=6)                46% (N=63)             .9348                .334 
Ways and Means                28% (N=18)                55% (N=51)           3.9227                .048** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.103 Difference of Medians for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2006 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                50% (N=10)                49% (N=59)             .0025                .960 
Agriculture                75% (N=12)                44% (N=57)           3.8460                .050* 
Appropriations                56% (N=16)                47% (N=53)             .4054                .524 
Civil Law                50% (N=6)                49% (N=63)             .0014                .970 
Commerce                38% (N=8)                51% (N=61)             .5020                .479 
Education                44% (N=9)                50% (N=60)             .0966                .756 
Environment                43% (N=7)                50% (N=62)             .1284                .720 
Health and Welfare                70% (N=10)                46% (N=59)           2.0097                .156 
Government Affairs                17% (N=6)                52% (N=63)           2.7956                 .095* 
Insurance                56% (N=9)                48% (N=60)             .1633                .686 
Judiciary                30% (N=10)                53% (N=59)           1.7384                .187 
Labor                14% (N=7)                53% (N=62)           3.8158                .051* 
Municipal                13% (N=8)                54% (N=61)           4.8964                .027** 
Natural Resources                44% (N=9)                50% (N=60)             .0966                .756 
Retirement                25% (N=4)                51% (N=65)           1.0011                .317 
Transportation                83% (N=6)                46% (N=63)           3.0496                .081* 
Ways and Means                41% (N=17)                52% (N=52)             .5920                .442 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.104 Difference of Medians for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2007 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                40% (N=10)                48% (N=58)             .2345                .628 
Agriculture                50% (N=12)                46% (N=56)             .0506                .822 
Appropriations                29% (N=17)                53% (N=51)           2.8333                .092* 
Civil Law                50% (N=6)                47% (N=62)             .0228                .880 
Commerce                43% (N=7)                48% (N=61)             .0553                .814 
Education                56% (N=9)                46% (N=59)             .3006                .584 
Environment                50% (N=6)                47% (N=62)             .0228                .880 
Health and Welfare                50% (N=10)                47% (N=58)             .0407                .840 
Government Affairs                33% (N=6)                48% (N=62)             .4976                .481 
Insurance                56% (N=9)                46% (N=59)             .3006                .584 
Judiciary                30% (N=10)                50% (N=58)           1.3694                .242 
Labor                43% (N=7)                48% (N=61)             .0553                .814 
Municipal                13% (N=8)                52% (N=60)           4.3464                .037** 
Natural Resources                56% (N=9)                46% (N=59)             .3006                .584 
Retirement                25% (N=4)                48% (N=64)             .8301                .362 
Transportation                83% (N=6)                44% (N=62)           3.4757                .062* 
Ways and Means                44% (N=18)                48% (N=50)             .0672                .796 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.105 Difference of Medians for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and 
membership on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2008 
Louisiana House Standing Committee % Committee members above 
median 
% Non-committee members 
above median 
Chi-square for 
Median Difference 
Prob-value 
 
Administration of Criminal Justice                33% (N=6)                41% (N=46)             .1401                .708 
Agriculture                45% (N=11)                39% (N=41)             .1490                .700  
Appropriations                45% (N=11)                39% (N=41)             .1490                .700 
Civil Law                57% (N=7)                38% (N=45)             .9436                .331 
Commerce                45% (N=11)                39% (N=41)             .1490                .700 
Education                45% (N=11)                39% (N=41)             .1490                .700 
Environment                50% (N=8)                39% (N=44)             .3631                .547 
Health and Welfare                50% (N=10)                38% (N=42)             .4755                .490 
Government Affairs                38% (N=8)                41% (N=44)             .0327                .857 
Insurance                25% (N=4)                42% (N=48)             .4260                .514 
Judiciary                44% (N=9)                40% (N=43)             .0745                .785 
Labor                25% (N=4)                42% (N=48)             .4260                .514 
Municipal                38% (N=13)                41% (N=39)             .0266                .870 
Natural Resources                50% (N=8)                39% (N=44)             .3631                .547 
Retirement                25% (N=4)                42% (N=48)             .4260                .514 
Transportation                25% (N=12)                45% (N=40)           1.5336                .216 
Ways and Means                44% (N=9)                40% (N=43)             .0745                .785 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
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Table A.106 Difference of Means for the 1999 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
1999 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 42.875 (N=8) 49.9219 (N=64) 7.0469 .6006 
Agriculture 48.2857 (N=14) 49.3448 (N=58) 1.0591 .1134 
Appropriations 57.4 (N=15) 46.9649 (N=57) -10.4351 -1.1573 
Civil Law 37.5 (N=6) 50.1970 (N=66) 12.6970 .9555 
Commerce 48.0910 (N=11) 49.3279 (N=61) 1.2370 .1204 
Education 51.8182 (N=11) 48.6557 (N=61) -3.1624 -.3080 
Environment 54.625 (N=8) 48.4531 (N=64) -6.1719 -.5257 
Health and Welfare 44.4375 (N=16) 50.4821 (N=56) 6.0446 .6821 
Government Affairs 39.2 (N=5) 49.8806 (N=67) 10.6806 .7373 
Insurance 42 (N=7) 49.9077 (N=65) 7.9077 .6356 
Judiciary 49 (N=7) 49.1539 (N=65) .1538 .0123 
Labor 39.1 (N=10) 50.7581 (N=62) 11.6581 1.1000 
Municipal 47.7778 (N=9) 49.3333 (N=63) 1.5556 .1392 
Natural Resources 63.6667 (N=15) 45.3158 (N=57) -18.3509 -2.0772** 
Retirement 56.4 (N=5) 48.5970 (N=67) -7.8030 -.5377 
Transportation 41.2 (N=10) 50.4194 (N=62) 9.2194 .8671 
Ways and Means 41.2353 (N=17) 51.5818 (N=55) 10.3465 1.2008 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.107 Difference of Means for the 2000 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2000 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                38.36364 (N=11)                    32.33333 (N=63)                       -6.030303                     -0 .6952                      
Agriculture                22.26667 (N=15)                    36.01695 (N=59)                     13.75028                      1.8263                  
Appropriations                33.8 (N=15)                      33.08475 (N=59)                    -.7152542                     -0.0929                
Civil Law                51.66667 (N=6)                    31.60294 (N=68)                   -20.06373                    -1.8086                   
Commerce                37.57143 (N=14)                     32.21667 (N=60)                    -5.354762                    -0.6796                 
Education                29.11111 (N=9)                    33.8 (N=65)                      4.688889                      0.4958                 
Environment                41.75 (N=8)                    32.19697 (N=66)                    -9.55303                     -0.9643                  
Health and Welfare                33 (N=13)                33.27869 (N=61)                      .2786885                    0.0343                     
Government Affairs                33.71429 (N=7)                    33.1791 (N=67)                          -.5351812                     -0.0506                  
Insurance                36.66667 (N=9)                    32.75385 (N=65)                     -3.912821                       -0.4136                  
Judiciary                38.63636 (N=11)                     32.28571 (N=63)                     -6.350649                    -0.7324                          
Labor                30.5 (N=8)                     33.56061 (N=66)                        3.060606                     0.3072                    
Municipal                23.88889 (N=9)                    34.52308 (N=65)                     10.63419                       1.1326                         
Natural Resources                43.92308 (N=13)                    30.95082 (N=61)                     -12.97226                     -1.6234                 
Retirement                57.8 (N=5)                   31.44928 (N=69)                    -26.35072                           -2.2074**                    
Transportation                18.625 (N=8)                    35 (N=66)                 16.375                     1.6740               
Ways and Means                27.52632 (N=19)                    35.2 (N=55)                      7.673684                     1.0916                   
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.108 Difference of Means for the 2001 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2001 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                54.7 (N=10)                     48.80645 (N=62)                          -5.893548                      -0.6140               
Agriculture                57.4 (N=15)                    47.57895 (N=57)                     -9.821053                        -1.2107                      
Appropriations                60.875 (N=16)                    46.41071 (N=56)                    -14.46429                    -1.8502                     
Civil Law                55.2 (N=5)                   49.20896 (N=67)                    -5.991045                     -0.4582                     
Commerce                44.38462 (N=13)                    50.77966 (N=59)                      6.395046                  0.7419                          
Education                45.88889 (N=9)                    50.15873 (N=63)                      4.269841                     0.4248               
Environment                60.375 (N=8)                    48.28125 (N=64)                      -12.09375                    -1.1526               
Health and Welfare                46.30769 (N=13)                    50.35593 (N=59)                      4.04824                     0.4685                  
Government Affairs                27.28571 (N=7)                52.03077 (N=65)                     24.74505                         2.2829**                        
Insurance                60 (N=8)                    48.32813 (N=64)                    -11.67188                    -1.1117                
Judiciary                51.54545 (N=11)                    49.27869 (N=61)                       -2.266766                    -0.2451              
Labor                33.875 (N=8)                    51.59375 (N=64)                    17.71875                      1.7074                    
Municipal                34.33333 (N=6)                    51.01515 (N=66)                     16.68182                     1.4045                  
Natural Resources                52.25 (N=12)                    49.1 (N=60)                     -3.15                    -0.3530                 
Retirement                58 (N=6)                48.86364 (N=66)                     -9.136364                     -0.7618                   
Transportation                31.28571 (N=7)                    51.6 (N=65)                      20.31429                            1.8518               
Ways and Means                42.83333 (N=18)                    51.88889 (N=54)                      9.055556                     1.1899               
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.109 Difference of Means for the 2002 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2002 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                56.4 (N=10)                    49.03279 (N=61)                     -7.367213                    -0.7890               
Agriculture                55.73333 (N=15)                    48.55357 (N=56)                     -7.179762                    -0.9036                
Appropriations                60.125 (N=16)                    47.14545 (N=55)                    -12.97955                    -1.6964               
Civil Law                54.25 (N=4)                    49.8209 (N=67)                     -4.429104                     -0.3132               
Commerce                48.33333 (N=12)                    50.42373 (N=59)                      2.090395                           0.2402               
Education                44.77778 (N=9)                    50.83871 (N=62)                      6.060932                     0.6198               
Environment                55.375 (N=8)                   49.39683 (N=63)                     -5.978175                    -0.5808               
Health and Welfare                45.38462 (N=13)                    51.12069 (N=58)                      5.736074                         0.6822               
Government Affairs                26.42857 (N=7)                    52.65625 (N=64)                     26.22768                     2.5028**               
 Insurance                56.55556 (N=9)                    49.12903 (N=62)                     -7.426523                      -0.7605                  
Judiciary                54.22222 (N=9)                    49.46774 (N=62)                     -4.75448                     -0.4857               
Labor                27.42857 (N=7)                    52.54688 (N=64)                     25.1183                      2.3880**              
Municipal                33.33333 (N=6)                    51.61538 (N=65)                     18.28205                      1.5867                 
Natural Resources                60.08333 (N=12)                    48.0339 (N=59)                    -12.04944                     -1.4037               
Retirement                64.42857 (N=7)                    48.5 (N=64)                    -15.92857                     -1.4783               
Transportation                42.75 (N=8)                     51 (N=63)                      8.25                      0.8033               
Ways and Means                40.88889 (N=18)                    53.18868 (N=53)                     12.29979                      1.6729               
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.110 Difference of Means for the 2003 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI and membership on 
Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2003 
Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice                63.9 (N=10)                60.06557 (N=61)                    -3.834426                    -0.5790               
Agriculture                62.92857 (N=14)                60.03509 (N=57)                    -2.893484                     -0.4994                    
Appropriations                56.6875 (N=16)                61.74545 (N=55)                     5.057955                      0.9207               
Civil Law                68.4 (N=5)                60.01515 (N=66)                    -8.384848                    -0.9349               
Commerce                64.54545 (N=11)                59.88333 (N=60)                    -4.662121                       -0.7333                 
Education                55.55556 (N=9)                61.33871 (N=62)                     5.783154                      0.8374               
Environment                62.88889 (N=9)                60.27419 (N=62)                    -2.614695                    -0.3771               
Health and Welfare                58.66667 (N=12)                61 (N=59)                 2.333333                       0.3791                   
Government Affairs                49 (N=7)                61.875 (N=64)                     12.875                      1.6964                    
Insurance                66.11111 (N=9)                59.80645 (N=62)                -6.304659                       -0.9138                 
Judiciary                57.22222 (N=9)                61.09677 (N=62)                      3.874552                      0.5595               
Labor                51.28571 (N=7)                61.625 (N=64)                    10.33929                     1.3523               
Municipal                58 (N=7)                60.89063 (N=64)                     2.890625                     0.3735               
Natural Resources                64.15385 (N=13)                59.81034 (N=58)                     -4.343501                    -0.7302                 
Retirement                61.57143 (N=7)                60.5 (N=64)                    -1.071429                       -0.1383               
Transportation                50.125 (N=8)                61.93651 (N=63)                    11.81151                     1.6488               
Ways and Means                61.47059 (N=17)                60.33333 (N=54)                    -1.137255                    -0.2102                
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01          
 
Table obtained from Sandahl (2005) 
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Table A.111 Difference of Means for the 2004 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2004 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 65.1111 (N=9) 65.1695 (N=59) .0584 .0096 
Agriculture 75.7692 (N=13) 62.6546 (N=55) -13.1147 -2.6188** 
Appropriations 62.4375 (N=16) 66 (N=52) 3.5625 .73333 
Civil Law 68.5 (N=6) 64.8387 (N=62) -3.6613 -.5029 
Commerce 65 (N=9) 65.1864 (N=59) .1864 .0305 
Education 76.6667 (N=6) 64.0484 (N=62) -12.6183 -1.7704* 
Environment 76.6667 (N=6) 64.0484 (N=62) -12.6183 -1.7704* 
Health and Welfare 57.6154 (N=13) 66.9455 (N=55) 9.3301 1.8170* 
Government Affairs 53.1667 (N=6) 66.3226 (N=62) 13.1559 1.8496* 
Insurance 69.7 (N=10) 64.3793 (N=58) -5.3207 -.9165 
Judiciary 63.8182 (N=11) 65.4211 (N=57) 1.6029 .2854 
Labor 62.8333 (N=6) 65.3871 (N=62) 2.5538 .3504 
Municipal 51.75 (N=8) 66.95 (N=60) 15.2 2.4742** 
Natural Resources 70.6364 (N=11) 64.1053 (N=57) -6.5311 -1.1744 
Retirement 68.4 (N=5) 64.9048 (N=63) -3.4952 -.4416 
Transportation 82.8 (N=5) 63.7619 (N=63) -19.0381 -2.5139** 
Ways and Means 60.6111 (N=18) 66.8 (N=50) 6.1889 1.3374 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.112 Difference of Means for the 2005 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2005 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 53.5833 (N=12) 57.8597 (N=57) 4.2763 .5767 
Agriculture 72.8333 (N=12) 53.8070 (N=57) -19.0263 -2.6946*** 
Appropriations 59.6471 (N=17) 56.2885 (N=52) -3.3586 -.5147 
Civil Law 64.8571 (N=7) 56.2419 (N=62) -8.6152 -.9291 
Commerce 59.3333 (N=9) 56.7833 (N=60) -2.55 -.3050 
Education 67.4286 (N=7) 55.9516 (N=62) -11.4770 -1.2440 
Environment 57.1667 (N=6) 57.1111 (N=63) -.0556 -.0056 
Health and Welfare 54.5 (N=12) 57.6667 (N=57) 3.1667 .4266 
Government Affairs 42 (N=5) 58.2969 (N=64) 16.2969 1.5253 
Insurance 58.8889 (N=9) 56.85 (N=60) -2.0389 -.2438 
Judiciary 49 (N=11) 58.6552 (N=58) 9.6552 1.2694 
Labor 55.2857 (N=7) 57.3226 (N=62) 2.0369 .2183 
Municipal 42.5 (N=8) 59.0328 (N=61) 16.5328 .0578* 
Natural Resources 70.5 (N=10) 54.8475 (N=59) -15.6525 -2.0139** 
Retirement 62.25 (N=4) 56.8 (N=65) -5.45 .6522 
Transportation 74.5 (N=6) 55.4603 (N=63) -19.0397 -1.9578* 
Ways and Means 46.2222 (N=18) 60.9608 (N=51) 14.7386 2.3931** 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.113 Difference of Means for the 2006 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2006 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 52.6 (N=10) 52.7288 (N=59) .1288 .0197 
Agriculture 62.5833 (N=12) 50.6316 (N=57) -11.9518 -2.0263* 
Appropriations 52.625 (N=16) 52.7359 (N=53) .1108 .0203 
Civil Law 49 (N=6) 53.0635 (N=63) 4.0635 .4981 
Commerce 51.5 (N=8) 52.8689 (N=61) 1.3689 .1903 
Education 50.5556 (N=9) 53.0333 (N=60) 2.4778 .3627 
Environment 57.2857 (N=7) 52.1936 (N=62) -5.0922 -.6698 
Health and Welfare 59.4 (N=10) 51.5763 (N=59) -7.8237 -1.2088 
Government Affairs 36.3333 (N=6) 54.2698 (N=63) 17.9365 2.2778** 
Insurance 57.7778 (N=9) 51.95 (N=60) -5.8278 -.8568 
Judiciary 49 (N=10) 53.3390 (N=59) 4.3390 .6654 
Labor 42.2857 (N=7) 53.8871 (N=62) 11.6014 1.5478 
Municipal 34.875 (N=8) 55.0492 (N=61) 20.1742 2.9851*** 
Natural Resources 56 (N=9) 52.2167 (N=60) -3.7833 -.5545 
Retirement 41 (N=4) 53.43077 (N=65) 12.4308 1.2765 
Transportation 69.6667 (N=6) 51.0952 (N=63) -18.5714 -2.3650** 
Ways and Means 48.2941 (N=17) 54.1539 (N=52) 5.8597 1.1063 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.114 Difference of Means for the 2007 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2007 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 44.6 (N=10) 46.7586 (N=58) 2.1586 .3235 
Agriculture 45.75 (N=12) 46.5893 (N=56) .8393 .1353 
Appropriations 41.1765 (N=17) 48.1961 (N=51) 7.0196 1.3015 
Civil Law 51 (N=6) 46 (N=62) -5 -.6012 
Commerce 43.2857 (N=7) 46.8033 (N=61) 3.5176 .4526 
Education 46.7778 (N=9) 46.3898 (N=59) -.3879 -.0556 
Environment 49.5 (N=6) 46.1452 (N=62) -3.3548 -.4028 
Health and Welfare 44.6 (N=10) 46.7586 (N=58) 2.1586 .3235 
Government Affairs 43.6667 (N=6) 46.7097 (N=62) 3.0430 .3653 
Insurance 53.7778 (N=9) 45.3220 (N=59) -8.4557 -1.2252 
Judiciary 39.1 (N=10) 47.7069 (N=58) 8.6069 1.3053 
Labor 42.2857 (N=7) 46.9180 (N=61) 4.6323 .5968 
Municipal 34.875 (N=8) 47.9833 (N=60) 13.1083 1.8304* 
Natural Resources 48.6667 (N=9) 46.1017 (N=59) -2.5650 -.3679 
Retirement 38 (N=4) 46.9688 (N=64) 8.9688 .8977 
Transportation 62.8333 (N=6) 44.8548 (N=62) -17.9785 -2.2362** 
Ways and Means 44.8333 (N=18) 47.02 (N=50) 2.1867 .4084 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Table A.115 Difference of Means for the 2008 Louisiana House of Representatives created from LABI scores and membership 
on Louisiana House standing committees to test the Major Party Cartel Theory 
 
2008 
 Louisiana House Standing Committee Committee member Non Committee member Mean 
Difference 
 
T 
Administration of Criminal Justice 57.8333 (N=6) 59.7174 (N=46) 1.8841 .3666 
Agriculture 59.6364 (N=11) 59.4634 (N=41) -.1729 -.0430 
Appropriations 58.5455 (N=11) 59.7561 (N=41) 1.2106 .3010 
Civil Law 63.5714 (N=7) 58.8667 (N=45) -4.7048 -.9862 
Commerce 57.9091 (N=11) 59.9268 (N=41) 2.0177 .5025 
Education 61.9091 (N=11) 58.8537 (N=41) -3.0554 -.7634 
Environment 60.5 (N=8) 59.3182 (N=44) -1.1818 -.2595 
Health and Welfare 63.6 (N=10) 58.5238 (N=42) -5.0762 -1.2353 
Government Affairs 58.25 (N=8) 59.7273 (N=44) 1.4772 .3246 
Insurance 57 (N=4) 59.7083 (N=48) 2.7083 .4398 
Judiciary 61.2222 (N=9) 59.1395 (N=43) -2.0827 -.4804 
Labor 57 (N=4) 59.7083 (N=48) 2.7083 .4398 
Municipal 60.3077 (N=13) 59.2308 (N=39) -1.0769 -.2839 
Natural Resources 60.5 (N=8) 59.3182 (N=44) -1.1818 -.2595 
Retirement 57.75 (N=4) 59.6458 (N=48) 1.8958 .3076 
Transportation 59.75 (N=12) 59.425 (N=40) -.325 -.0833 
Ways and Means 60.1111 (N=9) 59.3721 (N=43) -.7390 -.1701 
     
  *= p<.10     
 **= p<.05     
***=p<.01     
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Non-committee Members           Committee Members                     
 
Figure A.4.1 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means 
Committee, 1999 
 
 
Non-committee Members Committee Members 
 
Figure A.4.2 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means 
Committee, 2000 
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Non-committee Members                 Committee Members 
 
Figure A.4.3 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means 
Committee, 2004 
 
 
Non-committee Members       Committee Members 
  
Figure A.4.4 Distribution of W-nominate Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means 
Committee, 2008 
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Non-committee Member    Committee Member 
  
Figure A.4.5 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means Committee, 
1999 
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Figure A.4.6 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means 
Committee, 2000 
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Non-committee Member                    Committee Member 
 
Figure A.4.7 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means 
Committee, 2004 
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Figure A.4.8 Distribution of LABI Scores for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and Means 
Committee, 2008 
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    Non-committee members     Committee member 
  
Figure A.4.9 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Non-Members of the Louisiana House 
Agriculture Committee, 1999 
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Figure A.4.10 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House 
Agriculture Committee, 2000 
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  Non- Committee Member                       Committee Member 
 
 
Figure A.4.11 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House 
Agriculture Committee, 2004 
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Figure A.4.12 Distribution of Percent Employed in Farming for Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House 
Agriculture Committee, 2008 
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Non-Committee Member                        Committee Member 
  
Figure A.4.13 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House 
Agriculture Committee, 1999 
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Figure A.4.14 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Civil Law 
Committee, 1999 
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
0 1
D
e
n
si
ty
W-nominate
Graphs by approprdem
0
.5
1
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
0 1
D
e
n
s
it
y
W-nominate
Graphs by civillawdem
 308 
 
Non-committee Member                          Committee Member 
 
Figure A.4.15 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House 
Agriculture Committee, 1999 
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Figure A.4.16 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House 
Governmental Affairs Committee, 2004 
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Non-Committee Member      Committee Member 
 
Figure A.4.17 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Municipal 
Committee, 2004 
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Figure A.4.18 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana House Ways and 
Means Committee, 2004 
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Non-Committee Member                         Committee Member 
 
Figure A.4.19 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture 
Committee, 2004 
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Figure A.4.20 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Labor 
Committee, 2004 
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Non-Committee Member                     Committee Member 
 
Figure A.4.21 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Appropriations 
Committee, 2004 
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Figure A.4.22 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture 
Committee, 2008 
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Non-Committee Members                           Committee Members 
 
Figure A.4.23 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Appropriations 
Committee, 2008 
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Figure A.4.24 Distribution of W-nominate scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Retirement 
Committee, 2008 
  
0
.5
1
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
0 1
D
e
n
si
ty
W nominate
Graphs by approprdem
0
1
2
3
-1 -.5 0 .5 1 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
0 1
D
e
n
s
it
y
W nominate
Graphs by retirementdem
 313 
 
Non-Committee Members               Committee Members 
 
Figure A.4.25 Distribution of LABI scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 
1999  
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Figure A.4.26 Distribution of LABI scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 
2004  
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Non-Committee Member                          Committee Member 
 
 Figure A.4.27 Distribution of LABI scores for Democrat Members and Nonmembers of the Louisiana Agriculture Committee, 
2008 
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Figure A.4.28 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 1999 
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Democrat                                                                Republican 
 
 
Figure A.4.29 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 2000    
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Figure A.4.30 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 2004    
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Democrat                                                             Republican 
  
Figure A.4.31 Ideology scores for Democrat and Republican members of the Louisiana House of Representatives, 2008 
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APPENDIX B:  SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW INSTRUMENTS 
B.1 Consent Form for a Non-Clinical Study 
1. Study Title:  Testing the Informational, Distributive, and Major Party Cartel Theory in the 
1999-2008 Louisiana House of Representatives 
2. Performance Site: Louisiana House of Representatives, legislator or former legislator office, 
when legislators are not available for face to face interviews a mail survey will be conducted  
3. Investigators: The following investigators are available for questions about this study, 
           M-F, 8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m. 
           Trisha Sandahl 921-6048 
 
4. Purpose of the Study: The purpose of this research project is to add to current research on 
state legislative committee assignment  
 
5. Subject Inclusion: Former and present Louisiana House legislators or their staff, specifically 
interviewing senior legislators, Democrat and Republican legislators, committee chair, as 
well as legislators residing on different committees from each other 
 
6. Number of Subjects: 5-8 
 
7. Study Procedure: This study will verbally ask legislators a set of scripted questions 
concerning legislator committee assignment in the Louisiana House. Prior to verbal 
interviews a consent form plus questionnaire will be emailed to each participant to review 
over. For mail surveys a consent form, questionnaire, and paid postage will be provided.  
 
8. Benefits: This study will add to scholarly understanding of the assignment of legislators to 
committees in the Louisiana House. 
 
9. Risk: The only risk of this study is the inadvertent release of legislator answers to the 
questions presented in this study. However, every effort will be made to maintain the 
confidentiality of the study records. Files will be kept in a secure location in which only the 
investigator has access.  
 
10. Right to Refuse: Subjects may choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any 
time without penalty or loss of any benefit to which they might otherwise be entitled. 
 
11. Privacy: Results of this study may be published, but no names or identifying information will 
be included in the publication. Subject identity will remain confidential unless disclosure is 
required by law. 
  
12. Signature:  
 
This study has been discussed with me and all my questions have been answered. I may direct 
additional questions regarding study specifics to the investigators. If I have any questions about 
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the subjects’ rights or other concerns, I can contact Robert C. Mathews, Institutional Review 
Board, (225) 578-8692, irb@lsu.edu, www.lsu.edu/irb. I agree to participate in the study 
described above and acknowledge the investigator’s obligation to provide me with a signed copy 
of this consent from.  
Subject Signature: _______________________________________Date:________________ 
 
B.2 Questionnaire: 
Question 1: Do legislators generally get the assignments they request? If not, how are Louisiana 
committee assignments assigned (formally and informally)? 
 
Question 2: Why do you think legislators do or do not get the committee assignments they 
request? 
 
Question 3: Which Louisiana House committees are most sought after and why? Do these 
committees offer constituent benefits, policy benefits, or prestige benefits to a legislator? Which 
committees are less desirable and why? Are committee request more often granted on least 
sought after committees compared to more desirable committees? 
 
Question 4: When you entered the Louisiana House Legislature, what were your three top 
committee assignment requests? 
 
Question 5: In general what do you believe motivates Louisiana House legislators to request 
certain committee assignments? Does a legislator’s district ask them to join certain committees? 
What about their party? Lastly, do interest groups motivate individual legislators to join specific 
committees? 
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Question 6: Specifically speaking, what factors motivate your request for membership onto 
specific committees?  
 
Question 7: In general, what factors do you believe affect whether or not legislators receive the 
committee assignments they request? In your particular case, what factors do you believe affect 
or affected whether you receive or have received your requested committee assignments? 
 
Question 8: Could you tell me more about these factors, generally and specifically? 
 
Question 9: Speaking of these factors, what do you believe is the relative weight of each of these 
factors in determining whether legislators receive their committee request?  Are some of these 
factors more important than others?   
 
Question 10: In general, do you believe committee membership is reflective of the preferences of 
the chamber as a whole?  If not, what preferences do you believe committee membership 
reflects? Is it individual legislator district interests, party interests? 
 
Question 11: Generally speaking, during committee requests and assignments is there an 
emphasis on placing legislators which a particular viewpoint or area of expertise onto a specific 
committee? 
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She was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in April 1978, to Thomas and Patricia Sandahl.  
She is married to Clay Ourso and is the mother of two beautiful children named Brooke and 
Bennett.  She is a graduate of St. Jude Catholic Elementary School and St. Michael the 
Archangel Catholic High School.  After high school, she continued her catholic education by 
attending Spring Hill College in Mobile, Alabama.  She began college unsure of her academic 
path, until she took her very first political science class. She graduated from Spring Hill College 
in May 2000 with a Bachelor of Science of Political Science.  After college, her interest in the 
study of political science led her back home and to graduate school at Louisiana State University, 
where she completed her Master’s degree in political science with a concentration in American 
government in 2005.  She continued her education by completing her Doctorate of Philosophy in 
Political Science in 2012. 
 
